I wanted to add to my comments above..
It is common to assume with higher dimensions, that they are somewhere 'out there,' when the reality is that this notion only works up to a point (~5.25-d) and after that adding more dimensions makes the array smaller, or more compact - at least until we reach 24-d.
So rather than being something 'out there,' higher dimensions could be 'in here' instead. This actually corresponds to the fact that the algebras and spaces are first non-commutative, and later non-associative as well. So our common notions of size and distance, and then of interiority/exteriority, become invalid. This explains how the higher-d reality can be situated 'in here' rather than 'out there' "external to the universe."
Jonathan
Jonathan J. Dickau replied on Nov. 19, 2013 @ 05:39 GMT
I should add..
I agree precisely with your main point above Fred. While people have a hard time imagining a blank slate being a higher-dimensional space, it makes sense that having no rules would allow just that. And one can certainly assert that specific arrays of dimensions would appear as rules were formulated or instated. The sedenions set the stage, or engender the possibility for further evolution, and S15 has only one fibration, yielding O, H, C, and finally R.
So yeah; the Reals are in a way an end product of a process that began with the Octonions, or arguably before that.
Regards,
Jonathan
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Jonathan J. Dickau replied on Nov. 19, 2013 @ 05:41 GMT
Thanks Joy,
Glad to see you chime in, and your clarifications of course make sense of things.
Regards,
Jonathan
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Fred Diether replied on Nov. 19, 2013 @ 06:24 GMT
Yes, thanks Joy,
Since your great discovery of the origins of quantum correlations, we have to take very serious now the aspect of extra spatial dimensions over the 3 that we experience on a daily basis so what I am proposing makes logical sense to me based on the division algebras. Funny that we discovered them in basically reverse order of perhaps how they naturally happened. Of course that "happening" could have been very fast. :-) Maybe there is a clue in this somehow to make all of physics fit together.
Best,
Fred
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Rick Lockyer replied on Nov. 19, 2013 @ 06:44 GMT
FQXi has become a bit boring as of late with the same people saying the same things I find quite uninteresting, so I rarely take a look. Nice to see some discussion here on more interesting things.
Emergence as applied to physics is a bunch of poppycock. The only thing about physics that is emergent is understanding from ignorance, and it happens not with Nature but only between our ears. It is quite incorrect to say the reals emerge from a higher dimension algebra, especially when you say an algebra over the *field* of real numbers. For then you cannot define multiplication in the higher dimension algebra without a priori definition of multiplication over reals, in essence the algebra of real numbers.
What exactly is your point here anyway? What is gained by Nature did this, *then* it did that? I see no utility whatsoever.
Might take a look at the simulations. Perhaps it will answer my question of whether or not the algebraic operation of addition is performed between results generated from two distinct algebras, the distinction being orientation. This would be quite improper.
Rick
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Joy Christian replied on Nov. 19, 2013 @ 07:32 GMT
Hi Rick,
Thanks for your comments. Nowhere in my work is algebraic operation of addition performed between results generated from two distinct algebras. If you think otherwise, then you have been misled by those who don't understand the physics of the EPR-Bohm experiment. By now my model for the EPR-Bohm correlation has been verified by several highly competent physicists and mathematicians, as well as by at least four different computer simulations.
The point of my comment above, which is an elaboration on the earlier comment by Fred, is also physics. It does not imply that reals emerged from a higher-dimensional algebra.
Best,
Joy
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 19, 2013 @ 12:07 GMT
Hi Jonathan,
"One thing Ray Munroe insisted on that I agree with is that, geometrically speaking, both the minimal case and maximal or extremal cases must be considered as bounding conditions of reality, if we are to completely make sense of things."
This is one of the things in which I disagreed with Ray. A coordinate-free analytical framework without boundary conditions is...
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Hi Jonathan,
"One thing Ray Munroe insisted on that I agree with is that, geometrically speaking, both the minimal case and maximal or extremal cases must be considered as bounding conditions of reality, if we are to completely make sense of things."
This is one of the things in which I disagreed with Ray. A coordinate-free analytical framework without boundary conditions is indifferent to maxima and minima. "Finite and unbounded" is a perfect description of the space of general relativity; only when we reduce it to a measure space, are we compelled to have end points. Spacetime is not so constrained a priori.
Extra dimensions are mathematical artifacts -- string theorists, I think, are largely enchanted with the power that extra degrees of freedom impart to the calculating machinery.
Einstein, himself, though, was not opposed to using extra dimensions (Kaluza-Klein had convinced him of the utility of their argument) provided that "... there are sound physical reasons to do so."
Joy has convinced me that the sound physical reasons lie in spacetime topology that (by the very definition of continuity in topology) is continuous at the extreme of torsion, which remains nonzero. This is the condition that guarantees a consistent measure space from minus infinity to plus infinity -- the same measure space that John Bell chose *without* the topological continuity. Bell's measure space is disconnected before a measurement event, and multiply connected following a series of measurement events. Joy is right that it should have seemed obvious that a measurement function continuous from the initial condition would have to be the product of a simply connected space in order to get EPR's predicted result. Except that it wasn't so obvious (to me or anyone) until Joy's subtle mathematical treatment made it so.
I always get a little uncomfortable here when we get into the properties of the division algebras in which the measurement framework is explained. It isn't the discrete measure space that accounts for the result; it is the simply connected continuous function that allows correlation of points of the parallelized 3-sphere. I look at the division algebras as a scaffold from which to build the framework, and I fully expect that when the measurement *theory* is complete, the scaffold may be removed.
All best,
Tom
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Jonathan J. Dickau replied on Nov. 19, 2013 @ 16:23 GMT
Wow great comments!
I partly disagree with the either/or flavors offered, though, as I think the a priori and ab initio approaches come together seamlessly. This is implied by the result presented in Torsten's essay this year, showing that simplicial and analytic constructions actually create identical structures (also recent work by the CDT folks). The big thing is that one cannot have a measurement framework that is not geometrical, so as the constructivists assert, any act of determination is inherently a construction process as well.
Fred's remarks reflect the mindset of Wolfram's New Kind of Science, and I think it is sound reasoning that Nature's explorations would tend to seek rules that afford continuation or possibilities, while threads that do not afford continued evolution would quickly die out. My most focused research over the past 3 years has come out of the simple premise that all higher learning hinges on the skill of distance estimation, which is acquired by human children around the age of 2 1/2. What is actually acquired is a sense of the dimensionality of objects and spaces.
So it is germane to our discussion to ask "How does Nature acquire a sense of dimensionality?" I think this involves the hierarchy of smooth > topological > measurable spaces that Connes talks about and as with Fred's line of reasoning about numbers - a gradual application of stricter and stricter rules (which Joy explains very well above).
All the Best,
Jonathan
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Jonathan J. Dickau replied on Nov. 19, 2013 @ 16:49 GMT
Continuing..
If we posit that the ONLY cases worth examining are those where the a priori and ab initio approaches lead to the same result, then look at what remains; a pattern emerges where certain invariant structures in Math play a pivotal role. If we assume "make no preference" is the way to go, and further assert that Nature does the same, we find the following correspondences are essential.
First off; "make no preference" sounds like the Sedenions and S15, but the only decompositions yield S7, S3, S1, and S0 or O, H, C, and R algebras equivalently. If only threads that allow continuation or possibilities are allowed; what's obvious is that the Octonions are the workhorse, and do most of the driving, just as Rick has asserted all along.
So we don't need to express a preference for one type of number over another, and neither does Nature, but the Octonions are pure dynamism, while the Reals just sit there - computationally speaking. So if the criterion is only those rules that allow continuation or possibilities, the choice of the Octonions for an early creative role (shaping Natural law and the universe) is automatic. I'll stop there for now.
All the Best,
Jonathan
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 19, 2013 @ 16:54 GMT
"The big thing is that one cannot have a measurement framework that is not geometrical, so as the constructivists assert, any act of determination is inherently a construction process as well."
That's excellent, Jonathan. It's also a way of describing the result of Brouwer, Dedekind, Weyl, et al, that all real functions of a real valued variable are continuous.
Tom
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Jonathan J. Dickau replied on Nov. 19, 2013 @ 17:06 GMT
I wanted to add..
This all speaks to the question of computability, and what level of structure is necessary to making computation possible, or whether one needs a structure for computation to take place. My opinions about this are somewhat colored by long discussions with Brian Whitworth, and by a short conversation I had with Gerard 't Hooft at FFP10 where I asked the question explicitly and he replied that we don't need atoms of space, because the laws of nature do the calculating for us.
In my view; the move from smooth to topological spaces is essential for this to take place (because topology stores information efficiently), and further makes possible measurability. If gauging the measure of dimensionality is essential to higher learning, and we combine fact this with the constructivist principle that measurement = construction, we arrive at the conclusion that Nature had to evolve the possibility for measurable spaces to exist somehow - in order to create detailed structures and complexity - and that topology is the only way to go.
All the Best,
Jonathan
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 19, 2013 @ 17:57 GMT
" ... Nature had to evolve the possibility for measurable spaces to exist somehow - in order to create detailed structures and complexity - and that topology is the only way to go."
Exactly my
argument that dimensions are self organized and self limiting -- leading to an organic continuation of mathematics with physical reality and the way we measure it.
Joy's measurement framework is rich with new research potential, as any revolutionary idea ought to be.
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Rick Lockyer replied on Nov. 19, 2013 @ 18:39 GMT
Joy,
You (unnecessarily) assign lambda as the orientation choice for the algebraic basis used, then sum over lambda_k with the requirement on Nature of a 50-50 statistical choice of +1 and -1. Like many before you, you conflate basis element and coefficient definitions when you talk about beta_x and –beta_x. You may be able to properly represent both possible orientations of quaternion...
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Joy,
You (unnecessarily) assign lambda as the orientation choice for the algebraic basis used, then sum over lambda_k with the requirement on Nature of a 50-50 statistical choice of +1 and -1. Like many before you, you conflate basis element and coefficient definitions when you talk about beta_x and –beta_x. You may be able to properly represent both possible orientations of quaternion bases by doing this, but when you multiply algebraic elements in one basis by algebraic elements in the opposite orientation basis, you break the rules of quaternion algebra for rather than three non-scalar bases, you now have six. If instead you assign lambda as a coefficient with 50-50 chance of +1 and -1, and maintain a consistent singular basis set, everything works out as you intended it to, and the basis set orientation becomes a free choice made once for the full run. The math works out to the same conclusion for either orientation choice.
This is the essence of Nature’s clue to us regarding mathematical (algebraic) physics and physical reality. Orientation is a singular choice made by the physicist and must be consistently maintained throughout, and Nature demands the math had better not care which choice(s) is(are) made. For all those who fret over “extra” dimensions, this is a clue for you also. There are detectable forces with of course singular reaction directions that are mathematically defined as a non-scalar algebraic product of non-scalar items. Orientation is fully in play in this case, yet the result must have a singular reaction direction independent of the orientation choice. Think about the equivalence of rest frame electric field with moving frame magnetic field for the force on a charged particle, as well as the central scalar * non-scalar force on a charge in the presence of and electric field and realize you cannot deal with this mathematically without algebraic structure with more than 4 degrees of freedom. 4D space-time deals with this with the second rank field tensor, yet can’t provide the required degrees of freedom to cover gravitation AND charge central forces in the same expression without the additional structure of intrinsic space-time curvature. A 4D space-time, up ranked tensors, intrinsic curvature, Minkowski split signature are all unnecessary if the fundamental basis space is upped to 8 dimensions and its algebra ruling ALL of physics is Octonion. Smell the coffee, wake up and drink it, then re-read my 2012 FQXi essay.
Joy, you have done great work because you realized reality is proximal to the division algebras. You have just extrapolated beyond where you needed with unnecessary basis orientation connections and you really don’t need the non-division associative 8D algebra you allude to which shares the used quaternion sub-algebra with the real deal, the non-associative Octonion Algebra.
Rick
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 19, 2013 @ 19:08 GMT
"You (unnecessarily) assign lambda as the orientation choice for the algebraic basis used, then sum over lambda_k with the requirement on Nature of a 50-50 statistical choice of +1 and -1."
Come on, Rick. The variables are nonlinear input to a continuous function. The experimenter is forbidden to assign initial condition. That's the whole problem with Bell's choice of measure space.
"The math works out to the same conclusion for either orientation choice."
The math does not work, however, for a function continuous from the initial condition. One would get only a flat line for A, flat line for B.
Tom
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Joy Christian replied on Nov. 19, 2013 @ 19:08 GMT
Rick,
We have gone through all these before, haven't we?
I do not "multiply algebraic elements in one basis by algebraic elements in the opposite orientation basis." This is (at best) a misrepresentation of what I actually do. In the attached paper I explain more carefully what I do do, which is physics of the actual experiment. Please see the definition of orientation on page 3, and the derivation of correlation on page 11 [in particular equation (75)]. Nowhere do I "multiply algebraic elements in one basis by algebraic elements in the opposite orientation basis." Don't believe the lies spread about my work by some people. What I do do is the physics of the actual experiment.
Also, as powerful as your algebraic view is, in my view algebra provides merely a convenient representation of the deeper truth, which, for me, is topology---in particular, the topologies of S^3 and S^7 (I do not care much about S^1).
Joy
attachments:
27_whither.pdf
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Jonathan J. Dickau replied on Nov. 19, 2013 @ 19:41 GMT
Aw shucks,
Rick makes some good points, and deserves some acknowledgment for what he gets right. It is absolutely accurate to state that some of the constructions used by Joy are cast in the Quaternion case, because it captures the most salient features, and that this works because S3 and S7 share certain essential properties - topologically speaking. It is clear that the case stated with S7 is more general, but might be harder to sell because people are scared off by Octonion algebra.
Beyond this; I think that the dynamism I talk about in the comment below is an essential feature of the Octonion algebra that makes it indispensable, for explaining the Physics involved, rather than just a convenient representational schema. On the other hand; I think that realizable geometry is absolutely necessary to Nature, for creating persistent structures. The Octonions describe the actions and motions possible on S7, and without the curious properties of that algebra, some portions of Joy's argument (especially as involves GHZ states) fall apart.
I think the geometry and topology involved does constitute a deeper truth, but this does not make the powerful algebra of the octonions any less essential to understanding those remarkable properties.
Regards,
Jonathan
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Jonathan J. Dickau replied on Nov. 19, 2013 @ 20:02 GMT
I should probably add..
It is obvious to me that without some of the dynamic properties of the Octonions, it is likely not possible for nature to evolve topological spaces at all, but their existence (following the reasoning of Kainen) assures that this geometry must evolve or emerge. Again; the hierarchy of spaces smooth > topological > measurable, which Connes talks about (also in NCG 2000) involves the application of rules with progressively stricter conditions, as Fred was talking about with algebras above.
Spelling this out; the Associative rule in Algebra is pertaining to the subject of Surfaces or Topological distinctions - because it deals with interiority/exteriority, in determining what is or must be inside of what. The applications of parentheses can be equated with the creation of a topological boundary or distinction, in that each may be seen to be a container or separator from those elements that lie outside the boundary.
In my view; this process of acquiring topology flows naturally, once S7 or the Octonions come to be, or are well-defined as a system. I don't see how one could get topology from a blank slate without the strongly directed evolution of a number type like the octonions.
All the Best,
Jonathan
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 19, 2013 @ 20:06 GMT
" ... in my view algebra provides merely a convenient representation of the deeper truth, which, for me, is topology---in particular, the topologies of S^3 and S^7 (I do not care much about S^1)."
Right on! Whatever misunderstanding that I or anyone has about this measurement framework, let it not be that the model isn't analytical.
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Rick Lockyer replied on Nov. 19, 2013 @ 20:25 GMT
Joy,
Referenced document eqs (16) and (17) seem to be multiplying as I stated. Perhaps my cursory look missed something.
Rick
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 19, 2013 @ 20:37 GMT
" ... where the relative orientation lambda is now assumed to be a random variable, with 50/50 chance of being +1 or - 1 at the moment of creation of the singlet pair of spinning particles."
Seems clear to me that A and B are dichotomous variables. Classical probability.
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Joy Christian replied on Nov. 19, 2013 @ 20:52 GMT
Rick,
Point taken. Eqs (16) and (17) do give that impression. But they too can be expressed in the same basis, according to the definition of the orientation I mentioned. In particular, I can write eq (17) equally as [D][lambda D] instead of [D][L(lambda)]. Physically D represents the detector, whereas L(lambda) represents the "up" or "down" spin. But I could equally well represent the spin by [lambda D], and follow through the calculation in the same basis. To me that would be confusing, because I would like to keep track of "which one is the spin" and "which one is the detector", for physical reasons.
Joy
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Rick Lockyer replied on Nov. 20, 2013 @ 01:29 GMT
Tom,
Me: "You (unnecessarily) assign lambda as the orientation choice for the algebraic basis used, then sum over lambda_k with the requirement on Nature of a 50-50 statistical choice of +1 and -1."
You: “Come on, Rick. The variables are nonlinear input to a continuous function. The experimenter is forbidden to assign initial condition. That's the whole problem with Bell's choice of measure space.”
You quoting Joy later in same thread: " ... where the relative orientation lambda is now assumed to be a random variable, with 50/50 chance of being +1 or - 1 at the moment of creation of the singlet pair of spinning particles."
Come on me??
I have yet to see Joy weigh in on your connecting his work to your personal view of continuous functions as implied here. Maybe this is because he does not have any better idea than I do about just what you are implying. Personally I have no idea what you are talking about, and I believe I have a good appreciation for continuous functions.
Perhaps you could elaborate.
Rick
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Jonathan J. Dickau replied on Nov. 20, 2013 @ 04:35 GMT
If I may offer,
I know that a crucial point Joy makes in his book is the anomalous choice of a binary measurement space by Bell, implying a codomain equivalent to S0, where the unit 0-sphere contains only the points -1 and +1, a disconnected space. A key observation, to understand Joy's work, is that a disconnected measurement space is unduly restrictive, or unrealistic.
Indeed; J.B. Pors et al., in their
paper on Shannon dimensionality, show experimentally (using a circular phase plate) that a broader range is available than can be represented by a binary choice. They clearly demonstrate that the actual codomain of quantum correlations is at least as 'big' as S1, or subdivisions thereof, but do not set an upper bound on its actual range.
Joy's assertion that the actual codomain is S3 provides both a continuous range and a simply connected topology. This choice can explain a broad variety of phenomena which have been attributed to non-local entanglement. But the big piece is that the measurement space is continuous, not disconnected.
Regards,
Jonathan
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Fred Diether replied on Nov. 20, 2013 @ 07:15 GMT
Hi Jonathan,
How do you make the connection from the paper that "They clearly demonstrate that the actual codomain of quantum correlations is at least as 'big' as S1,..."? Your last paragraph is mostly right on the money except the codomain is S7. EPR-Bohm only requires S3 which is part of S7.
Best,
Fred
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 20, 2013 @ 12:53 GMT
Rick,
"Personally I have no idea what you are talking about, and I believe I have a good appreciation for continuous functions."
The subject is, a measurement function continuous from the initial condition.
Your octonionic construction is incapable of computing that function. It is not an analytical framework. All along, the value of linear algebra in Joy's measurement framework has been restricted to defining a measure space (Hestenes' spacetime algebra), not describing the function. He most certainly has addressed the subject in those terms, as have I.
Best,
Tom
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 20, 2013 @ 13:44 GMT
Rick,
To elaborate further, if you read this whole thread and my reply to Jonathan:
"I always get a little uncomfortable here when we get into the properties of the division algebras in which the measurement framework is explained. It isn't the discrete measure space that accounts for the result; it is the simply connected continuous function that allows correlation of points of the parallelized 3-sphere. I look at the division algebras as a scaffold from which to build the framework, and I fully expect that when the measurement *theory* is complete, the scaffold may be removed."
Only if you could prove that your octonionic construction is simply connected, would it be consonant with Joy Christian's measure space. I see no way to do that, since the R^4 of your construction is a different animal than the S^3 of Joy's.
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Rick Lockyer replied on Nov. 20, 2013 @ 18:48 GMT
Tom,
Joy’s “measure space” is S^3, which is not owned by Hestenes’ spacetime algebra. It is owned by Quaternion Algebra. It is only coincidental that spacetime algebra has Quaternion Algebra as a sub. Quaternion Algebra is a 7-fold sub-algebra of Octonion Algebra. Joy could remove all references to spacetime algebra or replace it with Octonion with no loss. So your claim that...
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Tom,
Joy’s “measure space” is S^3, which is not owned by Hestenes’ spacetime algebra. It is owned by Quaternion Algebra. It is only coincidental that spacetime algebra has Quaternion Algebra as a sub. Quaternion Algebra is a 7-fold sub-algebra of Octonion Algebra. Joy could remove all references to spacetime algebra or replace it with Octonion with no loss. So your claim that “Your (my) octonionic construction is incapable of computing that function” has no foundation. I haven’t and for that matter can’t change Quaternion Algebra in any way that impacts the complete definition of S^3. Your claim S^3 is different from “my” R^4 is specious since my work is not simply R^4 without the algebra behind it, or R^8 for that matter. S^3 is embedded with the norm 1 restriction. This restriction may make for interesting features like closure for Quaternion products of included points, but is WAY too restrictive to be the foundation for a full description of the totality of our physical existence.
The question is not about characteristics of S^3, it is about your claim Joy’s work finally made sense to you apparently because it tied into some reverence you held a priori for your definition of “continuous” in regards to the problem at hand, being Bell’s Theorem. If you backed into this “revelation”, discussion over. A big part of Joy’s problem selling his concept is justification of using S^3 “measure space” in a theory that seems to purposely omit details of the actual “measurements” being physically taken, where both in the end seem to statistically accumulate discrete +1, -1 measurement data. If you have substance and not just empty statements, help our friend out by educating the skeptical.
As for your claim on my presentation “It is not an analytical framework”, tell me what is wrong with my Ensemble Derivative and how it can’t be the foundation for general covariance for meaningful differential equations descriptive of physical reality. Don’t do so with more empty statements about Octonion Algebra not being spacetime algebra, or your definition of “coordinate free” instead of the real requirement for a definition that is a proper functional diffeomorphism. Good luck with that.
Rick
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James A Putnam replied on Nov. 20, 2013 @ 23:33 GMT
Rick Lockyer & Tom,
Thank you Rick for joining in and sharing your opinion here.
Rick: "A big part of Joy’s problem selling his concept is justification of using S^3 “measure space” in a theory that seems to purposely omit details of the actual “measurements” being physically taken, where both in the end seem to statistically accumulate discrete +1, -1 measurement data."
Tom replied: "Joy's measurement framework realizes quantum correlations on a *parallelized* 3-sphere. This requires linearly independent vector fields at each point. Which means that actual measurement functions *up to* diffeomorphism are non-degenerate (the function continues) and meet the general relativity requirement for coordinate-free geometry without invoking co-variance. We are talking actual, physical measurement results here, continuous from an initial condition.
I am off track here. Are these "physical measurement results" serving as inputs? If I just don't understand the whole meaning of this exchange, please disregard the question rather than draw this thread off track with me.
James Putnam
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 21, 2013 @ 12:06 GMT
Hi James,
By a "physical measurement result" one means the discrete record of events -- a click, a blip, a flash, particle tracks in a cloud chamber.
Whatever one proposes as the mechanism for causing such events, the variables are reduced by experimental controls to only two, i.e., the choice between recording an event, or not. This is classical randomness, demanded both by EPR and...
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Hi James,
By a "physical measurement result" one means the discrete record of events -- a click, a blip, a flash, particle tracks in a cloud chamber.
Whatever one proposes as the mechanism for causing such events, the variables are reduced by experimental controls to only two, i.e., the choice between recording an event, or not. This is classical randomness, demanded both by EPR and Bell.
The choice function of Bell-Aspect results is invested in the experimenter. Meaning that the experimenter's choice of orientation determines the outcome -- say, click or no-click and the simultaneous correlation of the result between observers (A & B). Joy's framework of continuous measurement functions replicates the Bell-Aspect result by taking the choice function away from the experimenter and investing it in a natural physical space, orientable by the topology. Meaning that the space of measurement functions exists in such a way that forces random events (by 50-50 classical randomness) to behave the same as the experimenter-determined orientation in the Bell-Aspect result. Bell-Aspect depends on linear approximations; Joy's framework is one of nonlinear certainty.
The difference is, that Joy's framework shows there is no boundary between quantum and classical domains. The world is fundamentally classical, just as EPR claimed and as Bell hoped. The assumptions of standard quantum theory make the world fundamentally probabilistic, as if the experimenter's choice of orientation is equivalent to the roll of dice every time a measurement is made.
Only a physical experiment could demonstrate that Joy's measurement framework is strong enough to be incorporated into a theory. The computer simulations, however, are like a proof of concept. Even more, though, the concept is strongly in favor of continuous functions; that it translates smoothly from one machine language to another, would obviate any hint of biasing away from the continuous function model.
Best,
Tom
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James A Putnam replied on Nov. 21, 2013 @ 15:41 GMT
Tom,
I am still not clear on what constitutes "experimental results" in the context of:
Me (Paraphrasing Tom): "...a continuous measurement function with randomly changing boundary conditions...(simulation)...requires random input to a continuous trajectory, in order to replicate the function."
I am wondering about the correctness of: The substitution of "...requires random input to a continuous trajectory, in order to replicate the function." for "...a continuous measurement function with randomly changing boundary conditions..." I am not saying anything is wrong with it.
The two concerns are: Should this substitution be made? - and - What 'baggage' does one bring along with experimental results when they are used as inputs (If they are being used as inputs.)? That was why I asked if "experimental results" are being used as inputs.
Are established physical experimental results of "...a continuous measurement function with randomly changing boundary conditions..." being used as inputs for "...random input to a continuous trajectory..."?
On a different point:
"...that it translates smoothly from one machine language to another, would obviate any hint of biasing away from the continuous function model."
My earlier use of the words "machine language" referred to the one's and zero's that all computers actually operate with. I don't see that the choice of a computer language that serves as a translator between human language and machine language aids in proving anything about the validity of what is being modeled at the machine language level. What am I missing here?
James Putnam
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 21, 2013 @ 16:32 GMT
"I am still not clear on what constitutes 'experimental results'"
You don't understand clicks, flashes, blips, etc.? Physical events.
"Are established physical experimental results of '...a continuous measurement function with randomly changing boundary conditions...' being used as inputs for '...random input to a continuous trajectory...'?
You're overthinking it, James. Bell-Aspect results depend on input from a discrete linear orientation. A measurement function continuous from the initial condition allows nonlinear continuous input from random orientations.
"My earlier use of the words 'machine language' referred to the one's and zero's that all computers actually operate with. I don't see that the choice of a computer language that serves as a translator between human language and machine language aids in proving anything about the validity of what is being modeled at the machine language level. What am I missing here?"
Binary arithmetic (combinations of zeros and ones) is a universal software language that expresses data. Machine languages (Java, Mathematica, Fortran, Python, etc) are adapted to specific computing requirements for assembling and processing data. Computer code is written in a specific machine language. That several varieties of code can get the same result for simulating a continuous measurement function in Joy's framework, suggests to me that there is no bias from one language to another. As I told Florin (which he already knows, but may be helpful to you), one can bias a function for any one program toward discrete or continuous; however, if one gets no bias using common programming parameters in several languages, it's a pretty good bet that the simulation is a true representation of the given program.
Best,
Tom
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James A Putnam replied on Nov. 21, 2013 @ 18:23 GMT
"I am still not clear on what constitutes 'experimental results'"
Tom: "You don't understand clicks, flashes, blips, etc.? Physical events."
Me: How about a straight answer to this question:
"Are established physical experimental results of '...a continuous measurement function with randomly changing boundary conditions...' being used as inputs for '...random input to a continuous trajectory...'?
Tom: "You're overthinking it, James. Bell-Aspect results depend on input from a discrete linear orientation. A measurement function continuous from the initial condition allows nonlinear continuous input from random orientations."
My thinking will be over when I understand that there is data representative of real physical results being used as inputs for '...random input to a continuous trajectory...'?
The importance to me of making this answer clear is to determine whether or not there is 'baggage' that comes along with using established repeatable physical empirical data. Do you understand what I mean by 'baggage'?
James Putnam
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James A Putnam replied on Nov. 21, 2013 @ 18:37 GMT
Tom,
There were points in Rick's message that I would like to see your response to.
James Putnam
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Joy Christian replied on Nov. 21, 2013 @ 18:47 GMT
Hi Rick, James, Jonathan, and Tom,
It is about time I defended Tom in public. I am doing this not because Tom has defended me and my ideas unaccountably many times before, but because I think Rick is criticising him too harshly and too unfairly.
Let me begin by noting that I think you, Rick, are quite a talented mathematician. I think you know a thing or two about mathematics, and can effortlessly pick up even those things in mathematics you are unfamiliar with. And yet, I do not see you as a professional mathematician, nor as a professional scientist. I could be wrong about this, but that is the impression I got from reading your FQXi essay.
Now Tom is definitely not a professional mathematician, or a professional physicist, or a professional computer scientist. Neither does he claim to be. And yet he has been able to see some of the subtleties within my framework that even the self-proclaimed professionals haven't been able to see. It is quite shocking to me to witness the blind-spots they have for some of the most elementary things in physics and mathematics. Now sometimes Tom gets things wrong---but who doesn't? We are all guilty of getting things wrong sometimes---even the mighty ones among us. It is therefore too harsh and too unfair to criticise Tom for getting things wrong sometimes. If we all got everything right all the time, then there would be no point in having any of these discussions here, or elsewhere.
Now something of substance: Earlier in this thread Jonathan made an attempt to defend Tom, with a substantive argument. I think that was an excellent defence of what Tom has been saying, if only in a rather casual language compared to how Jonathan has put things. So there! You too, Rick, are sometimes unable to see things that others, like Jonathan in this case, are able to see so clearly.
I rest my case!
I certainly don't want to be drawn into this too deeply. As it is, there is enough on my plate.
Best,
Joy
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 21, 2013 @ 18:55 GMT
Joy, thank you for those even-handed comments.
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James A Putnam replied on Nov. 21, 2013 @ 19:26 GMT
Tom,
Me: "The importance to me of making this answer clear is to determine whether or not there is 'baggage' that comes along with using established repeatable physical empirical data. Do you understand what I mean by 'baggage'?"
You: "No, and it doesn't matter, because the physical experiment hasn't been done. If you want to help, go to Joy's blog and chip in some cash."
Maybe it doesn't matter and maybe it does. I can't say with reason unless I am certain about what constitutes what you referred to as "...actual, physical measurement results...".
I am not pretending to understand the conversations with regard to theoretical interpretations. What I think I do understand is that an experiment will involve physical inputs leading to physical outputs. My question was directed at understanding whether or not the inputs to be used carryover meaning resulting from the methods used in the earlier experiments that yielded them?
My second question was: Does the substitute method used in the computer simulations serve faithfully in place of the original method? Here maybe only theoretical discussion would make the answer clear. In that case, it probably won't be clear to me. That is ok, it is my own failing. None of this was intended to harm anyone's position. I am following and not leading.
I assume that if these questions are relevant that they have been taken into consideration. Are they relevant or not? If they are relevant what was determined about them?
James Putnam
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 21, 2013 @ 20:55 GMT
James,
"My question was directed at understanding whether or not the inputs to be used carryover meaning resulting from the methods used in the earlier experiments that yielded them?"
Thank you -- this is one of the most important questions in the world to me, personally. A great deal of my own research is devoted to answering it.
I have disclosed an extreme bias of mine, in...
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James,
"My question was directed at understanding whether or not the inputs to be used carryover meaning resulting from the methods used in the earlier experiments that yielded them?"
Thank you -- this is one of the most important questions in the world to me, personally. A great deal of my own research is devoted to answering it.
I have disclosed an extreme bias of mine, in rejecting Bayesian inference. I see it as the crux of your question, which I think can be reformulated as, "Do prior results determine future probabilities?"
Most of those who work in quantum theory and computer science exercise Bayesian assumptions routinely -- and they say, "yes.," that there is a definite probability for such and such event on the closed interval [0,1], and it can be calculated from prior probabilistic results. Then the Bayesian belief in that result is calculated for the combined probability, which is tested against actual physical results, and so on.
Probability is added to probability, based on one's faith in their own personal belief and experience.
This creates an illusion that reality is foundationally probabilistic -- that probabilities are additive. The statistical method that you are probably most familiar with, and that supports the deterministic philosophy that you and I share, is called "frequentist." This is a purely empirical result, based on a long run of independent (Bernoulli) experimental trials, in which one's confidence of the real probability on [0,1] grows with the number of trials conducted (law of large numbers).
I take my disdain for Bayes' theorem a step further, and demand absolute independence of the linguistic model (an equation, or a computer program) from the empirical result. Language and meaning must be shown to correspond 1 - 1 without probabilistic inference, for determinism to hold as a foundational principle.
"My second question was: Does the substitute method used in the computer simulations serve faithfully in place of the original method? Here maybe only theoretical discussion would make the answer clear. In that case, it probably won't be clear to me. That is ok, it is my own failing. None of this was intended to harm anyone's position. I am following and not leading."
I'm following, too. I have never tried to disguise the fact, though, that I follow from a specific point of view, a bias that resists introducing the bias of personal belief into the measurement framework of a theory.
All best,
Tom
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James A Putnam replied on Nov. 21, 2013 @ 20:58 GMT
Tom,
From Tom's link: Machine language; "A set of instructions for a specific central processing unit, designed to be usable by a computer without being translated. Also called machine code."
This is what I meant and what Rick said it was. Anyway my point made was that I questioned that the successful simulations in various computer languages do not add proof for the program being run. It also doesn't do harm. What I think it does do is demonstrate that Joy's model can be simulated by computer program.
James Putnam
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Joy Christian replied on Nov. 21, 2013 @ 21:24 GMT
James,
While I agree with you to certain extent, you are underestimating the sociological value in the five different simulations of my model, authored by four different people, and written in four different programming languages.
There were those who flatly denied that this was possible. They declared that my analytical model was a pure fantasy of mine. Some still remain in denial.
Among others detractors, the panelist recruited by FQXi to evaluate my model flatly declared that my model predicts constant (rather than sinusoidal) correlation, of value -1, for all detector directions a and b. The simulations prove all of the detractors wrong.
But you are right in that a computer simulation of a model is simply a numerical implementation of the model. It is neither its proof, nor its disproof. In a sense, it is merely a feel-good-factor. The real beef is the analytical model.
Best,
Joy
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 21, 2013 @ 21:30 GMT
"From Tom's link: 'Machine language; A set of instructions for a specific central processing unit, designed to be usable by a computer without being translated. Also called machine code.'
This is what I meant and what Rick said it was."
What you meant and what Rick claimed is not what I meant, which should be clear to you if you look further down to definitions number 2 and 3, and which should have been clear from the context of my remarks.
"Anyway my point made was that I questioned that the successful simulations in various computer languages do not add proof for the program being run."
A simulation of physical experiment doesn't prove anything except feasibility of the experiment.
"It also doesn't do harm. What I think it does do is demonstrate that Joy's model can be simulated by computer program."
It's more than that. Rick is incorrect that every simulation of a continuous function is a continuous function, and in this forum I gave a *specific* example of a continuous function (Chaitin's constant, the halting probability of a Turing machine) that is *not* transportable to different machine languages. The same algorithm generates different results.
It is a short step of logic from the random coin toss probability one sees in Chaitin's result -- which is not transportable, and Joy Christian's framework that is -- to the hypothesis that the simulation of a continuous function (in nature) is a continuous function (in mathematical analysis). *It's strong evidence* that Joy's model is analytical. Chaitin's number shows that there is randomness in arithmetic; Joy's model points toward the absence of randomness in the foundation of nature. We invented arithmetic (Kronecker's belief notwithstanding); we didn't invent nature.
Best,
Tom
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James A Putnam replied on Nov. 21, 2013 @ 22:43 GMT
Me: "From Tom's link: 'Machine language; A set of instructions for a specific central processing unit, designed to be usable by a computer without being translated. Also called machine code.'
I am separating this out thinking maybe it will go away:
Me: "This is what I meant and what Rick said it was."
Tom: "What you meant and what Rick claimed is not what I meant, which should be clear to you if you look further down to definitions number 2 and 3, and which should have been clear from the context of my remarks."
Each meaning said the same thing, machine language is the level at which the cpu operates. It consists only of strings of ones and zeros which are a representation of the storage or lack of storage of electrons placed at the input to transistors. The computer not only does operate on this level only, but in addition, all other levels of computer languages are meaningless to the cpu.
James Putnam
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James A Putnam replied on Nov. 21, 2013 @ 23:11 GMT
Hi Joy,
"While I agree with you to certain extent, you are underestimating the sociological value in the five different simulations of my model, authored by four different people, and written in four different programming languages."
I think I do see this. When the first simulation appeared, one or perhaps more specific program lines drew negative comments, but, as each new simulation came out, it became necessary to find new kinds of program lines to buttress each challenge to the original simulation. I am not aware that anyone was able to keep up their challenge by addressing the codes of each new simulation. They should have been able to do this for any valid challenge.
I recognize the simulations as an important success for proving that your model can be simulated by a computer. It is being simulated on various computers using various computer languages. Importantly, this probably includes various machine languages.
Perhaps this is well said or perhaps not. I am limited. What I will say confidently is that those programmers who simulated your model performed a valuable service.
James Putnam
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John Brodix Merryman replied on Nov. 21, 2013 @ 23:24 GMT
Tom,
" we didn't invent nature."
Nor can we bottle her. The problem with nature, is that prior to the calculation, you don't have all the input, which makes it difficult to calculate the output.
Regards,
John M
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James A Putnam replied on Nov. 21, 2013 @ 23:59 GMT
Tom,
"...the crux of your question, which I think can be reformulated as, "Do prior results determine future probabilities?"
I wasn't thinking about probabilities in particular. I was thinking that prior meaningful results of any experiment will, if used as inputs, effect future results of any new experiment. This effect will produce results that may form continuous functions(?) that will not be the same as would have resulted from random(?) inputs.
The question marks indicate that for the first one I am not certain if the word function is correct, The second question mark represents my opinion about what constitutes randomness. I see the word used when meaning is associated with it as for example results that produce a Bell curve. The input data clearly had direction. For me, randomness is meaninglessness or having no associated direction. Otherwise I find the word to be misleading.
James Putnam
James Putnam
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James A Putnam replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 03:00 GMT
Tom,
Me: "It [The computer simulations of Joy's model.] also doesn't do harm. What I think it does do is demonstrate that Joy's model can be simulated by computer program."
Tom: "It's more than that. Rick is incorrect that every simulation of a continuous function is a continuous function, and in this forum I gave a *specific* example of a continuous function (Chaitin's constant, the...
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Tom,
Me: "It [The computer simulations of Joy's model.] also doesn't do harm. What I think it does do is demonstrate that Joy's model can be simulated by computer program."
Tom: "It's more than that. Rick is incorrect that every simulation of a continuous function is a continuous function, and in this forum I gave a *specific* example of a continuous function (Chaitin's constant, the halting probability of a Turing machine) that is *not* transportable to different machine languages. The same algorithm generates different results.
It is a short step of logic from the random coin toss probability one sees in Chaitin's result -- which is not transportable, and Joy Christian's framework that is -- to the hypothesis that the simulation of a continuous function (in nature) is a continuous function (in mathematical analysis). *It's strong evidence* that Joy's model is analytical. Chaitin's number shows that there is randomness in arithmetic; Joy's model points toward the absence of randomness in the foundation of nature. We invented arithmetic (Kronecker's belief notwithstanding); we didn't invent nature."
Me: I guess I don't know how you are using the words 'machine language' and 'random'. If by machine language you still refer to higher level computer languages, then, I can't evaluate your statement.
With regard to the absence of randomness in nature, so long as my use of the word is understood to mean lacking meaning and direction, then I certainly agree with that. Any existence of meaninglessness, if it is possible, would destroy all meaning. I have stated this in the past as: The existence of randomness anywhere in the universe would destroy order in the universe.
Your example of the randomness of a coin toss says to me that you don't define random as lacking direction. It appears to me that your meaning of random is analogous to chance. I don't assume agreement with what I have said. I am not attempting to describe Joy's model. I guess that makes my part of this message off topic.
James Putnam
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Rick Lockyer replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 04:34 GMT
Never said this: Tom: "It's more than that. Rick is incorrect that every simulation of a continuous function is a continuous function….”
For the record, I have written tens of thousands of lines of assembler code i.e. machine code, tens of thousands of lines of high level language code i.e. C, C#, VB, Javascript in my 35+ year career doing Engineering Design and Management. I have also done the hardware design on >40 microprocessor based products. I did not have to look up the definition of machine code to know what it is. Tom, you looked like a fool today claiming you knew more than I did not knowing me, while stating something obviously incorrect in the same breath.
There is nothing mystical going on in computer programs. Lack of portability ALWAYS has a very straight forward explanation that is entirely within the domain of the programming; in the high level language program and/or the compiler implementation. Near zero chance in the machine code. Zero chance in the implemented algorithm itself if all implementations are true to it. If you think otherwise Tom, wrong again.
Rick
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 11:32 GMT
James,
"With regard to the absence of randomness in nature, so long as my use of the word is understood to mean lacking meaning and direction, then I certainly agree with that."
Well, if meaning is independent of language, then apparently random events don't have any meaning of their own.
"Any existence of meaninglessness, if it is possible, would destroy all meaning. I have stated this in the past as: The existence of randomness anywhere in the universe would destroy order in the universe."
That's just the thing. Joy's measurement framework demonstrates that apparent randomness adds meaning to order. It's classical randomness, though -- a deterministic framework that applies from the cosmological initial condition to microscale events.
One shouldn't confuse randomness with probabilism.
Best,
Tom
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John Brodix Merryman replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 11:50 GMT
Tom,
"One shouldn't confuse randomness with probabilism."
Exactly.
What if there is no initial condition, no proverbial beach we walked out from? That the center point in the horizon is only ever our particular here and now?
Regards,
John M
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 12:07 GMT
"What if there is no initial condition, no proverbial beach we walked out from? That the center point in the horizon is only ever our particular here and now?"
Sure, John. That's exactly what I said, with the same metaphor (Poincare disk), in my FQXi essay before last. It supports my conclusion that the source of all information is a point at infinity.
However, measurement results are always finite, so the choice of initial condition affects what we observe here and now (local reality). The whole question of whether reality is probabilistic (standard quantum physics) or determined (classical physics) rests on the choice function. Who does the choosing?
Best,
Tom
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 12:25 GMT
"The problem with nature, is that prior to the calculation, you don't have all the input, which makes it difficult to calculate the output."
John, that's exactly why quantum theorists and quantum computing specialists use Bayesian probability analysis, in the belief that prior probabilities change future output.
Consider Chaitin's number, though, in the same context. It is only a repeating series of binary digits; remarkably, though, the order of the digits is different from one machine language to another though they are supposedly calculating the same thing. If one chooses one of the digits as an initial condition, there is only a random 50-50 probability that the next digit will match. No prior probability for the next coin toss.
Tom
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James A Putnam replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 16:22 GMT
Tom,
Me: "With regard to the absence of randomness in nature, so long as my use of the word is understood to mean lacking meaning and direction, then I certainly agree with that."
Tom: "Well, if meaning is independent of language, then apparently random events don't have any meaning of their own."
There is no 'apparently'. The word random means there is no direction or meaning in the hypothetical existence of physical randomness. The hedge use of 'apparently' shows that you are not talking about randomness.
Me: "Any existence of meaninglessness, if it is possible, would destroy all meaning. I have stated this in the past as: The existence of randomness anywhere in the universe would destroy order in the universe."
Tom: "That's just the thing. Joy's measurement framework demonstrates that apparent randomness adds meaning to order. It's classical randomness, though -- a deterministic framework that applies from the cosmological initial condition to microscale events."
In other words the use of the word 'randomness' in the above paragraph does not mean physical randomness.
Tom: "One shouldn't confuse randomness with probabilism."
My use of the word random is consistent with the definition of random. One shouldn't confuse randomness with chance. It gives the false impression that order can arise from disorder.
James Putnam
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John Brodix Merryman replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 16:27 GMT
Tom,
It seems to me you can have entirely deterministic processes, with ultimately random input.
I'm still not convinced the desire for a universal initial condition isn't more a consequence of our needs, than nature's. LeMaitre stated as much.
Regards,
John M
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 16:48 GMT
James,
Order can -- and demonstrably does -- come from disorder.
It's an empirical fact.
Tom
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 16:58 GMT
Rick,
I've flagged for deletion all posts (yours and mine) that contain juvenile personal insults. This forum is for serious science.
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James A Putnam replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 17:01 GMT
"Order can -- and demonstrably does -- come from disorder.
It's an empirical fact."
No there is no demonstration that order can come from disorder. The transformation of disorder into order is not an empirical fact. What is a fact is that the use of the word 'disorder' is not being used to mean disorder. Obviously your 'disorder' had order. That order existed in the form of previously having all means necessary to become changed into a more recognizable, to us, orderly way.
James Putnam
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 17:23 GMT
John,
"It seems to me you can have entirely deterministic processes, with ultimately random input."
Of course you can.
"I'm still not convinced the desire for a universal initial condition isn't more a consequence of our needs, than nature's. LeMaitre stated as much."
It never was otherwise. Lemaitre asked if the universe had ever been at rest -- in a relativistic universe one has to respond, "at rest relative to what?" The necessity to specify an initial condition, therefore, is built into the assumption of relativity, as a continuum of space with time. Under the assumption of quantum cosmology, time is at rest relative to space (the time parameter t = 1 is assumed in every quantum interaction) while the classical rest state is undefined in general relativity (the theory blows up at the singularity of creation).
If the universe is fundamentally probabilistic, there is still the necessity to specify an initial condition, because whatever random quantum vacuum fluctuation brought the universe into existence, it did so with probability 1. But from what range of equally likely events? A probabilistic universe makes no more sense at the cosmological initial condition, than the singularity of general relativity.
Now -- if none but classical randomness (50-50 probability of existence) obtains from the cosmological initial condition to the present -- Joy Christian's framework answers the cosmological problem. Existence and non-existence are equally likely. Nature chose existence.
Best,
Tom
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Rick Lockyer replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 17:23 GMT
Fine Tom, as long as you cop to having acted inappropriately. As for something appropriate that was deleted:
Non-computable numbers and unbuildable machines have absolutely nothing to do with the issue at hand, which is Joy’s results which are clearly computable since the algorithm is spelled out in the equations he has published, and these algorithms can be run on real world computers, all of which are completely deterministic.
I will challenge your opinion when I do not agree with it. *That* is what this blog is all about. I hope you find the strength to address the challenges on a non-emotional basis.
Rick
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 17:25 GMT
"No there is no demonstration that order can come from disorder."
Don't kid yourself, James. Shake up a bag of paper clips and dump them out. You'll get ordered strings.
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James A Putnam replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 17:38 GMT
Tom,
"Don't kid yourself, James. Shake up a bag of paper clips and dump them out. You'll get ordered strings."
Your claim is that the means for the paper clips to by chance become strung together did not exist while in the bag?
James Putnam
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 17:46 GMT
"I hope you find the strength to address the challenges on a non-emotional basis."
That's a two-way street. And you can leave our president out of it, he has enough problems.
The facts of what I wrote still stand -- Chaitin's number is not uncomputable (though algorithmically incompressible), it is a random continuous function, and it cannot be transported between machine languages.
The relevance to Joy's simulation is suggestive evidence that the simulation of a (deterministic, non-random) continuous function is a continuous function. Remember, the simulation has built-in randomness.
If it were the case that random input (the ThrowDie function) could not be programmed with the same result in other varieties of program code, the evidence would go the other way -- that noise makes a difference in the measurement of quantum correlations. Joy's framework is not only strong enough to stand up against random noise, it gets the same results as experiments that seek to mitigate noise interference.
Tom
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 17:51 GMT
Ordered chains of paper clips will form with probability 1, given sufficient paper clips and energy input.
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James A Putnam replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 17:57 GMT
Tom,
"Ordered chains of paper clips will form with probability 1, given sufficient paper clips and energy input."
Getting back to the subject of the meaning of disorder. Presumably it is accepted that disorder means lack of order:
Your claim is that the means for the paper clips to by chance become strung together did not exist while in the bag?
James Putnam
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 18:36 GMT
James,
Call unlinked paper clips disordered. Call a bag of unlinked paper clips a totally disordered state. Shake the bag and call that energy input to the totally disordered system. Then count the number of paper clips forming ordered chains, and you get a measure of order from disorder.
Your question: "Your claim is that the means for the paper clips to by chance become strung together did not exist while in the bag?" -- is a non-starter, because there is no prior probability for the paper clips to form an ordered chain. My example is strictly empirical.
Tom
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James A Putnam replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 18:47 GMT
Tom,
Recognizing your high skill level, I will risk treading into dangerous waters:
Tom: "The facts of what I wrote still stand -- Chaitin's number is not uncomputable (though algorithmically incompressible), it is a random continuous function, and it cannot be transported between machine languages."
Me: The inability to be transported between machine languages results from the un-program-like arrangement of program steps of a particular computer language, which makes no sense in that language, cannot be replicated in a different computer language? The computability part results from an existing probability that the first steps of the careless arrangement might be executable by a computer? These are questions and not answers.
James Putnam
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John Brodix Merryman replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 18:50 GMT
Tom,
"(the theory blows up at the singularity of creation)"
" A probabilistic universe makes no more sense at the cosmological initial condition, than the singularity of general relativity."
All of which further supports the question of whether an initial condition is a valid supposition. Beginnings, as well as endings, are only evident as markers of time units. The question always arises; What came before, as well as; What comes after.
If we were to treat time as an effect of action, then the whole process of beginnings and endings is integral to the present state, as forms coalesce, evolve and dissipate. There is certainly enough evidence that the current cosmology is enough of a patch job, that in any other situation would garner significant skepticism, but this need to pin our arrow of time to some greater framework gives it significant psychological support.
James,
What is order and disorder? Consider it in the relationship of signal to noise. Now obviously, what is signal to one, could be noise to another. Any sound, light, radiation, mass, etc. will have some structure, delineation, bounds, etc. So in that sense, everything could be considered ordered. Yet if you were to try and perceive the entire spectrum of information, energy, evidence, form, order, etc, it would overlap and cancel out to white noise, thus losing the order of any particular observer. So order requires, not just form, but a frame of reference, not to be just random noise. Order is both content and context. Randomness is content without context.
Regards,
John M
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Rick Lockyer replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 18:53 GMT
“The facts of what I wrote still stand -- Chaitin's number is not uncomputable (though algorithmically incompressible), it is a random continuous function, and it cannot be transported between machine languages.”
That is debatable.
Please refrain from incorrectly using the phrase “machine languages” when you are actually meaning “high level languages” such that...
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“The facts of what I wrote still stand -- Chaitin's number is not uncomputable (though algorithmically incompressible), it is a random continuous function, and it cannot be transported between machine languages.”
That is
debatable.
Please refrain from incorrectly using the phrase “machine languages” when you are actually meaning “high level languages” such that knowledgeable people can understand you.
The operation of real world computer programs is completely deterministic. Any portability issues between high level languages is thus completely deterministic, and can be remedied by modification of the procedures of the implementation in the high level language (bug fixes) or in the compiler procedures to have them behave in identical fashion. It is completely possible to retool *any two compilers for two different high level languages* to result in the exactly the same native machine code, for *any codeable algorithm*.
The example I gave previously was the fact that there can be no truly random “random number generator”, there can only be a pseudo random number generator in a deterministic system. This is almost universally done with PN codes, with the emphasis on plural. The implementer of the compiler has two choices, code run length and seed, where seed is the initial value when the program begins execution. There are other implementation issues that especially come into play when the sample count is made large in an effort to minimize the impact of the pseudo random nature of the number generator used, being related to round off and truncation errors. These can create result differences between implementations, but they once again, are fully deterministic and thus repairable, and have absolutely nothing to do with any mysterious characteristics of the process being modeled. If one is ignorant of what goes on under the hood so to speak, they may fall prey to assigning something magical or mystical to the process independent of its natural and factual reality, much like our predecessors did with eclipses.
It is nice that several people have verified Joy's conclusions with several high level languages, but there is no revelation of something significant in this fact as to his algorithm. If it did not come to be I would consider one or more attempts were suspect. There is no "there" here.
Rick
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 19:02 GMT
Here is an
example of what I mean about noise-mitigating efforts in quantum systems. The assumption of quantum entanglement that drives research in quantum computing is forcing researchers to re-think their strategies about containing noise to get pure states -- toward quantum discord which deals with non-entangled quantum states and noise input becomes something of an asset toward realizing pure states:
"We showed that, starting from a maximally entangled state, the quantum correlations display different decaying behaviors, depending on the nature of the considered noise. In particular, Markovian environments lead to a monotonic decay, while in non-Markov regimes sudden death and revival phenomena are present, in agreement with previous results in the literature."
So we may not have to wait much longer, before computational necessity drives the community to reject even quantum discord in favor of Joy Christian's classically derived quantum correlations.
Tom
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James A Putnam replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 19:26 GMT
Hi John,
We appear to not be speaking of the same things:
"...not to be just random noise. Order is both content and context. Randomness is content without context.
Noise is not random. With a properly designed filter one will receive data containing organized patterns of changes of velocities of an object or objects. Randomness does not contain direction or meaning or it is not randomness. Disorder, in the sense that I am using it, means no cooperation or coordination. I do not limit my description to isolated levels. Tom's paper clips may be describable on appearance as being disordered in the bag, but the resulting chain links are due to a more fundamental level of order that deterministically affects the arrangement of the paper clips. it was there in the paper clips while still in the bag. If either cooperation or coordination, even in potential form, exists then order exists. Either disorder is the opposite of order or there is no such concept as disorder.
James Putnam
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 19:27 GMT
Sure, Rick, high level language is fine with me. I don't live in the software engineering community.
My real point is, that discrete numerical implementation of a program depends on the soundness of arithmetic. To a pencil and paper mathematician, that is not a problem because we are believers in the primary orderliness and predictability of the number line. If that order is not secure in any high level language, we may be doing mathematics all wrong -- analysis, not natural numbers, may be created by "God," to borrow from Kronecker's metaphor.
"The operation of real world computer programs is completely deterministic. Any portability issues between high level languages is thus completely deterministic, and can be remedied by modification of the procedures of the implementation in the high level language (bug fixes) or in the compiler procedures to have them behave in identical fashion. It is completely possible to retool *any two compilers for two different high level languages* to result in the exactly the same native machine code, for *any codeable algorithm*."
Not Chaitin's, to my knowledge. The program outputs different results according to the high level language running the algorithm. It's paradoxical, because the algorithm is deterministic and the output isn't.
I pretty much agree with everything else you wrote. I reserve my opinion on whether the replication of Joy's framework has further signficance than cross-verification.
Best,
Tom
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James A Putnam replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 19:41 GMT
John'
I think I should have been more thorough and made clear that any noise can be filtered at any part of its spectrum, or range of any kind, and one will receive meaningful data.
James Putnam
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John Brodix Merryman replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 19:42 GMT
James,
"With a properly designed filter one will receive data containing organized patterns of changes of velocities of an object or objects."
Isn't that context derived?
"Randomness does not contain direction or meaning or it is not randomness."
It is noise.
"Disorder, in the sense that I am using it, means no cooperation or coordination."
Lack of supporting context.
"describable on appearance as being disordered in the bag, but the resulting chain links are due to a more fundamental level of order that deterministically affects the arrangement of the paper clips."
In one context, disordered, in another, ordered. Signal to one, noise to another.
"Either disorder is the opposite of order or there is no such concept as disorder. "
Disorder is when order breaks down, but then order of another frame is asserting itself. The real issue here is whether there is some universal frame by which everything is ordered, or is it inherently subjective. The only apparent universal frame is absolute zero, at which point, it isn't even white noise and there is nothing to order. Flatline.
Regards,
John M
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James A Putnam replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 19:53 GMT
John,
Ok I see we are definitely not speaking of the same meanings. No noise is random. Every bit of it consists of meaningful data about changes of patterns of an object or objects. No order exists in disorder. The relative sense in which you seem to me to be placing both randomness and disorder clearly fall outside of the points that I am making. To be clear, neither randomness nor disorder are relative. If either are described as being relative, then, I say that it is neither randomness nor disorder that is being described.
James Putnam
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John Brodix Merryman replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 20:44 GMT
James,
If they are not relative, then presumably they are absolute. What state is absolute order and disorder?
Regards,
John M
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John Brodix Merryman replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 20:46 GMT
How would you measure/observe it?
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James A Putnam replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 21:42 GMT
"If they are not relative, then presumably they are absolute. What state is absolute order and disorder?"
Yes they are absolute. Their relative usages lead to misunderstanding. An example would be to speak of the random tosses of a coin. Each toss is a toss. Each results is definite, either heads or tails. I can't tell you which it will be, but I do know that it is not random, because I know that during those tosses, I will observe equal numbers of heads and tails many times. that result is repeatable. There was no part of the whole event that did not have direction. I know each part had direction because all together the results reveal that heads and tails will each appear 50 percent of the time over and over again.
Absolute order is what the universe consists of. There is no example of meaninglessness or lack of direction anywhere in it at any time.
"How would you measure/observe it?"
Nothing in this universe has ever observed, actually I prefer experienced, randomness or disorder. Every object in it plays its role both in communicating information and using information. There is no place or time of lack of information. Even the existence of noise in its fullness tells me information. Even if I lack the ability to actually isolate individual pieces of information, I can know if nucleuses and electrons are sources of some of the noise by looking at its spectrum. What's to measure except parts of order.
James Putnam
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James A Putnam replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 22:12 GMT
Tom,
I understand that you use the words random and disorder in relative sense as if they can exist sandwiched in-between orderliness. I have many times read your statements that showed this.
"Your question: "Your claim is that the means for the paper clips to by chance become strung together did not exist while in the bag?" -- is a non-starter, because there is no prior probability for the paper clips to form an ordered chain. My example is strictly empirical."
Empirical yes, your conclusion no. There was a prior probability for the paper clips to form an ordered chain.
James Putnam
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John Brodix Merryman replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 22:15 GMT
James,
" What's to measure except parts of order."
That's the point, that you can only measure parts of it. Think in terms of taking a picture; You set the focus, speed, aperture and direction to get the most or the desired information from the waves of light which might enter the lens. If you simply opened up the aperture, set the lens to infinity and left the lens open, the frame would be white, even though you would be gathering potentially far more information.
The same applies to flipping the coin, the more times you flip it, the more it statistically averages out, so no decision is clarified. It would be nearly the same as not flipping it at all. So unless your focus of information is statistical averages, no decision is made.
The ideas of randomness, indecision, fuzziness, etc. are when the preferred signal is obscured by too much or wrong information, ie. noise.
Regards,
John M
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James A Putnam replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 22:44 GMT
John,
Parts of order are parts of order because there is nothing to measure except order. The idea of perception ruling the meaning of randomness in physics is not accepted by me. It leads to misleading statements such as "Nothing is unstable." So it is conclusively shown that the universe originated from nothing. I won't be following that lead. There has never been randomness nor disorder nor nothing in the universe. No one knows, by scientific means, what can be concluded about 'before the universe'. There are many observations and conclusions resulting from one's perspective that yield contrary statements.
"The ideas of randomness, indecision, fuzziness, etc. are when the preferred signal is obscured by too much or wrong information, ie. noise."
I do understand the acceptance of this position does occur often. However, Your words 'obscured' and 'wrong' do not support your conclusion "i.e. noise." That is if you mean the result lacks direction or meaning. You accept a perception definition for randomness and disorder. I don't. I am describing physical properties that actually exist in the universe regardless of one's perception. One's perception can lead to self-imposed limits as to what is random and what is disordered.
It is as if randomness or disorder are products of one's perception. They are not so long as they are portrayed as existing physical properties in the physics sense. Perceptions aside, there has never been randomness nor disorder anywhere at anytime in the universe. The evidence for this claim is that the universe remains orderly and so far as we can see back into its past it was always orderly.
James Putnam
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John Brodix Merryman replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 23:12 GMT
James,
I certainly accept that everything is ordered in and of itself, but that is circular logic, ie. "It is what it is." So the issue for me, is how do we perceive this order. As I see it, there is no universal, 'God's eye' view of everything, because the more information, perspective, etc, the more the white noise issue.
Regards,
John M
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James A Putnam replied on Nov. 22, 2013 @ 23:55 GMT
John,
"I certainly accept that everything is ordered in and of itself, but that is circular logic, ie. "It is what it is." So the issue for me, is how do we perceive this order. As I see it, there is no universal, 'God's eye' view of everything, because the more information, perspective, etc, the more the white noise issue."
I have not presented circular logic. I spoke only about what empirical evidence shows us. The universe, so far as we have observed it, has always been orderly. Do you know how we can know this? I did not present a God's eye view. I restrict my comments to fit into the science of physics. If your point is that you or I individually cannot usefully contain all information accumulated, ok. But, that does not describe the breadth and usefulness of scientific learning. Perhaps you find specialization restrictive and detrimental.
I am not sure why you brought up the concept of 'white noise'? My point had to do with physical noise and that it is not evidence of either randomness or disorder. There is no evidence of either randomness or disorder at any time or anywhere ever in the universe. Do you say that this is incorrect?
You did state, I think, that the issue for you is that we do not know and probably cannot know everything because learning interferes with itself. My interest is not in knowing everything. In this thread, my interest has been in refuting ideology presenting itself as science; and, in the loose use, causing misuse, of what I understand is intended to be physics terminology.
James Putnam
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John Brodix Merryman replied on Nov. 23, 2013 @ 00:30 GMT
James,
We are very much on the same page of trying to peel away some of the mystical thinking. For example, consider the uncertainty principle, in that the point isn't that the structure is uncertain, but that our efforts to probe it also affect if, thus we can only know part of the information about it. Which, in a nutshell, is my point. I just think this goes to the nature of knowledge and information, rather than the reality we are exploring.
By circular logic, I do simply mean, "It is what it is." Take a pencil; It is what it is, nothing more, nothing less. It's not fuzzy, or random, or indecisive. All the material components and all their molecular and atomic subcomponents are what they are. We can probe the nature of this pencil and discover what it is, according to our ability to put it in the context of our knowledge base.
I'm certainly not criticizing specialization. It is the professional essence of exploring the parts of knowledge we can examine. Even generalists are specialists at another, broader level, limited by their ability and proficiency at cross referencing the various areas of specialization within their purview.
Regards,
John M
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 24, 2013 @ 19:47 GMT
"Empirical yes, your conclusion no. There was a prior probability for the paper clips to form an ordered chain. "
Prove it.
James, your belief in prior probabilities is just what Bell loyalists say is true -- as a matter of mystical assurance, not a matter of scientific rationalism. That is, what you and they mean by "empirical" and "rational" is not the correspondence between an event and a theory; it is correspondence between the event and a probability.
No such correspondence exists.
The probability is a myth, a belief. The only difference is that you are more honest in your faith than Bell believers, who actually perform calculations on prior probabilities; in principle, you do not differ.
True determinism is as you claim -- based in the outcome of physical events, empirical. If those events are probabilistic, however, what you claim actually opposes what you believe.
Will you be a believer, or a scientist?
Best,
Tom
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James A Putnam replied on Nov. 25, 2013 @ 02:11 GMT
Tom,
Me: "Empirical yes, your conclusion no. There was a prior probability for the paper clips to form an ordered chain. "
Tom: "Prove it."
Me: You make unprovable statements regularly. My statement is supported by the empirical evidence. The evidence is that some paper clips form a string.
Tom: "James, your belief in prior probabilities is just what Bell loyalists say...
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Tom,
Me: "Empirical yes, your conclusion no. There was a prior probability for the paper clips to form an ordered chain. "
Tom: "Prove it."
Me: You make unprovable statements regularly. My statement is supported by the empirical evidence. The evidence is that some paper clips form a string.
Tom: "James, your belief in prior probabilities is just what Bell loyalists say is true -- as a matter of mystical assurance, not a matter of scientific rationalism. That is, what you and they mean by "empirical" and "rational" is not the correspondence between an event and a theory; it is correspondence between the event and a probability."
I don't say prior anything exists priorly as if the future is active. I say the means for the end exists before the end occurs. Use the word probability or whatever, but it has no mystical connotations to it. Your repeated efforts to define your beliefs as resulting from rational thinking is betrayed as false by your adoption of theory. What I mean by empirical is empirical evidence. What I mean by rational is to avoid empirically unwarranted inventions and learn that which it is that empirical evidence is communicating to us.
Tom: "No such correspondence exists."
Me: The correspondence that I use exists.
Skip Your continuation ..."The probability is a myth, ... you do not differ."
Me: "You can't see yet where I differ. You don't yet understand what I describe to you. Theory isn't the tool you need.
Tim: "True determinism is as you claim -- based in the outcome of physical events, empirical. If those events are probabilistic, however, what you claim actually opposes what you believe."
Me: That statement demonstrates that we are still not communicating. You obviously mean something different with 'probabilistic'. I presume that you are thinking in terms of some probability theory. Theory isn't the tool you need. Theory is the practice of inventing substitutes to serve in place of the unknown in physics equations. You won't need those invented properties if you learn from empirical evidence. The first corrective step you need to take is to recognize that mass should not have been declared a fundamental indefinable property.
Tom: "Will you be a believer, or a scientist?"
Me: This statement is similar to many self promoting statements that you make. For you theory rules. You believe it and more problematic is that you preach it.
James Putnam
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 25, 2013 @ 11:21 GMT
James.
"I don't say prior anything exists priorly as if the future is active."
What does that mean?
"I say the means for the end exists before the end occurs. Use the word probability or whatever, but it has no mystical connotations to it."
No? Then all you're saying is that the likelihood of anything happening at any moment that it happens is ordained by the initial...
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James.
"I don't say prior anything exists priorly as if the future is active."
What does that mean?
"I say the means for the end exists before the end occurs. Use the word probability or whatever, but it has no mystical connotations to it."
No? Then all you're saying is that the likelihood of anything happening at any moment that it happens is ordained by the initial cosmological condition. I agree. Now explain it without invoking a mystical cause. Contrary to your opinion, we do get cause "for free." Life is free.
"Your repeated efforts to define your beliefs as resulting from rational thinking is betrayed as false by your adoption of theory."
Not my adoption. It's what "rational" means.
"What I mean by empirical is empirical evidence. What I mean by rational is to avoid empirically unwarranted inventions and learn that which it is that empirical evidence is communicating to us."
And that requires a theory. Otherwise, your belief is a "just so" narrative, like any religious narrative. There's nothing wrong with that -- you just can't call it science.
"Tom: "No such correspondence exists."
Me: The correspondence that I use exists."
Yes, but it's a correspondence of belief to evidence; in other words, if one believes that witches float, every prosecution of an accused witch in medieval times was just.
In the same vein, if one accepts probabilism as fundamental, every experimental violation of Bell's theorem confirms it.
"Skip Your continuation ...'The probability is a myth, ... you do not differ.'
Me: "You can't see yet where I differ. You don't yet understand what I describe to you. Theory isn't the tool you need."
Theory is the only *objective* tool you have.
Tim: 'True determinism is as you claim -- based in the outcome of physical events, empirical. If those events are probabilistic, however, what you claim actually opposes what you believe.'
"Me: That statement demonstrates that we are still not communicating. You obviously mean something different with 'probabilistic'."
How many meanings do you think that term can have? It's quite unambiguous.
"I presume that you are thinking in terms of some probability theory. Theory isn't the tool you need. Theory is the practice of inventing substitutes to serve in place of the unknown in physics equations. You won't need those invented properties if you learn from empirical evidence. The first corrective step you need to take is to recognize that mass should not have been declared a fundamental indefinable property.
Tom: "Will you be a believer, or a scientist?"
Me: This statement is similar to many self promoting statements that you make. For you theory rules. You believe it and more problematic is that you preach it."
I sure do. Not for my sake -- for the sake of rational thought. Too many witches have been thrown in the river by believers.
Best,
Tom
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 25, 2013 @ 14:47 GMT
James. please understand that chaos (order from disorder) is deterministic and nonlinear as well as empirical. Joy's measurement framework fits the chaotic model of nonlinear determinism.
Let's look again at the bag of paper clips -- you say the potential for a jumbled bag of individual paper clips to form ordered chains just "is," that there is 100% probability that chains will form...
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James. please understand that chaos (order from disorder) is deterministic and nonlinear as well as empirical. Joy's measurement framework fits the chaotic model of nonlinear determinism.
Let's look again at the bag of paper clips -- you say the potential for a jumbled bag of individual paper clips to form ordered chains just "is," that there is 100% probability that chains will form because that's the way they were made. That doesn't explain anything, however -- one asks, how many chains will form under what conditions? How many paper clips will remain as discrete units? Given any finite time interval t --> T, will every paper clip in the bag be a part of an ordered chain? In infinite time? What is the relation, if any, between the initial number (n) of paper clips and the number (m) of ordered chains in a given time interval? What time interval is sufficient for any ordered binary chain to form, given what threshold of energy input? Does the rate of formation of ordered chains increase with energy input? Infinitely? What is threshold of energy input for any chain to form? What, if any, is the role of space in the interaction; is there a maximum or minimum distance of interaction? And so on.
The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has an excellent article on chaos and determinism, accurately allowing that "theory" in the conventional sense does not apply to chaotic determinism:
"There are no axioms -- no laws -- no deductive structures, no linking of observational statements to theoretical statements whatsoever in the literature on chaotic dynamics."
As I said in the beginning -- it's purely empirical.
Back in 1991, Paul Davies and John Gribbin co-authored a book titled *The Matter Myth* (which an internet search shows available as a free e-book online) which tolled "the death of materialism," and argued that matter is not fundamental.
And that's why I always have a problem discussing this subject with you. You are intent on convincing me that mass is a fundamental physical property, and I find no reason to suppose so. In fact, quantum theorists also take mass as fundamental and the results of Bell's theorem assume it, even when the particles in the experiment are massless.
I agree with most of what you say about determinism and empiricism; however, your belief in the primacy of mass negates the deterministic view. Quantum correlations don't depend on the prior existence of mass, as Joy's framework shows, because the lack of boundary between quantum and classical domains leaves only two primary relations: space and time (from which we get spinors and other objects). That's why the framework applies to *all* quantum correlations at every scale. It promises to lead to an empirical definition of "quantum," independent of mass. It is faithful to Newton's prescription, "Hypotheses non fingo."
Paper clips and other components of a chaotic complex system aren't physically real. The underlying relations that generate the phenomena we observe, are.
All best,
Tom
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James A Putnam replied on Nov. 25, 2013 @ 16:46 GMT
"I don't say prior anything exists priorly as if the future is active."
"What does that mean?"
It means that distortion begets distortion.
Tom describing his views of what I mean:
"Then all you're saying is that the likelihood of anything happening at any moment that it happens is ordained by the initial cosmological condition. I agree. Now explain it without invoking a mystical cause. Contrary to your opinion, we do get cause "for free." Life is free."
What I say is that everything that has ever occurred or will ever occur in the universe was provided for since the beginning of the universe. You statement is a misrepresentation. Cause is not mystical. It is unknown.
The rest of the exchange is repetitive of past discussion.
James Putnam
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James A Putnam replied on Nov. 25, 2013 @ 17:01 GMT
The shaken paper clips can, may, and will occasionally link together. They can because of their form. The may because of their form. They occasionally will because of their form. That covers it.
Your words describing me as believing in the 'primacy of mass' show that your following your own path and not mine. The fundamental indefinable status of mass makes it as 'primary' as length and time. That should not be the case. whatever it is that you mean, you are not describing what I mean. I say that it was the first error of theoretical physics to arbitrarily assign mass the status of a fundamental indefinable property. My meaning is that mass should have been and could have been a defined property. In the equation=ma, both force and mass should have been and could have been defined properties. I have fixed that problem. The theory that mass is a fundamental indefinable property is gone and the equations is now corrected. That is my meaning.
James Putnam
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 25, 2013 @ 17:25 GMT
"It means that distortion begets distortion."
This is empirically falsified
"What I say is that everything that has ever occurred or will ever occur in the universe was provided for since the beginning of the universe. You statement is a misrepresentation. Cause is not mystical. It is unknown."
I take it you mean unknown but not unknowable. Then accept the empirical evidence.
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 25, 2013 @ 17:27 GMT
"The fundamental indefinable status of mass makes it as 'primary' as length and time."
Then it is not primary, as neither length nor time independently are primary.
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James A Putnam replied on Nov. 25, 2013 @ 18:55 GMT
""The fundamental indefinable status of mass makes it as 'primary' as length and time.""
"Then it is not primary, as neither length nor time independently are primary."
To readers: Length and time are primary because they are naturally fundamental indefinable properties. They are indefinable because they are the properties of empirical evidence. There are no properties before those of empirical evidence by which the properties of empirical evidence can be defined. For the science of physics empirical evidence consists of patterns in changes of velocities of objects. Changes of velocities of objects when measured with respect to time is called acceleration. From those patterns of accelerations, we learn there are two other properties, force and mass. Neither force nor mass are empirical evidence. Their existences are inferred by empirical evidence.
When f=ma was introduced, it was not recognized how either force or mass could be defined using length and time alone. The choice was made to declare mass to be a third fundamental indefinable property. This choice put mass on the same level as length and time. Length and time are primary properties because they are the first properties. Neither mass nor force are first properties. Only the properties of empirical evidence are first properties. First properties are properties with no other properties existing before them by which they may be defined. The choice to make mass a third fundamental indefinable property elevates mass to the status of a primary property. The fundamental indefinable status of mass was an arbitrary theoretical act that artificially elevated mass to the status of a primary property. Humans made that choice and not nature.
James Putnam
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Thomas Howard Ray replied on Nov. 25, 2013 @ 19:21 GMT
"To readers: Length and time are primary because they are naturally fundamental indefinable properties. They are indefinable because they are the properties of empirical evidence."
No they're not. Meter sticks don't come with pre-marked gradations, and clocks don't come with pre-marked faces.
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James A Putnam replied on Nov. 25, 2013 @ 21:08 GMT
""To readers: Length and time are primary because they are naturally fundamental indefinable properties. They are indefinable because they are the properties of empirical evidence.""
"No they're not. Meter sticks don't come with pre-marked gradations, and clocks don't come with pre-marked faces."
The sticks and clocks aren't primary nor are their markings. What is primary is object length and action timing so that acceleration can be recorded and evaluated for meaning. The sticks, clocks and their markings are tools. We can decide on different versions or choices of 'sticks' and 'clocks' don't need faces.
James Putnam
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Anonymous replied on Nov. 26, 2013 @ 11:02 GMT
"What is primary is object length and action timing so that acceleration can be recorded and evaluated for meaning."
James, lengths and action of measure zero (at rest) accelerate only relatively. I'm not getting into this anymore.
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James A Putnam replied on Nov. 26, 2013 @ 14:58 GMT
""What is primary is object length and action timing so that acceleration can be recorded and evaluated for meaning.""
"James, lengths and action of measure zero (at rest) accelerate only relatively. I'm not getting into this anymore."
Objects accelerate. 'Relatively' has nothing to do with changing anything that I have said. I say it correctly and I stay with it to make sure it stays said correctly.
James Putnam
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