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What's Ultimately Possible in Physics? Essay Contest (2009)
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On Explaining Existence by Dean Rickles
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Author Dean Rickles wrote on Sep. 16, 2009 @ 17:04 GMT
Essay AbstractWhat are the limits of physics' explanatory power? Can physics explain everything? In this paper I discuss a somewhat broader question: can physics explain existence itself? I argue that genuinely ultimate explanations---those that really explain everything---involve the most basic and most general elements of logic. Such explanations cannot be done within physics unless physics undergoes a methodology shift more closely aligning itself with mathematics and logic. However, I give reasons for thinking that just such a shift might be in operation.
Author BioDean Rickles is a historian and philosopher of physics at the University of Sydney. He is the author of Symmetry, Structure, and Spacetime (Philosophy and Foundations of Physics, Volume 3. North Holland: Elsevier, 2007) and editor of The Structural Foundations of Quantum Gravity (co-edited with Steven French and Juha Saatsi; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006) and The Ashgate Companion to Contemporary Philosophy of Physics (Ashgate, 2008). He is currently working on a project devoted to the history of quantum gravity.
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Casey Blood wrote on Sep. 17, 2009 @ 00:29 GMT
Hi Dean,
Your essay is very clear for such an abstract subject (or at least I think I understood parts of it). But I have two questions/comments.
(1) I agree that mathematical systems "exist." But I should think that the only ones of interest would be those which can lead to some kind of awareness. That is, I think the question of existence is somewhat tied up with awareness.
(2) It seems one could imagine existences--with aware beings--which are not based on mathematics. Are you saying that any kind of non-chaos, any kind of awareness, any ability to distinguish "this" from "that" implies mathematics?
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Frank Martin DiMeglio wrote on Sep. 17, 2009 @ 00:51 GMT
Hi Dean, there is [undoubtedly] much thinking behind mathematics; although mathematics requires relatively narrow thinking in comparison with the highest/true form of genius.
In taking [the] mathematics further, one must determine what is the integrated, relational, and "as extensive as possible" significance of/behind the mathematics -- ideally, that is, how mathematics applies to experience in general.
A good example of this is the mathematical union of gravity and electromagnetism/light in a fourth dimnension of space. There is a physical basis/reality behind this. It takes even more genius to describe what this reality is.
Importantly, mathematics demomstrates that the integrated and interactive extensiveness of being and experience (including thought) go hand-in-hand in and with time.
Good luck in your work.
Author Frank Martin DiMeglio
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Florin Moldoveanu wrote on Sep. 17, 2009 @ 05:00 GMT
Dear Dr. Rickles,
Congratulations on an excellent essay. I am still reading it carefully, but I disagree with the main idea that it is not possible to be nothing. An empty set is a trivial counter example. You may argue that the notion of a set presupposes some mathematical construct and therefore this is not a truly “nothing”, but this is only a semantic argument. If nothingness is...
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Dear Dr. Rickles,
Congratulations on an excellent essay. I am still reading it carefully, but I disagree with the main idea that it is not possible to be nothing. An empty set is a trivial counter example. You may argue that the notion of a set presupposes some mathematical construct and therefore this is not a truly “nothing”, but this is only a semantic argument. If nothingness is impossible/inconsistent, then we should not be able to represented it and use in any proof, (and in particular in proving that there should be something rather than nothing).
But the question remains: why there is something rather than nothing? My take on this is that your 2 ways of answering it (existence is necessary, or bootstrap) are both wrong. The simple answer is that we have something rather than nothing because “something” can be. (You may argue that I am only shifting the discussion towards introducing a first cause, but I am not, and I will address this at the end).
So what is existence? What are its core critical requirements? Those are 3:
1. “universal” logical consistency: meaning the truth value of existence should be universal and not confined to the boundary of an axiomatic system.
2. interaction. Without interaction we are confined to the frozen Platonic word of math
3. infinite complexity. This is necessary to escape a brain in a vat argument.
If you now look carefully at the 3 requirements, we observe that they specify precisely how our physical world is different than the Platonic world of math. But here comes the truly remarkable part: one can extract mathematical consequences from them and prove very important uniqueness results about our universe. (see my essay entry: Heuristic rule for constructing physics axiomatization)
Now it seems that there are 4 classes of “existence”: A. complete nothingness, B. the frozen Platonic world of math, C. an universe nursery satisfying only requirements 2 and 3 and D. our universe satisfying requirements 1,2, and 3. Time does not exists in cases A, B, and C, and while in the D case we have standard quantum mechanics, in case C we have split-complex (or hyperbolic) quantum mechanics. (I ran out or room to describe the cosmological ideas in my essay, but there is no first cause because there is no time in hyperbolic quantum mechanics which violates requirement (1) because it violates the von Neumann’s uniqueness theorem regarding different representations) I strongly believe we can mathematically prove that our universe is unique: it should have 3 spatial and one time dimension, it should have quantum mechanics, the 4 forces, the elementary particles we observe and their properties, etc. But a new question arises: why is our universe happening only once? This is at odds with a Copernican principle which states that we are in no way special. Here the class ( C ) of existence can potentially come to the rescue IF this speculation will turn out to be true and we will be able to work out the math into proving it.
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Author Dean Rickles wrote on Sep. 17, 2009 @ 07:17 GMT
Hi Casey. Thanks for the comments.
You wrote:
"(1) I agree that mathematical systems "exist." But I should think that the only ones of interest would be those which can lead to some kind of awareness. That is, I think the question of existence is somewhat tied up with awareness.
(2) It seems one could imagine existences--with aware beings--which are not based on mathematics. Are you saying that any kind of non-chaos, any kind of awareness, any ability to distinguish "this" from "that" implies mathematics?"
I don't agree with your (1) here, though I appreciate the Wheelerish sentiment in it, but I think to make better sense of your idea I'd need to know what you meant by 'awareness' and 'existence'. On (2): I challenge you to imagine a world in which, say, the law of non-contradiction did not hold. Also, I didn't mention non-chaos, awareness, or identity and indiscrenibility issues. The point was that no matter what kind of situation you envisage (chaotic, non-chaotic, aware, non-aware, etc.) you will find that the same mathematical truths hold in all. So if you agree that these mathematical truths exist, and you agree that they are necessary, then you have to also hold that there is no conceivable situation in which they do not exist. That is enough to get the conclusion I need.
Cheers,
Dean
Sascha Vongehr wrote on Sep. 17, 2009 @ 07:44 GMT
Thanks for one of the few essays that actually address the ultimate in physics or the ultimate role of it anyways. “Why anything?” seems to be most profound. If physics were to answer this, it will certainly be something ultimate, although you have not much expounded on the role of physics (rather than math) in answering it. Anyways, your discussion of why this is a pseudo-question stops at...
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Thanks for one of the few essays that actually address the ultimate in physics or the ultimate role of it anyways. “Why anything?” seems to be most profound. If physics were to answer this, it will certainly be something ultimate, although you have not much expounded on the role of physics (rather than math) in answering it. Anyways, your discussion of why this is a pseudo-question stops at the surface. Since your essay evidences a serious author behind it, I encourage you to go further, say towards the Robert Nozick or Wittgenstein level and understand so called “category mistakes” [G. Ryle: The Concept of Mind. (1949)]. It is “pseudo” because it only looks like a well formed question. You either split into modalities (possible, existent, necessary) or not. If not, you cannot ask about any of them. If you do, you cannot afterwards mix them up haphazardly like “Either existence is contingent or it is necessary” [page 6]. It is muddleheaded use of terminology.
A few miscellaneous remarks since I am at it (please take my blunt criticisms as a compliment: I will not comment if I do not consider an essay quite reasonable):
1) “Reality is mathematical (as evidenced by the effectiveness of mathematics in the sciences). Therefore, there is existence.” [page 6]
The “effectiveness” is simply due to the co-evolution of our thinking along with our problems; basically, we keep the useful and toss the useless, the most abstract and thus widely applicable we then call “math”. It is also mere PR (Look how effective our stuff is). One could just as well point out how ineffective math is. A completely arbitrary attribution does not evidence anything. The “there is existence”, i.e. existence exists constitutes again a category mistake.
2) “We do not have the same kind of problem with the existence of mathematics. Mathematical statements are necessarily true in the sense that if they are true in one world (in the sense of modal logic) then they are true in all worlds” [page 9]. The axiom of choice does not have to be true in all worlds, except in case the statement is to be understood as an empty tautology (all is everything and includes all cases where it is either true or not but not both at once …). The bare validity of math would be just the same even if no worlds were possible and nobody existed to appreciate it. Everything else is a redefinition of “existence” into something it is not meant to distinguish.
3) The “theory has overtaken experiment in very recent years” [page 2] is over appreciating what happens to be in vogue. Apart from that much of the “overtaking” is speeding in useless directions, it is also not a phenomenon of “very recent years”. Just a few examples: Riemann geometry (turned out useful), GRT of black holes (maybe no experiment possible that probes inside the horizon), quaternions/octonions (counter example to your general position, beautiful math probably never finding any widely accepted use in physics).
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Author Dean Rickles wrote on Sep. 17, 2009 @ 09:50 GMT
Sascha. These are excellent comments. Thanks.
I'm sure you appreciate that it's very hard to do more than scratch the surface of this question in 10 pages and was intent on keeping it as close to math/physics as possible. There was an awful lot I wanted to put it, and I'm not happy with the actual argument itself. Also, however, this essay was for fun rather than part of my serious...
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Sascha. These are excellent comments. Thanks.
I'm sure you appreciate that it's very hard to do more than scratch the surface of this question in 10 pages and was intent on keeping it as close to math/physics as possible. There was an awful lot I wanted to put it, and I'm not happy with the actual argument itself. Also, however, this essay was for fun rather than part of my serious research: I am only a hyper-Pythagorean in my spare time!
On to your comments:
You are perfectly correct that it is mathematics doing the work here rather than physics, but that is why I included the merger between physics and mathematics. Physics would then amount to the probing of those parts of the mathematical universe that interest us humans.
On the category mistake issue. My original conclusion had Wittgenstein's stuff about letting the fly out of the bottle, essentially by dissolving the "big questions" into such simple category errors. I disagree with such objections. I didn't split into possible, necessary, existent. Existence was descried as something that can be possible or necessary. When I say existence is necessary I always mean *some kind of existing 'thing'*. We are rather constrained by language here. Of course Wittgenstein and the ordinary language brigade focused squarely on how concepts are used in practice. I thought we'd gotten beyond that straightjacketed form of philosophizing?
By the way, Nozick does not fall into this category. He expresses genuine perplexity over the problem, noting that it is compounded by the fact that anything we might use as explanatory ammunition is part of what needs to be explained, so we end up with circularity (this is the incompleteness problem I mentioned in my essay). I have a copy of his Philosophical Explanations, and what he says is:
"The question appears impossible to answer. Any factor introduced to explain why there is something will itself be part of the something to be explained, so it (or anything utilizing it) could not explain all of the something - it could not explain why there is *anything* at all." [Phil. Exp. p. 115]
Nozick views the problem as forming the absolute limit of our understanding. The point beyond which we cannot go. Incidentally, my title is based on a section title from his book! I also like his claim that: "The question cuts so deep...that any approach that stands a chance of yielding an answer will look extremely weird". That is, of course, a necessary rather than sufficient condition.
(1) On the effectiveness of math issue. It's true that there is selection bias going on here: we ignore the unsuccessful. But the successful still needs explaining. How is it that the mathematical representations we construct enable us to make often surprising successful predictions? It doesn't matter that sometimes we get unsuccessful predictions. Of course we do. Consider the prediction of the white spot in the center of the shadow cast by an opaque disc onto which light is shone, predicted by Poisson (on the basis of Fresnel's theory). The unsuccessful cases do not mitigate against cases such as this. There is a sense here in which our mathematical representation and parts of reality are isomorphic. One easy (but hard to stomach, no doubt) way is to assume that reality is itself mathematical.
The "there is existence" was supposed to be elliptical for there is the existence of *something*, but something sounded to hard and concrete. The section this comes from was certainly the worst bit. But I'd run out of space by this point and didn't really have time to revise - have a conference talk to write as well!
(2) You say: "The bare validity of math would be just the same even if no worlds were possible and nobody existed to appreciate it." That is the root of my point.
(3) When I say theory has overtaken experiment, I am referring (as you can probably tell) to quantum gravity and 'beyond the standard model'. When I say very recent, I mean within the last 100 years (I'm a historian of physics: this is recent for historians)! Riemannian geometry was not devised as a physical theory (though Riemann was aware of physical aspects). True, it was then applied in GR (which was not ahead of experiment, but based on anomalous extant data: Mercury perihelion). This seems like a case in my favour. Not sure what the black hole case is supposed to be proving here. But again, you admit that there are physical/experimental limits imposed by the scales of the new physics. That is precisely my point. If you still want to continue doing physics in the same way, then the recourse to more mathematical explorations seems inevitable.
On the quaternions/octonions as a counterexample to applicability. Certainly not true. Both find plenty of applications in physics (whether they are 'widely applicable' or not seems to be irrelevant). Two nice books are:
http://www.amazon.com/Division-Algebras-Quaternions-Math
ematics-Applications/dp/0792328906/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=book
s&qid=1253180087&sr=8-1
and
http://www.amazon.com/Introduction-Octonion-Non-Associative-
Algebras-Mathematical/dp/0521017920/ref=sr_1_3?ie=UTF8&s=boo
ks&qid=1253180087&sr=8-3
Also, my point was meant to be more general: even if there happen now to be structures that happen not to be applied to physics; it is hard to believe that one could not find some representational link between them and some aspect of the world - but this is, of course, impossible to prove: it's a plausibility argument.
Thank you again. These were thoughtful, intelligent questions.
Cheers,
Dean
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Stefan Weckbach wrote on Sep. 17, 2009 @ 11:21 GMT
"The question appears impossible to answer. Any factor introduced to explain why there is something will itself be part of the something to be explained, so it (or anything utilizing it) could not explain all of the something - it could not explain why there is *anything* at all." [Phil. Exp. p. 115]
Very interesting arguments about this issue here!
The problem is indeed...
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"The question appears impossible to answer. Any factor introduced to explain why there is something will itself be part of the something to be explained, so it (or anything utilizing it) could not explain all of the something - it could not explain why there is *anything* at all." [Phil. Exp. p. 115]
Very interesting arguments about this issue here!
The problem is indeed circularity/tautology.
If one assumes that we have something rather than nothing because “something” can be, one simply states that "something rather than nothing is possible because it is possible".
If one assumes that something rather than nothing is necessary, one simply states that "something rather than nothing is necessary because it is necessary" (without answering *why* it is necessary).
That something rather than nothing is possible, is evident.
That something rather than nothing is necessary, is only "evident" if one assumes that boolean logics is the one-and-only everlasting truth, eternal and the source of all relations that can be built.
If one assumes that the question about something rather than nothing has no rational answer via logics (human intelligence/mind), the necessity-argument vanishes, but the possibility-argument survives.
If one assumes via logics that logics is limited in the sense that mutually exclusive polarities aren't really mutually exclusive at a deeper level, then both arguments could count, necessity as well as possibility. The melting of these polarities could be done by realizing via logics that each side of the polarities *defines* its counterpart in an entanglement-like fashion. This seems to be logic for me. Now one can conclude out of this line of reasoning that there must be a deeper level that isn't concerned with definitions, its realm is an *undefined* area on which one can project definitions. For me, it seems that such an area could best fit with - vaguely spoken - an area of imagination-like abilities including intentions and emotions. But even this argument has its circularity-problem, because it presupposes the one thing it wants to explain, namely existence of consciousness (to be able to evidently state at all that there is rather something than nothing and "something" is at least possible).
With observers which would live forever and some properties of "observing something" would be an in-built-feature of all particles/matter/fields, the whole problem wouldn't be existent. There would be only transformations from possibilities to actualities (and maybe backwards). There would be only creativity by transforming a problem into its solution. If in this case the problem of "something rather than nothing" doesn't really exist, therefore another "thing" must exist "a priori", namely consciousness and its transformatory power. But this could only be possible if consciousness itself would be self-evident to itself and would realize that itself has created the polarities of something and nothing. So consciousness at its core level must be something that goes deeply beyond "something" and "nothing". It would deal *mainly* with values, not with quantitative proportions like maths.
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Uncle Al wrote on Sep. 18, 2009 @ 02:04 GMT
An axiomatic system sufficiently complex to be useful must contain questions it cannot answer. So? Economics is an empirical disaster as is string theory and its 10^(50,000) acceptable vacua. Both are punctilious interpolations that are revealed to be frauds when extrapolated. The first class of failure requires a contrived construct to fail. The second class of failure merely requires a look. That is an important difference.
Existence might be an automaton whose evolution is contingent upon universal simple rules acting on increasingly complex structures. The bulk is self-evident. Increasing locality is increasingly perverse. Both scales are self-consistent and co-consistent. So?
A gold dubloon is accidently dropped near the center of a long unlit block. A professional manager will amortize the loss. A quality engineer will search at the corners, under four bright streetlights. A decent scientist will get a flashlight and a metal detector, walk into the darkness, find the gold dubloon, and then be discharged for cause - insubordination. Know the fear and do it anyway.
You don't have anything unless you risk a contingent unique testable prediction. Libraries bursting with scientific socialism tomes are ample warning that theorists boast promiscuity while empiricists pay child support.
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Author Dean Rickles wrote on Sep. 18, 2009 @ 02:21 GMT
Uncle Al,
The whole point of this essay competition is to go beyond "unique testable predictions". There's nothing wrong with some good old-fashioned speculation to get the mind going. If I were to write something with a "unique testable prediction" it would really be probing the ultimate foundations of physics now would it?
In any case, the idea of a unique testable prediction" is a slippery notion: Popper's views have been widely discredited amongst philosophers of science for quite some time now, largely thanks to Lakatos' analyses, and the Duhem-Quine hypothesis. You also need to have an account of experiment in order to give sense to the idea of a "unique testable prediction" - not as easy as you might think. Whatever you might think of the sociologists of science, there have been some very good studies that highlight the many contingencies in experiments.
Give me any so-called "unique testable prediction" from the history of science and I will show you an alternative that can also make that prediction. Moreover, if scientists were really to restrict themselves to "unique testable predictions" we would have a very impoverished science to show for it.
Also: perhaps you might phrase your points in plain English rather than quirky metaphors next time, and then we might be able to have a coherent argument.
Cheers,
Dean
Sascha Vongehr wrote on Sep. 18, 2009 @ 05:06 GMT
Dear Dean Rickles
I do not really appreciate your lauding my comments and then squeezing around them like a cat around a hot pot of milk.
Your answer is not addressing the issues properly and I will only point out again your main flaw and for the last time:“I didn't split into possible, necessary, existent. Existence was descried as something that can be possible or necessary. When I say existence is necessary I always mean *some kind of existing 'thing'*. We are rather constrained by language here. Of course Wittgenstein and the ordinary language brigade focused squarely on how concepts are used in practice. I thought we'd gotten beyond that straightjacketed form of philosophizing?”
The “straightjacket” is plainly to stick to meaningful terminology. What you are saying is, actually your essay is not about existence, but about some kind of “Rickles-existence”. In that case however, you need to make that clear right from the beginning. You disregard what existence, possible, necessary etc actually means, claim that you cannot get into what you are actually writing about on only 10 pages, and then instead spend the valuable space on three or four times at length expounding one of the most silly, empty and misleading statements, namely that math is “unreasonably effective”.
I recommend those who address the modality terminology and who want to improve it in the light of for example quantum theory. However, one needs to first understand the issues one desires to improve.
S
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Author Dean Rickles wrote on Sep. 18, 2009 @ 06:38 GMT
Sascha,
I showed you a great deal of respect in my response. I can both appreciate some comments and then proceed to criticise them. There's no inconsistency here. Knowledge advances by criticism. Consider: "Dear Mr Bohr. I don't appreciate the way you laud my comments on local realism and then squeeze them around them like a cat around a hot pot of milk (whatever the hell that means!)" Yours A. Einstein. Though neither you nor I are a Bohr or an Einstein, the point is this is clearly a ridiculous attitude.
The definitions of possibility and necessity I gave are the standard ones from modal logic. I didn't need the existence operator. I don't know what superior source you have. Enlighten me. You say: "The “straightjacket” is plainly to stick to meaningful terminology." I am using the standard, meaningful terminology in this case. My ambivalence over the definition of existence concerns the fact that the word "thing" is too heavily loaded. I don't quite want to say existence implies existence of some thing, but it'll have to do. The question 'why something rather than nothing?' does mean 'why existence?', but that will always be interpreted as the existence of a thing of some kind. I tried to remain as general as possible about what that 'thing' might be.
Finally. If the claim that mathematics' being “unreasonably effective” is silly and empty, then I'm perfectly content to be silly and empty with Wigner.
D
Sascha Vongehr wrote on Sep. 18, 2009 @ 09:11 GMT
Dear Dean Rickles,
I was not complaining about your lauding me but about your use of such strategy to circumvent addressing the issue. I prefer people just get to the point – it is shorter and does not hide the core in PC niceties.
My source, since you are so dependent on big names like Einstein Bohr and Wigner, is I. Kant (for example) and his work on categories, particularly that of modality, which is traditionally split into possibility, existence, and necessity.
Wigner’s statement is not only empty and silly but misleading (read: detrimental to research progress), but you may remain hiding behind Wigner, because the views of founding fathers do matter a great deal in religion, and if you are with Wigner, then of course you may do so, because Wigner is of course Wigner and I am no Wigner.
S
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Author Dean Rickles wrote on Sep. 18, 2009 @ 10:59 GMT
Sascha.
I'll ignore your deliberate attempts to wind me up this time and focus on what you insist on saying is my main flaw.
You say: "... I. Kant (for example) and his work on categories, particularly that of modality, which is traditionally split into possibility, existence, and necessity."
Yes, I know that. Why should I follow this Kantian approach? If you knew anything about Kant, you'd realise that my definitions of necessity and possibility are in any case perfectly consistent with his (his universality almost exactly matches the definition of necessity). What, in any case, does this have to do with the topics in my essay? I'm interested in ontology; beyond the categories. The best connection I can make is via a transcendental argument: it's necessary condition for us having any experience is that there be something that exists. We can know that a priori, so it must be a necessary truth that something exists. But this is just the anthropic-type argument that I mentioned. It doesn't genuinely resolve the problem. Add to this the internal problems with Kant's theory as described by Quine and Kripke.
Next: "Wigner’s statement is not only empty and silly but misleading (read: detrimental to research progress), but you may remain hiding behind Wigner, because the views of founding fathers do matter a great deal in religion, and if you are with Wigner, then of course you may do so, because Wigner is of course Wigner and I am no Wigner." So what is your actual argument here? I gave you a reasoned response to the unreasonable effectiveness issue involving a case study.
Dean
Lev Goldfarb wrote on Sep. 18, 2009 @ 18:12 GMT
Dear Dean,
May I ask you for the clarification of your *main point*?
“If it is necessary then we need a necessary structure to ground this fact. Mathematical structures are of this kind. If reality is mathematical then it must exist. Reality is mathematical (as evidenced by the effectiveness of mathematics in the sciences). . . . Mathematical structures are timeless. . . . In other words, the universe is mathematical because there is existence, and the only reason for there to be existence is that there are mathematical truths.”
Aren’t mathematical structures *created* by us? As far as I understand the situation, they are not handed to us by any God. In fact, the most basic mathematical structure, the natural numbers, is an encapsulation, or representation, of a sequence of identical consecutive events (Peano axioms). One can argue that without such connection with temporal events, the concept of number, and hence of the mathematical structure, could not have appeared in the first place. So, to produce numbers—the very foundations of our mathematical journey—the least *our* universe must have are the sequences of events. Thus, our experience suggests that to have any ‘mathematical structures’ (in our current understanding of the term) the universe must have temporal sequences of events. Hence, I do not see how, *relying on the mathematical structures*, we can argue beyond this *minimal requirement on one of the possible universes*.
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Author Dean Rickles wrote on Sep. 19, 2009 @ 00:28 GMT
Dear Lev,
You said: "Aren’t mathematical structures *created* by us? As far as I understand the situation, they are not handed to us by any God."
I certainly never said they were handed to us by a God! Then I'd have to explain that!
Representations of mathematical structures *are* constructed by us. Of course I agree with that. What they represent was not. The structures were around before the first sentient being capable of representing them emerged.
You then say: " One can argue that without such connection with temporal events, the concept of number, and hence of the mathematical structure, could not have appeared in the first place." There are plenty of possibilities whereby the concept of natural numbers could have emerged. Are you saying that temporal succession is a necessary condition for the emergence of this concept? That doesn't sound like a good thing to be saying. And even if it were true that the 'concept' of the natural numbers emerged this way, that does not mitigate against the structure having a reality independently of this. If the sequence of events is there then we have something instantiating the structure. Unless you mean the sequences recorded in memory. But that case: (1) you have a very idealist view that seems harder to stomach than mathematical realism; or (2) you face the problem that memory, records, and psychology are hardly unproblematic themselves.
I don't know what you have in mind by the claim: "Hence, I do not see how, *relying on the mathematical structures*, we can argue beyond this *minimal requirement on one of the possible universes*". You'll have to spell that out a bit more for me.
Best,
Dean
Ben Baten wrote on Sep. 19, 2009 @ 01:21 GMT
Hi Dean-
You are stating the interesting issue of existence and suggest that there are two ways to go about answering the questions that you bring up:
But now what if we are puzzled about existence itself? Why is there anything at all? This is really the ultimate question: why is there something when, presumably, there might not have been? There are two ways to go about answering...
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Hi Dean-
You are stating the interesting issue of existence and suggest that there are two ways to go about answering the questions that you bring up:
But now what if we are puzzled about existence itself? Why is there anything at all? This is really the ultimate question: why is there something when, presumably, there might not have been? There are two ways to go about answering this kind of question:
1. Show that existence is in fact necessary, so that there couldn't possibly have been nothing-in other words, we deny that there might have been nothing, so that the presumption above is seen to be mistaken.
2. We somehow give a 'bootstrap' explanation showing how consistency alone brings reality into being, perhaps via some kind of (non-vicious) explanatory loop.
The questions are answered in the context of Quantum Field Mechanics (QFM), which is described in my essay "Ultimate Possibilities of Physics". QFM originates from A.P. Kirilyuk. I have extended QFM in some areas and provided it with tutorial style explanations on my website.
The issue of existence issues boils down to the existence of two pre-space pre-time physically motivated fields (aka protofields) and their mutual attraction. This configuration is mathematically described as a state equation, also called existence equation.
Refering to your item 1: Existence is a necessary (unavoidable) consequence of the mutually attractive protofield interaction.
Refering to your item 2: Bootstrapping occurs, again, a consequence of attractive protofield interaction, which causes uncessing pulsations, rotation, and random motion of the interacting protofields.
In the essay, protofield attraction is postulated, but its physical need is motivated as follows. Without interaction, any perturbation in a protofield will 'spread out' and thus be unstable. Protofield attraction could potentially ensure that protofield perturbations are 'self-stabilizing'. As shown by the mathematical analysis of the state equation (existence equation), under the assumption of protofield attraction, protofield stabilized pulsating entities can indeed occur and be identified with particles.
Sincerely,
Ben Baten
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Lev Goldfarb wrote on Sep. 19, 2009 @ 02:19 GMT
1. “Representations of mathematical structures *are* constructed by us. Of course I agree with that. What they represent was not. The structures were around before the first sentient being capable of representing them emerged.”
Dean, I don’t know what exactly you mean by the last statement. I can accept such existence for some (informational) structure, but this structure can be *radically* different from any of the *currently* known mathematical structures. The latter can be, as was suggested by von Neumann (see the end of his quote on page 2 of my essay), “a *secondary* [formal] language, built on [top of] the *primary* [formal] language”. (In fact, in my essay such a possible formalism is discussed.)
2. “There are plenty of possibilities whereby the concept of natural numbers could have emerged. Are you saying that temporal succession is a necessary condition for the emergence of this concept? That doesn't sound like a good thing to be saying.”
I don’t see at all why it “doesn't sound like a good thing to be saying”.
3. “If the sequence of events is there then we have something instantiating the structure.”
I agree that there should be some structure instantiating streams of events (and this I discuss in my essay), but, as I mentioned above, the important question, of course, is *which* structure is instantiating them.
Dean, the reason I raised the question in the first place has to do with the following point. Based on the above, we can claim only that *in our universe* there is at least one ‘preexisting’ formal structure. It is not quite obvious why this situation is also valid for *all* other (possible) universes.
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Stefan Weckbach wrote on Sep. 19, 2009 @ 03:59 GMT
Another short remark to the issue of existence/non-existence:
If one assumes that something rather than nothing is possible, one assumes at the same time that nothing rather than something could also be possible - but actually isn't, because of the evidence that we have for something rather than nothing as an obvious fact. So the question wether there could be nothing instead of something seems to be not very puzzling for me. Because the case of a totally non-existence in the future (maybe by the vanishing of the universe into "non-existence" in some far away future) or even in the past (by arising of "something" out of nothing), one cannot erase the very fact of the possibility of our present existence.
But that does not prove the necessity of existence - or does it? I think it does, because a "possibility" inhabits choices. The possibility of a totally non-existence inhabits the choice of being actual or not, as we see with our actual existence. Therefore, something that inhabits choices cannot be "nothing" at all.
It seems to me, that assuming a totally non-existence to be possible is to deny a subtle detail in the argumentative chain, namely the fact of the existence of our universe and ourselves.
Therefore, the question for me is not, if it is possible that nothing exists, but moreover, where do choices come from - insofar as they cannot come from nothing at all. If they nonetheless could, then everything could come out of nothing and our choices and deductions could be only random exercises, because even contradictions of any kind could come out of nothing and even such contradictions, which could camouflage themselves as consistent lines of reasoning. Therefore, if we believe in rationalism, the necessity of something existent seems obvious for me and Dean Rickles rule of non-contradiction is as necessary as existence seems to be for me.
p.s. In my own essay in the current contest i argue, that not only the rule of non-contradiction is necessary, but also consciousness for the explanation *where* this rule originates from.
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Leshan wrote on Sep. 19, 2009 @ 10:47 GMT
Your essay contains important questions but I don't see the responses and real results. What are the limits of physics 'explanatory power? Can physics explain existence itself? These questions do not have responses in your essay. 'Reality is mathematical. Therefore, there is existence.'
It explains nothing. If reality is mathematical then please transform a formula into a material body. Or...
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Your essay contains important questions but I don't see the responses and real results. What are the limits of physics 'explanatory power? Can physics explain existence itself? These questions do not have responses in your essay. 'Reality is mathematical. Therefore, there is existence.'
It explains nothing. If reality is mathematical then please transform a formula into a material body. Or try to transform a body into a formula. Therefore your approach to EXISTENCE is erroneous. You cannot explain the EXISTENCE using simple logical discussions like 'the only way one can explain existence is to demonstrate that non-existence is a logical impossibility'. The answer for EXISTENCE lies in a deep physics. 'Why is there being?' The answer for this fundamental question lies in the region of nature of space-time: all bodies EXIST IN SPACE. All bodies EXIST IN TIME. To find a sense of EXISTENCE you must explain why a body occupies space and why a body exists in time. The discussions about 'Reality is mathematical' do nothing here.
'why does something exist (rather than nothing)? Please see in my essay the explanation of nothing.
http://www.fqxi.org/data/essay-contest-files/Leshan_Leshan.p
df
It is a hole in space-time without extension and duration properties. It is the primal void, it is the fundament of universe and 'being'. Thus a hole in space-time is an example of the non-existence. To explain the existence, please explain first the non-existence (a hole in space-time). After that you can explain why a body have extension and duration properties and it will be the explanation of existence (why is there being?). You cannot explain EXISTENCE without explanation of extension and duration properties. The explanation of EXISTENCE means explanations of extension and duration: why a body exists in space and time?
All discussions about EXISTENCE using mathematical reasons are senseless. Bodies exist in space and time but not in imaginary mathematics.
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Author Dean Rickles wrote on Sep. 19, 2009 @ 11:26 GMT
Leshan wrote: "If reality is mathematical then please transform a formula into a material body. Or try to transform a body into a formula."
Formulae are *representations* of mathematical structures, not the structures themselves.
You also wrote: "The explanation of EXISTENCE means explanations of extension and duration: why a body exists in space and time?" and that "a hole in space-time is an example of the non-existence."
But spacetime is not nothing: why spacetime rather than nothing? To say nothing is a "hole" in spacetime as you do depends on there being some boundary. But why the bounding spacetime rather than nothing? Space and time belong to the family of existing things that we are trying to explain, you cannot presuppose their existence.
Dean
Leshan wrote on Sep. 19, 2009 @ 13:14 GMT
Dean wrote:
'Formulae are 'representations' of mathematical structures, not the structures themselves'
What is the difference? Can you transform a mathematical structure into a material object? Please understand - really exists only physical (material) structures only. The Earth is a physical object, not mathematical. The mathematical model of Earth exists in heads (imagination) of...
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Dean wrote:
'Formulae are 'representations' of mathematical structures, not the structures themselves'
What is the difference? Can you transform a mathematical structure into a material object? Please understand - really exists only physical (material) structures only. The Earth is a physical object, not mathematical. The mathematical model of Earth exists in heads (imagination) of mathematicians only. Can you show me the (material) mathematical abstraction that really exist?
'But spacetime is not nothing'
You are right. Space-time is a physical (real) object. To create NOTHING we must destroy (remove) space-time from the chamber. Since the space-time disappears, the walls of chamber must come into a proximity (because extension disappears). Also time dilation effect must appear because time disappears. This NOTHING exists a very short time only because it is filled quickly by environment. (Please read my essay for more information).
'To say nothing is a 'hole' in space-time as you do depends on there being some boundary'
Yes, a hole in space-time has a boundary, it is the wall of the chamber. You cannot create a hole without a boundary. But we speak about a hole inside of chamber, it is a true nothingness, it is an absolute void without extension and duration properties. The absolute void collapses quickly into a dimensionless point.
Let us explain the EXISTENCE now. The existence is the property of body to have EXTENSION and DURATION properties. Without extension and duration a body cannot exist.
Do you see the difference between existence and non-existence? All objects must have extension and duration properties in order to exist. The absolute vacuum is nothingness which does not possess the extension and duration properties. There is no EXISTENCE inside of a hole in space-time. Thus we defined non-existence. Then let's define existence.
Bodies exist really in space-time because they have extension and duration properties. Why they have extension and duration? The modern physics do not know the answer.
If you'll write another essay about existence then try to use extension and duration instead of mathematical reality.
Constantin
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Florin Moldoveanu wrote on Sep. 21, 2009 @ 02:10 GMT
Dear Dean,
I have finally had the time to read carefully your essay in its entirety.
Let me start by saying that I do agree 100% with your conclusion, and my own essay shows how you unify math and physics. What I do disagree however, are your arguments for this conclusion.
The arguments are a bit convoluted in taking the pro and against positions and I need to sketch them to...
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Dear Dean,
I have finally had the time to read carefully your essay in its entirety.
Let me start by saying that I do agree 100% with your conclusion, and my own essay shows how you unify math and physics. What I do disagree however, are your arguments for this conclusion.
The arguments are a bit convoluted in taking the pro and against positions and I need to sketch them to frame the arguments:
you present [MN] vs. [C] and present [S] as an argument for [MN] and against [C]. Then you present some weaknesses of [S] and this should weaken [MN]. Your ultimate position is completely against [MN] and you take this as proof of existence.
Finally you say:
“Either existence is contingent or it is necessary. If it is contingent
then there is no complete coherent account of existence. If it is necessary then we need a necessary structure to ground this fact. Mathematical tructures are of this kind. If reality is mathematical then it must exist. Reality is mathematical (as evidenced by the effectiveness of mathematics in the sciences). Therefore, there is existence.”
So here are my comments regarding this discussion.
MN and S are all wrong to some degree.
Instead of MN, we should have MD (metaphysical democracy) where existence and non-existence can coexist peacefully. The world of math is not only timeless, it is also made of incompatible axiomatic systems coexisting side by side and if math and reality are unified, then existence and non-existence should be able to coexist as well in the same fashion. [S] is a rather naïve mechanicist argument at odds with quantum field theory. I do not know enough of [C] to comment on it.
Now your statement: “If it is contingent then there is no complete coherent account of existence.” is reminiscent of Einstein’s position in his debate with Bohr, and from this perspective, it is wrong especially after Aspect’s experiments proved Born right and not Einstein.
“If it is necessary then we need a necessary structure to ground this fact.” Yes
“Mathematical structures are of this kind.” Yes.
“If reality is mathematical then it must exist.” No, only that it can exist.
“Reality is mathematical (as evidenced by the effectiveness of mathematics in the sciences).” Yes (see also my essay on how to reality is unified with mathematics)
“Therefore, there is existence.” No, because existence is contingent.
Your obvious counter argument will be that you are talking about existence in general, and not only our universe in particular. To that I say that existence is only defined in time; time is one of its core requirements. To argue about existence from a timeless point of view outside our universe is impossible because the very notion of existence is not defined there; it is like talking about notions of distance and neighborhood in formal logic. By Goedel, there is not comprehensive axiomatization of mathematics, and your discourse domain about existence in general is ill defined precisely because of that. Suppose for the sake of argument, that Goedel’s incompleteness theorem is false, and there is such a thing as mathematical axiomatization. Then your analysis will be valid. This is a different argument that what you argue in your discussion of Goedel.
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Helmut Hansen wrote on Sep. 22, 2009 @ 05:12 GMT
Dear Mr. Rickles,
I have read your essay. For me it is an absolutely exemplary case for why metaphysics found little applause among scientists. But that does not mean, that I believe such investigations to be meaningless. On the contrary: They are enormously important, because only they can heal the break between philosophy and physics.
In the past metaphysical propositions were not...
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Dear Mr. Rickles,
I have read your essay. For me it is an absolutely exemplary case for why metaphysics found little applause among scientists. But that does not mean, that I believe such investigations to be meaningless. On the contrary: They are enormously important, because only they can heal the break between philosophy and physics.
In the past metaphysical propositions were not wrongly suspected of being meaningless, because often it was not clear what they actually meant.
I think the question why is there something rather than nothing belongs to this category. Usually something and nothing are regarded as opposites. But I doubt whether this is indeed the case.
If the word something is used the simple fact is evocated that there is a world which can be perceived by us. In other words: Something relates to the fact that there are visible things. Visibility here is not meant in a purely visual sense, but in a more general sense as something which can be perceived at all. This includes the usage of all kinds of technical tools, like a telescope.
If we look deeper we can find that distingushibality is the most elementary precondition of perception. A thing can only be seen if there is any difference towards other things. If there would be no difference, such a thing would be, in principle, invisible.
If we follow this way of reasoning then the opposite of SOMETHING would be something, which is by its very nature invisible and indistinguishable.
Or in brief:
Something .. Visibility .. Distinguishability
Something .. Invisibility (Non-Visibility) .. Indistingishability
This philosophical setting was never investigated in detail, because not only nothingness was an unclear physical concept invisibility was an physical unclear concept as well. But we can precise the concept of invisibility. We can give it a well-defined physical meaning. In my paper Taming of the One I have tried to explain invisibility as the natural result of a certain kind of radical non-dual conception of the Universe.
If this explanation would really hold, then Leibniz question appears as a classical case, which the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein would have called as the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.
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Lawrence B. Crowell wrote on Sep. 24, 2009 @ 03:03 GMT
I thought your essay made for an interestin read. I see you are into a bit of a debate over the ontology of mathematics. It is my thinking that we will never be able to figure that out.
Cheers LC
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Anton W.M. Biermans wrote on Sep. 25, 2009 @ 03:59 GMT
The way you speak about existence expresses the assumption that things can have an absolute, objective kind of existence, a reality which exceeds the borders of the universe itself, as if there’s some higher realm outside of it, an outside observer to whom these things exists, which is an essentially religious notion. As without some creator, the universe must have created itself out of nothing, meaning that everything inside of it, including spacetime itself, doesn’t exist as ‘seen’ from the outside, but only to an inside observer who’s part of it, objects only existing to each other as far as they interact, but having no reality outside of it.
“Cosmology and cosmogenesis were, until relatively recently, thought to be outside the ‘proper’ domain of science, to be relegated instead to the armchair speculations of metaphysicians and theologians.”
I’m afraid that cosmogenesis still belongs as much to the domain of metaphysics as it did in pre-Copernican times, never mind the impressive arsenal of instruments we have at our disposal today, the theories the ingeniousness of which seem to pass for proof, nor the huge amount of data which, if I’m right, can support a much simpler and consistent scenario of a self-creating universe which cannot but produce a homogenous, isotropic universe and answers questions Big Bang hypothesis doesn’t even try to like the mechanics and why of its creation.
As some other essays of the contest touch similar matters, I have posted my arguments among the discussion posts at my essay ‘Mechanics of a Self-Creating Universe’ –see my post of 25 september.
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Don Limuti (www.zenophysics.com) wrote on Sep. 29, 2009 @ 08:03 GMT
Interesting essay going for existence (the something coming out of nothing).
Existence will always presuppose nonexistence.
existence/nonexistence/existence/nonexistence/e
xistence/nonexistence/ etc.
When this chain is looked at with a poor resolution we get real objects and classical physics.
When we look at this chain with subtle tools and good resolution we get fuzzy objects and quantum mechanics.
And of course there is always that pesky observer. I am not sure if he/she is doing mathematics or physics?
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Anton W.M. Biermans wrote on Oct. 2, 2009 @ 09:53 GMT
Though I agree that ‘physics and mathematics have a common basis’, there is a fundamental difference. If in a self-creating universe the sum of everything inside, including spacetime itself somehow must stay zero (conservation law), then the physicist cannot treat physical quantities and phenomena like a mathematician does his numbers and symbols. Where his numbers and symbols exist only in...
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Though I agree that ‘physics and mathematics have a common basis’, there is a fundamental difference. If in a self-creating universe the sum of everything inside, including spacetime itself somehow must stay zero (conservation law), then the physicist cannot treat physical quantities and phenomena like a mathematician does his numbers and symbols. Where his numbers and symbols exist only in the mind of the mathematician, the physicist is part of the sum he studies, so he is not allowed, for example, to imagine how the universe looks from the outside as any physical observation requires a at least a specification of his position with respect to what he observes, his distance and the conditions at the place he looks from, which by definition is impossible outside the universe. If he nevertheless imagines to see galaxies of about the same age (since he believes their particles to be created at the same time) receding from each other faster than light, then this is only possible by seeing their spacedistance, but ignoring their corresponding timedistance: by thinking like a mathematician.
‘… The mathematical universe is safe from Godel’s theorem …’
I’m afraid this is not the case. If to explain some phenomenon or prove some theorem we start our reasoning from assumptions and axioms which contain preconceptions, if the truth of our allegations depends on the truth of unprovable assumptions and axioms, then we can never prove them in an absolute sense, however valid they may be within the set of axioms and rules of reasoning they are formulated. The problem is that though our assumptions and axioms may seem self-evident, they aren’t necessarily true as they only reflect our view of our world and express a logic which may differ from nature’s logic. Richard Powers (in The Gold Bug Variations) ‘Why is the last line of a proof surprising, if its truth is already hiding tautologically in the lines above?’ suggests as much: that we put as much information in our choice and formulation of axioms and rules of reasoning as we can get out of them. If the proof of a theorem to some extent also involves the proof of the implicit assumptions which are built into our axioms and rules of reasoning, then the formulation of a theorem can be thought of as an effort to formulate this implicit information explicitly, its proof being incorporated in the theorem as it is formulated. If in that case we don’t so much prove something but rather adapt our thinking to the way our observation evolves, then the impossibility to (dis)prove statements which can be made within a consistent set of rules and axioms (Gödel) might originate in the incompleteness or indefiniteness of our definitions and axioms, in the lack of information or restrictions we’ve put into our rules, axioms and assumptions, so statements can inherently be too ambiguous to prove or disprove. The problem is that much of the information we put in them appears too obvious for us to consider as being information, as if it reflects a truth that needs no inspection: as it is almost impossible to be aware of this implicit information, we indeed are surprised at the last line of the proof, as if we got some information for free that we didn’t put in ourselves in the first place. As our reasoning and the tools we think with are rather the product, the expression of our relation to our world than something which is open to inspection (by itself), it is difficult to detect the implicit information present in our assumptions, in the preconceptions they may contain. This might mean that if we could explicitely formulate all implicit information in a set of axioms and rules so there would be no ambiguity, nor in the theorems we can formulate within that set, Gödel’s theorem would no longer apply, any statement or theorem being a tautology. If we have more confidence in a theory as it is more consistent and it is more consistent as it relates more phenomena, makes more facts explain each other and needs less additional axioms, less more or less arbitrary assumptions, then any good theory has a tautological character though a tautological theory of course isn’t necessarily true nor useful.
In an uncaused, causeless universe which creates itself (see Mechanics of a Self-Creating Universe), where things and events create each other, they explain each other in a circular way, are each other’s ‘cause’. Though a circular reasoning at first sight may seem ridiculous, here we can take any statement, any link of the chain of reasoning without proof, use it to explain the next link and so on, to follow the circle back to the statement we started with, which this time is explained, proved by the foregoing reasoning. Though in a self-creating, noncausal universe a proof seems to be less convincing than a proof which follows a causal reasoning, a causal assertion or explanation ultimately is invalidated as the primordeal cause it is built upon by definition cannot be understood nor proved. The point is that if our logic originates in nature’s logic and not the other way around, that our logic is but a reflection of our relation to our world and not a reflection of some absolute, platonic kind of truth which precedes, exists outside that world, an objective reality as there’s no such thing, mathematics and its development follow physics, and not the other way around, so we cannot blindly rely on its conclusions that explain the why and how of our universe, its laws. Though dreaming up mathematics without bothering too much about the nature of the quantities its equations refer to sometimes can help decide whether ideas in physics make sense, mathematics itself cannot dream up really new physical approaches or ideas. An excessive emphasis on mathematics tends to create its own reality and confuse our view on physical issues. Though many models in physics may mathematically be consistent, I’m still waiting for the one model which obviously, compellingly and necessarily excludes any other model and explains why the universe needs the particular particles we find, why the ratio between their masses is as it is etcetera.
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Jayakar Johnson Joseph wrote on Oct. 3, 2009 @ 06:11 GMT
Dear Dean Rickles,
As per my perception, I support 'Nothing is always Something' and thereby 'Existence' is true. The problem in unification of mathematics and physics to explain physical reality is due to the mathematical formulation of 'zero' that is not true.
With best wishes,
jayakar
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James Putnam wrote on Oct. 4, 2009 @ 18:13 GMT
Dr. Rickles,
In response to an earlier message posted by Dr. Casey Blood you responded:
Quoting Dr. Blood:
"(1) I agree that mathematical systems "exist." But I should think that the only ones of interest would be those which can lead to some kind of awareness. That is, I think the question of existence is somewhat tied up with awareness.
(2) It seems one could imagine existences--with aware beings--which are not based on mathematics. Are you saying that any kind of non-chaos, any kind of awareness, any ability to distinguish "this" from "that" implies mathematics?"
Quoting you:
I don't agree with your (1) here, though I appreciate the Wheelerish sentiment in it, but I think to make better sense of your idea I'd need to know what you meant by 'awareness' and 'existence'. On (2): I challenge you to imagine a world in which, say, the law of non-contradiction did not hold. Also, I didn't mention non-chaos, awareness, or identity and indiscrenibility issues. The point was that no matter what kind of situation you envisage (chaotic, non-chaotic, aware, non-aware, etc.) you will find that the same mathematical truths hold in all. So if you agree that these mathematical truths exist, and you agree that they are necessary, then you have to also hold that there is no conceivable situation in which they do not exist. That is enough to get the conclusion I need.
My question:
You are aware that mathematics exists. You are aware that theoretical physics relies upon it for its definitions of the nature of the universe. You are aware that you have thought extensively about the nature of existence. You are aware that you have reached a conclusion. If your view of a mathematical universe explains your awareness for you, would you please say something about how - a sophisticated collection of shortcuts to arrive at sums without having to do all of the counting otherwise necessary - accounts for your awareness of counting? Did counting preceed intelligence? Is counting the cause of intelligence? How is the act of counting (not the sum result) viewed as timeless?
James
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Terry Padden wrote on Oct. 6, 2009 @ 10:12 GMT
Dean
You write (3rd paragraph) as the keynote of your essay
" Why is there anything at all? This is really the ultimate question: why is there something when, presumably, there might not have been?
Who or what is doing the "presuming" of nothing ? ? Presumably another different (?) nothing (a God ?) .
"and so ad infinitum .." Dean Swift
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Narendra Nath wrote on Oct. 7, 2009 @ 14:15 GMT
Dear Dean,
your boldness approach i like, but that boldness need some basis. May eb the way Physics has proceeded thus far need a change in methodology, i agree. Widening the base by having close links not only with logic/Maths. but also with life sciences apppears to me to be essential. I have mentioneed it at the end of my own essay on this forum. The erason lies in 'consciousness' / awareness. nless the level is high we go on doing routine studies. Now, consciousness is a term that has been sicentifically associated with the brain , a sa process of thinking. i do not like this limitation. Consciousness involves the entire body as well as its interaction with its cosmic counterpart. That is what happened even to Einstein when he privately admitted that he had the problems in his mnd in the early 1900 and all the solutions he could think about failed in implementation to provide the solution. Then, all of a sudden, out of the blue, he got the ideas that were not a part of his thought processes. He could discern their significance and immediately applied the tools he had by way of mathematics, that worked out the solutions!
This analysis is very important to understand. Only an open and highly discerning mind can achieve such success, no methodology can provide a solution. The importance lies in strenghtening the human mind. It has a lot of contents full of random thoughts. One needs the silent moments to have larger duration through disciplining the mind and then the individual consciousness through interaction with the cosmic consciousness , may result in a miracle!
Both maths and experiments are mere tools in Physics. Unless one conceives the right idea, things only may proceed routinely.
yes, programming through Computers today helps but only in solving the complexities of calculations that need to be done, as per the conceptual ideas, their mathematical format and the expyal data available already.
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Mark Stuckey wrote on Oct. 15, 2009 @ 14:58 GMT
"At the root of my explanation of existence is the notion that it is not possible for there to be nothing: existence is necessary."
I agree that "nothing" cannot "be," since "being" entails existence and "nothing" entails nonexistence, i.e., not existence (as I infer from your arguments, anyway). Thus, to say "nothing" has "being" is to say "nonexistence exists," or "not existence and existence" which violates the principle of non-contradiction. Thus, as long as reality conforms to logic, "it is not possible for there to be nothing" is tautologically a true statement. Of course, one could argue that we've introduced a "contingency that enters in to an explanation," i.e., that reality conforms to logic, which then "will leave open a logical gap that renders the explanation incomplete." But, this is a fun essay and I would have to say you're tackling the most ultimate of possibilities!
This essay deserves to win "something rather than nothing" :-)
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George Schoenfelder wrote on Oct. 16, 2009 @ 19:57 GMT
Dear Dean,
I very much liked your essay’s statement, “More explicitly: the only way one can explain existence…is to demonstrate that non-existence is a logical impossibility.”
I am an engineer not a philosopher. Has philosophy argued the word nothing is an oxymora? If so why? If not why not? I argue in my essay the concept is not scientific and should be suspect in physics, but it would help if logicians have too.
Sincerely,
George Schoenfelder
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Narendra nath wrote on Oct. 17, 2009 @ 10:26 GMT
it amazed me to see that your introduction has the same title as my essay on this forum. i also appreciate your philosophical approach to physics and great support for it through pure Mathematics which is not limited by space/ time as concepts.
However, i am unable to see how some physical concepts to build the mathematics for physics does not provide the right methodology to conduct physics.
Physics is tied to the understanding of our physical universe. How can it get tied to pure mathematics except through the relevance of such mathematics to the concepts developed that have achieved success already. One can however chose an alternate set of concepts to represent the realities of the physical universe and then devlop theories with the help of Mathematics relevant to the same.
Existence is tied to awareness and that in turn gets tied to consciousness. The latter has evolved the entire existence through its intelligent logic.There is an essay in this forum by Klingman that explains physical phenomenon purely on the basis of gravity and consciousness, the latter also tied to the material mass in rotatory motion around the mass configuration.
May be the author prefer to comment on such aspects.
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Andreas Martin Lisewski wrote on Oct. 29, 2009 @ 19:28 GMT
For me, a perhaps subtle take-home-message of this essay contest is that non-classical logic such as modal logic and fundamental mathematical structures such as sets, ordinals and natural numbers emerge as the ultimate source and possibility of physics.
In my opinion, your essay contributes nicely to this outcome.
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Eckard Blumschein wrote on Nov. 6, 2009 @ 12:08 GMT
Dear Dean,
While common sense tells us that even the best model or immaterial copy of something real is less comprehensive that the real object itself. Physics of believers like Einstein ignores this at least by equating real time with our abstract time. I do not expect you sharing my belonging conclusions. Are you at lest ready for taking issue with respect to my first sentence?
Regards,
Eckard
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