Zenith Grant Awardee

Christopher Fuchs

University of Massachusetts, Boston

Co-Investigators

Joseph Melia, University of Oxford; John B. DeBrota, University of Massachusetts, Boston

Project Title

Does Participatory Realism Make Sense? The Role of Observership in Quantum Theory

Project Summary

Since the advent of quantum information theory, there has been a small but growing resurgence of an idea as old as quantum mechanics itself. It is that observership is not something to be derived from the theory, but the very thing the theory is about in the first place. Far from advocating instrumentalism, however, many of the interpretive efforts in this direction intend to use quantum theory as an object lesson on how our (contingent, empirical) reality must be wired so that the centrality of observership is simply a consequence of this. That is, these quantum interpretations are forms of realism in their own way, but they have something about their metaphysics that is quite foreign to the usual concerns of the philosophy of science. The common denominator is that they strive for a worldview in which it is impossible to give a third-person description of the whole show, and as a consequence all eschew a “block universe” vision of reality. We propose to methodically dissect, classify, and correlate the further distinguishing features of these interpretations with the aim of making a conclusive statement on whether such a top-down “participatory realism” really makes sense.

Technical Abstract

Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, Wheeler, Zeilinger, Brukner, Ferrero, Barad, Rovelli, Fuchs, Mermin, Schack: The research programs of all these interpreters of quantum theory have something in common. It is that they take observership, in one form or another, as something not to be derived from quantum theory, but as the very thing the theory is about. Yet, far from varieties of instrumentalism or antirealism, one finds on a careful reading that each program strives to use quantum theory as an object lesson on how our (empirical) reality must be so wired that centrality of observership is the final outcome. That is, these are each forms of realism in their own way, but they have something about their metaphysics that is quite foreign to the usual concerns of philosophy of science. The common denominator is that they strive for a worldview in which it is impossible to give a third-person description of the whole show, and as a consequence all eschew a “block universe” vision of reality. We propose to methodically dissect, classify, and correlate the further distinguishing features of these interpretations with the aim of making a conclusive statement on whether such a top-down “participatory realism” really makes sense.