CATEGORY:
Undecidability, Uncomputability, and Unpredictability Essay Contest (2019-2020)
[back]
TOPIC:
Sentience, the ontology of experience by Cristinel Stoica
[refresh]
Login or
create account to post reply or comment.
Author Cristinel Stoica wrote on Apr. 13, 2020 @ 11:23 GMT
Essay AbstractCan consciousness be completely reduced to physical processes or computation? To answer this question, we'll have to critically review the domain of science, in particular physical processes and computation. A serious limitation is found: science only deals with relations, not with the nature of things. We are led to a formulation of the hard problem of consciousness, which I hope makes it clear for the more skeptical ones that there is a hard problem. Science can be used to approach this problem, but only in an indirect way. We will see that the hypothesis that there is something fundamental about consciousness makes testable predictions.
Author BioTheoretical/mathematical physicist, formerly computer programmer. Research interests: foundations of physics, gauge theory, foundations of quantum mechanics, singularities in general relativity. Interested especially in the geometric aspects of the physical laws. ArXiv: http://arxiv.org/a/stoica_o_1 Blog: http://www.unitaryflow.com/
Download Essay PDF File
Author Cristinel Stoica wrote on Apr. 13, 2020 @ 11:36 GMT
I wrote more about this, and gave more technical details, here
The negative way to sentience. However, there are some differences in the arguments.
Steve Dufourny wrote on Apr. 13, 2020 @ 15:00 GMT
Hi Cristi,
I am happy to see your essay on this Contest. I liked a lot your approach for this consciousness, its limitations and its computability, a very relevant analysis, general, I wish you all the best,
Friendly, regards
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on Apr. 13, 2020 @ 18:32 GMT
Hi Steve,
Good to see you, thanks for reading it. I wish you all the best too!
Regards,
Cristi
Edwin Eugene Klingman wrote on Apr. 13, 2020 @ 19:43 GMT
Dear Christi Stoica,
A very enjoyable and valuable essay. Yes, theory is about making structural hypotheses, and science deals with relations only, not with the nature of things. When we declare the nature, we make a metaphysical choice; we choose an ontology. My current essay Deciding on the nature of time and space is about deciding on this choice.
You say to go beyond relations...
view entire post
Dear Christi Stoica,
A very enjoyable and valuable essay. Yes, theory is about making structural hypotheses, and science deals with relations only, not with the nature of things. When we declare the nature, we make a metaphysical choice; we choose an ontology. My current essay
Deciding on the nature of time and space is about deciding on this choice.
You say to go beyond relations is to “
contaminate with intuition...”
Klaas Landsman, commenting to Noson Yanofsky: “
I am increasingly beginning to believe that we should incorporate intuitionistic math into,(quantum) physics...”. I’m not sure what this means but I know others in this contest favor reconsidering intuition.
I believe your topic, ‘
Sentience, the ontology of experience’, is well suited to explore intuition, which derives either from Being or from our experience.
One drum I regularly beat is that physicists project math structure on the world, then come to believe that the world actually has that structure. If not, false premises mar the theory. ‘Qubits’ for example lead to non-locality.
You propose ‘easy problems’ as fully expressible in terms of relations. In John Schultz’s essay, I believe he would characterize these as ‘algorithmic patterns’. He claims, and I buy it, that limitation theorems are algorithmic, while non-algorithmic patterns pose no necessary limitations on knowability. I recommend his essay. I suggest that non-algorithmic patterns are the basis of ‘intuition’, and knowability is not limited by any theorems.
I relate this to the universal consciousness field, which I identify with the gravitomagnetic field [your Case 2 substrate] in the
present [see my essay]. The field is, of course, self-interacting and also interacts with mass density flows in axons and across synaptic gaps. Logical patterns exist, whereby we obtain logic, but non-algorithmic patterns in the dynamic self-interacting field are not logic constrained, but intuition-based, in essence the self awareness that transcends relations, as the field is locally dense but contiguous with the universe.
An extremely valuable essay, thank you!
Edwin Eugene Klingman
view post as summary
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on Apr. 13, 2020 @ 20:42 GMT
Dear Edwin,
Thanks for the careful reading and the well thought comments.
> When we declare the nature, we make a metaphysical choice; we choose an ontology.Exactly.
About Klaas' comment you mention, to incorporate intuitionistic math (idea that I think is shared by Flavio too), this is in the line with what I tried to say, more that it may seem at a first...
view entire post
Dear Edwin,
Thanks for the careful reading and the well thought comments.
> When we declare the nature, we make a metaphysical choice; we choose an ontology.Exactly.
About Klaas' comment you mention, to incorporate intuitionistic math (idea that I think is shared by Flavio too), this is in the line with what I tried to say, more that it may seem at a first sight. Intuitionism in math is not about intuition in the same sense as the one I used in my essay, but about avoiding assumptions with infinitely long shot, a thing with which I resonate.
About the usual meaning of intuition, I am very much in favor of it, but I see it like a step of a stair, you don't take the step with you when you climb the stair. You form new intuition along the way. I have the feeling that you think the same about this.
> physicists project math structure on the world, then come to believe that the world actually has that structureI think the same as you. Projecting math structures is a particular type of projecting assumptions. This bothers me too, and I think I base my research in general on trying to also undo some of the mathematical assumptions made by physicists in an ad-hoc manner, under the pressure of history. I am just as human as the others are, so most likely I project my own assumptions on everything, even if I try to avoid this.
In fact, the intention to not be committed in the analysis made in this essay to a particular math structure led me to use dynamical systems as a general framework able to include all known theories in physics as particular cases. When talking about foundations, I don't want to miss some possibilities by relying on a particular human construct. Dynamical systems are human constructions too, but at least they are general enough to include the other theories as particular cases, which allows me to say general things without committing to particular models.
> I relate this to the universal consciousness field, which I identify with the gravitomagnetic field [your Case 2 substrate] in the present [see my essay].An interesting thing is that I've heard recently three unrelated known people working at the hard problem of consciousness and supporters of panpsychism, mentioning gravity (maybe they didn't know about the gravitomagnetic field) as a possible example of physical field that could be associated to consciousness. I look forward to read more about this in your essay. Based on your previous essays I expect another good reading.
Cheers,
Cristi
view post as summary
Edwin Eugene Klingman replied on Apr. 25, 2020 @ 02:56 GMT
Dear Cristi,
I was very interested in your comment about having heard recently others mention gravity as a possible field for panpsychism. I have rewritten my essay to include information that became available the day after you wrote the above comment. I sincerely hope you will reread at least the last 4 pages of my essay. I think you’ll find it worthwhile.
Best regards,
Edwin Eugene Klingman
report post as inappropriate
Jochen Szangolies wrote on Apr. 14, 2020 @ 05:07 GMT
Dear Christi,
I'm glad to see you enter this contest; your essays always bring an interesting point of view or novel argumentation to the table. This year's does not disappoint.
Intriguingly, there seems to be some degree of confluence of thought between your particular neutral monist stance, and the one I defended in a recent publication (https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-020-09522-x)....
view entire post
Dear Christi,
I'm glad to see you enter this contest; your essays always bring an interesting point of view or novel argumentation to the table. This year's does not disappoint.
Intriguingly, there seems to be some degree of confluence of thought between your particular neutral monist stance, and the one I defended in a recent publication (https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-020-09522-x). Basically, your view seems to be close to Strawson's physicalist panpsychism, which I characterize by the following two main theses:
PP1: In experience we are immediately presented with the intrinsic nature of physical stuff, which is inherently experiential.
PP2: Theories are purely structural or relational in form.
The second thesis, which goes back to Russell's causal theory of perception, and has roots as well in Eddington's structuralism (who talks memorably about the 'inner un-get-atable nature' of matter), I think both of us share, and likewise, the thesis that this relational structure does not suffice for conscious experience.
I think you may want to accept the first thesis---your S essentially being the intrinsic properties grounding the relational mathematical structure of P---whereas I ultimately reject it, substituting instead a different model of how 'structure-transcending properties' of the world can come to attention in the mind, thus grounding experience without themselves necessarily being experiential (or elements of sentience).
So I do agree that the relational structure as present in our theories needs grounding by some structure-transcending properties, and that it is those which are, properly understood, ultimately what ground subjective experience; but I don't think that these properties simply are experiential in themselves, essentially because I think the resulting panpsychism or pan-experientialism faces some difficult challenges, such as the notorious combination problem. Hence, I propose that the intrinsic must be used in the right way---essentially, as grounding our models of the outside world---in order to yield conscious experience.
We also seem to look to similar sources for inspiration---the quote from the Tao you use to preface section 6, I used as the hook for my entry in the previous FQXi contest, 'Four Verses from the Daodejing', which contained precursors to many of the notions in the 'Minds and Machines'-article. Indeed, some of it even turned up in my very first FQXi-entry, 2013's 'Informational Ontologies and 'Hard' Problems', which pointed out the underdetermination of the character of physical objects by relational structure: "[I]nformation is only concerned with differences. Wherever there is a difference, wherever you can tell apart one thing from another, you have information; and only this difference structure is straightforwardly encoded in the information state. [...] But this difference structure is not enough to recover the physical state of an object: the informational underdetermines the physical."
Furthermore, later, it goes on to argue that "information has an intrinsically relational character"---hence arriving at the insufficiency of a purely relational characterization. And of course, the basic point of that essay was that such underdetermination is at the root of the 'Hard Problem' (which I still think is the case, even if I no longer agree with the solution outlined back then). There's also already a tentative connection to quantum mechanics being made, which I've since gone on to flesh out some more, see this year's essay and my paper in 'Foundations of Physics' (https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-018-0221-9).
Anyway, I'm sorry about the extensive self-quoting; I don't mean to be vain, but I wanted to underscore that there indeed seems to be some amount of convergence between our views. This, to me, always indicates that we're not merely barking at shadows---if two people are led to similar views along independent routes, one just might hope that there's something worthwhile to find at that destination.
Hence, thanks for this eminently readable and thought-provoking essay. I'll have to take some time to digest your larger piece, and perhaps return with some further comments and questions. Good luck in the contest!
Cheers
Jochen
view post as summary
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on Apr. 14, 2020 @ 09:48 GMT
Dear Jochen,
Good to see you, and thank you for the careful reading of my essay.
>
I think you may want to accept the first thesis---your S essentially being the intrinsic properties grounding the relational mathematical structure of PBy S I mean the "speakable" related to sentience, but not sentience itself. Sentience is the ontology of S. I find that the most natural solution is S=P.
>
I think the resulting panpsychism or pan-experientialism faces some difficult challenges, such as the notorious combination problem.I think the same. I think S=P is like pan-experientialism, but I don't think it faces the combination problem, because I don't think there are separate units of sentience, rather sentience is the ontology of both S and P (is this different from "grounding our models"?). I think fundamental sentience faces another problem, which I called "the climbing problem" in my extended essay
The negative way to sentience. But, while this is a problem, it allows Hypothesis 1 to make empirical predictions and be falsifiable, which I think it's a good thing.
>
if two people are led to similar views along independent routes, one just might hope that there's something worthwhile to find at that destinationIndeed, this qualifies as "intersubjective verification", which I mentioned in "The negative way to sentience". If you have comments, I look forward to hear them, no matter if you disagree, I have this on ResearchGate with the words "comments welcome" in the title, since I'm still collecting feedback. At the same time, I'm looking forward to read yours, and I expect, based on your previous ones, that I will love it.
Cheers,
Cristi
Jochen Szangolies replied on Apr. 14, 2020 @ 14:37 GMT
Dear Christi,
thanks for your reply. I had misunderstood the precise meaning of your 'S'---it seems to me, you use it to refer to the relational structure of 'sentience'? If so, then I guess what you mean by 'ontology of sentience' is what I mean by 'structure-transcending properties'. I had thought you were using S to refer to this ontology itself, as sort of a set in want of a structure, with P being a structure of relations in want of relata, then using one to fill the other's gap.
As for the combination problem, I think I don't quite grasp what exactly you mean by the term 'ontology of sentience'. Do you mean it in the sense of a singular experiential reality? If so, then it's not obvious to me how (what appear like) individual minds emerge from this---something I think I've seen called the 'separation problem' instead. Perhaps you can take a suggestion from Bernardo Kastrup, who argues that we're all essentially schizophrenic 'alters' of the cosmic mind? (https://iai.tv/articles/why-materialism-is-a-dead-end-berna
rdo-kastrup-auid-1271)
I'm gonna go have a look at your longer treatment.
Cheers
Jochen
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on Apr. 14, 2020 @ 16:17 GMT
Dear Jochen,
Indeed, I think we can only talk about the relational structure of sentience. I tried to be more explicit in the longer article, where I discuss that we can only research "the crack". The purpose was to see what can be done by limiting, or rather by being limited to talk only about relations, not about ontology. Kastrup is the closest to how I see it from what I've read, but I...
view entire post
Dear Jochen,
Indeed, I think we can only talk about the relational structure of sentience. I tried to be more explicit in the longer article, where I discuss that we can only research "the crack". The purpose was to see what can be done by limiting, or rather by being limited to talk only about relations, not about ontology. Kastrup is the closest to how I see it from what I've read, but I think it's "metaphorical", and still at the level of relations, because "metaphor" is all that we can do about it. But I'd rather say it in another way. Suppose you're a materialist. Based on materialism, you would attribute a certain materialist ontology to a rock, a piece of ice, water, or steam. You would see it as derived from the fundamental ontology of the elementary particles. Then, if you try to replace "matter" in the materialist ontology with "sentience", you'd have of course a problem,
the combination problem you mention. A better way than materialism is physicalism, and to think of particles as excitations of the quantum field, so to think of objects like some stable excitations/fluctuations of the vacuum. Then, you don't combine, it's just the field, not a combination of particles. Then, the ontology doesn't rely on a bottom-up approach starting from particles. Now replace the physicalist ontology with sentience. This would reduce the combination problem, at least apparently, since you have just a field, out of which separate fields are apparent. But the real problem is the
problem of climbing: how does fundamental sentience climb the structure, from the fundamental level, to the coarse grained level that we call brain, to our minds? This view of excitations/fluctuations with the coarse graining is a metaphor that is similar to Kastrup's I think, but closer to what I mean, yet not quite what I mean, which I think it's unspeakable. The closest to what I think the explanation is, is contained in my previous essay,
Indra's net, particularly in note 8, which is about the equivalence class of germs defining the holomorphic field. I didn't include this in the essay or even in the longer essay, since I wanted to allow for more options, even though I prefer S=P, and since I wanted to see how far we can go just from the most inevitable principles,
i.e. by avoiding speculations.
Cheers,
Cristi
view post as summary
Jochen Szangolies replied on Apr. 25, 2020 @ 15:26 GMT
Dear Cristi,
I think we're not worlds apart in our views. My own thinking, as elaborated in the Minds and Machines-article, is very similar---physics is about what we can say about the relational structure of the world, which leaves out its intrinsic character. Many, from William James via Russell to modern theorists like Kastrup or Galen Strawson (I think, if you don't know it, you might find lots of interest in his essay '
What does 'physical' mean?'), have taken this to suggest that the stuff left out in this way then just is experience/experiential, or 'sentience' as you put it. Strawson's view is especially illuminating: he argues that there's really no grounds to think that the experiential, in this sense, is 'extra-physical'; rather, it's just what carries the relations that physics discovers, and hence, even though 'structure-transcending', is just as much physical in character---something not miles away from your 'S = P', it seems to me.
Me, I'm not quite there, yet. It's always seemed to me that panpsychist views solve the problem of consciousness rather like Alexander solved the Gordian Knot---essentially, perforce stipulating mental properties as elements of the world. Hence, I strive to try and find a way to make intrinsic properties be apparent to consciousness, and only in that appearance becoming experiential---a process which, I agree, will not ever allow for any formal description, and hence, unspeakable.
But I do believe that this is a viable---even promising---avenue to pursue, even if it's not quite my own. There are various attempts at trying to steer a middle way between Cartesian dualism and all-out eliminative materialism, neither of which I find very appealing, and I think the recent resurgence in the exploration of these options is a hopeful sign that we're maybe making some actual progress.
Cheers
Jochen
report post as inappropriate
hide replies
Satyavarapu Naga Parameswara Gupta wrote on Apr. 14, 2020 @ 07:10 GMT
Respected Prof Cristinel Stoica,
Thank you for presenting a wonderful essay on Human Consciousness.
In my opinion this inner Consciousness is a constant guidance force which guides all aspects of life..
for particles like electron, this may the charge. For astronomical bodies this the Universal Gravitational Force acting on that body at that instant of time and space (UGF). This UGF varies with time and space and configuration of Universe around it at that instant.
You have defined VERY NICELY what is NOT consciousness in general. Very good!!
Hope you can spend a little time on my essay to see how the above definitions in more detail.
I hope to have lively discussion with you on your thinking.
Best wishes for your essay!!!
=snp
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on Apr. 14, 2020 @ 09:50 GMT
Dear Satyavarapu Naga Parameswara Gupta,
Thank you for the careful consideration of my essay. Based on your comment, I think we both take the position that S=P and sentience underlies them.
>
You have defined VERY NICELY what is NOT consciousness in general. Very good!!I guess you noticed that I took a
neti neti (नेति नेति) path, as the title of my longer essay,
The negative way to sentience, suggests.
>
Hope you can spend a little time on my essay to see how the above definitions in more detail.I'd love to!
>
I hope to have lively discussion with you on your thinking.>
Best wishes for your essay!!!I wish the same to you too! Take care!
Cheers,
Cristi
Satyavarapu Naga Parameswara Gupta replied on Apr. 14, 2020 @ 12:59 GMT
Respected Prof Cristinel Stoica,
You got a wonderful interest in Indian Philosophy , and tried to add mathematics in that too! I just saw your paper negative Philosophy, I will study it little later ... Very Good!!!
I don't know How much deep you went into "neti neti (नेति नेति)" path.It is a difficult path. There is positive path also. It is called "observer becomes observed", do you know that??? Of course it is also a difficult path. There are 1000's of 'Rishi's each and every one had his own path!!!
Ultimately you have to find your own path to Nirvana............
Best wishes
=snp
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on Apr. 14, 2020 @ 14:08 GMT
Dear Satyavarapu Naga Parameswara Gupta,
Please call me Cristi. Thanks for your appreciation, it's reciprocal. Indeed, the "negative path" is normally used in the sense you mentioned, as a way to Nirvana. What I mean by negative way or neti neti in the context of
my longer essay is mainly
science as a negative way. Science allows hypotheses then rejects them. Most powerful results come as
no-go theorems, which is also the theme of this contest. The body of science grows, which gives the impression that it's a "positive growth", an accumulation of knowledge. But positivism is no longer the way of science. In some sense the body of knowledge is growing, but the attachment to the accumulated knowledge is not in the spirit of science itself, which works by negation. All of the models and theories are to be seen as provisional hypotheses, always in search for contrary evidence. It's the way of skepticism, in the proper meaning of the word, which is the same as in negative mysticism, but applied to science. As for neti neti as a personal path, my ego probably wants a piece of Nirvana too :) I have no worries about this, my ego is just an ephemeral cloud on the blue sky. It's a form of experience, I take it as it is, with the goods and the bads. Nature built these neural networks as a form of life, and as neural networks, they are made out of biases. But a cloud can neither help nor do any harm to the unchanging blue sky, it's just a playful fluctuation of oblivion which gives too much importance to itself :)
Cheers,
Cristi
Satyavarapu Naga Parameswara Gupta replied on Apr. 15, 2020 @ 06:23 GMT
Dear Cristi,
Thanks for your appreciation also, your essay is wonderful !!.
You are correct about negativism in science. This happens and continues to happen in Physics. I got my personal experiences in my life for the last 40 years or so. Whatever the Ethical Values I kept, whatever the foundational principles were used, whatever the physical cosmological philosophies were used, whatever the predictions that came true, for Dynamic Universe Model an N-Body problem solution, whatever I got is kicks on the back, never any back patting. I am sorry about this bla bla bla…. Now I got everything positively. I did this work on Gods guidance, I will leave everything on him, I did this work for the development of science and betterment of humanity. My problem is over….
I am requesting to see a paper on a universe model proposed by Dynamic Universe Model
https://vaksdynamicuniversemodel.blogspot.com/2018/08/n
ew-paper-model-of-universe-as.html
Hope you will have a visit at my essay and leave a suitable comment….
Best Regards
=snp
report post as inappropriate
hide replies
Andrew Beckwith wrote on Apr. 14, 2020 @ 20:11 GMT
Hi Christi
I enjoyed your essay, but in terms of consciousness, there is demonstrably an AI analogue to this problem, which is in the interconnectivity of synapses in the human brain, i.e. in terms of the universe, the issue can be related to the density of neuronic pathways.
Finding a counter part to this issue of interconnectivity to bits, and logic processors as to the human brain may be the way to extend this sort of modality to cosmological structures. I.e. we may be looking at the wrong places for determining the minimum structure needed for self awareness
It is, in a sense directly related to the problem of what makes an entity self aware.
In animals, i.e. Cats and Dogs, it shows up if an animal can recognize its own image in a mirror reflection. To a degree some dogs can do this, whereas cats flunk the test and try to go behind a mirror to identify if there is another cat present. Whereas the great Apes definitely DO have a working ability to recognize themselves in a mirror.
So what is the threshold in terms of interconnectivity of some sort of cosmologically based "thinking " structure ?
I do not know and I doubt anyone has addressed that issue in terms of biophysics. But if they did find a way to quantify interconnectity of structure with self awareness, they then would be able to map the measurable biological markers of signal interconnetivi5ty of structure with a minimum threshold allowing consciousness.
That issue of a minimum level of interconnectivity of "thinking" or neuronic structure may be later, in some sense after we know more about what causes cognition and self awareness be mapped directly upon what we know about cosmological structures
This is my speculation. It is meant to be in tandem with your investigations
Andrew
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on Apr. 15, 2020 @ 07:29 GMT
Hi Andrew,
Thank you for the interesting comments, which are complementary to the focus of my essay, in tandem, as you said.
>
in terms of consciousness, there is demonstrably an AI analogue to this problem, which is in the interconnectivity of synapses in the human brain, i.e. in terms of the universe, the issue can be related to the density of neuronic pathways.Certainly, there must be a structural side of the problem, the physical correlates of sentience. You propose a measure of this, the density of neural paths. Another one is the Phi proposed in Integrated Information Theory.
>
It is, in a sense directly related to the problem of what makes an entity self aware.Yes, self-awareness requires structure, to be able to include a self-representation. When I say "sentience" I mean the ontology of the structure, "what is like to be", whether self-aware or not.
I think the so called "easy problems", those related to structure, functionality, behavior, are not easy at all, not understood yet, but understandable in principle, and they are important.
Thanks again for considering my essay and for the comments! I'm looking forward to read yours.
Best regards,
Cristi
Andrew Beckwith wrote on Apr. 14, 2020 @ 23:32 GMT
Hi Christi
I enjoyed your essay, but in terms of consciousness, there is demonstrably an AI analogue to this problem, which is in the interconnectivity of synapses in the human brain, i.e. in terms of the universe, the issue can be related to the density of neuronic pathways.
Finding a counter part to this issue of interconnectivity to bits, and logic processors as to the human brain may be the way to extend this sort of modality to cosmological structures. I.e. we may be looking at the wrong places for determining the minimum structure needed for self awareness
It is, in a sense directly related to the problem of what makes an entity self aware.
In animals, i.e. Cats and Dogs, it shows up if an animal can recognize its own image in a mirror reflection. To a degree some dogs can do this, whereas cats flunk the test and try to go behind a mirror to identify if there is another cat present. Whereas the great Apes definitely DO have a working ability to recognize themselves in a mirror.
So what is the threshold in terms of interconnectivity of some sort of cosmologically based "thinking " structure ?
I do not know and I doubt anyone has addressed that issue in terms of biophysics. But if they did find a way to quantify interconnectity of structure with self awareness, they then would be able to map the measurable biological markers of signal interconnetivi5ty of structure with a minimum threshold allowing consciousness.
That issue of a minimum level of interconnectivity of "thinking" or neuronic structure may be later, in some sense after we know more about what causes cognition and self awareness be mapped directly upon what we know about cosmological structures
This is my speculation. It is meant to be in tandem with your investigations
Andrew
report post as inappropriate
Flavio Del Santo wrote on Apr. 15, 2020 @ 00:19 GMT
Dear Cristi,
thank you for great essay, very well argued and clearly written. Although I was not particularly familiar with systematic developments on the hard problem of consciousness, I think you provided an excellent analysis and good food for thought.
I particularly appreciated your clean-dut discussion on how science is only about relations. And in particular your phrase: "We can compare nature with a book written in a language that we don't understand. Science is a way to decode the book. It proceeds by identifying various words in various contexts, and the result is a dictionary, along with some grammar rules. Each word in the dictionary is defined in terms of other words, but there are no primary words whose meaning we understand."
Best of luck for the contest!
Flavio
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on Apr. 15, 2020 @ 07:40 GMT
Dear Flavio,
I am happy to see you here again with an essay. Thank you for reading my essay and for the comments. Since you liked that passage, let me provide one from John von Neumann:
you don't understand things. You just get used to them. It's a though I had independently, but I found out that he said it long before, referring to math. I think it applies much more widely. Perhaps most clearly it applies to the foundations of quantum mechanics :)
Thanks again, I am looking forward to read it! Good luck with the contest to you too!
Cheers,
Cristi
Satyavarapu Naga Parameswara Gupta wrote on Apr. 15, 2020 @ 18:12 GMT
Dear Cristi,
I am just repeating this post please....
Thanks for your appreciation also, your essay is wonderful !!.
You are correct about negativism in science. This happens and continues to happen in Physics. I got my personal experiences in my life for the last 40 years or so. Whatever the Ethical Values I kept, whatever the foundational principles were used, whatever the physical cosmological philosophies were used, whatever the predictions that came true, for Dynamic Universe Model an N-Body problem solution, whatever I got is kicks on the back, never any back patting. I am sorry about this bla bla bla…. Now I got everything positively. I did this work on Gods guidance, I will leave everything on him, I did this work for the development of science and betterment of humanity. My problem is over….
I am requesting to see a paper on a universe model proposed by Dynamic Universe Model
https://vaksdynamicuniversemodel.blogspot.com/2018/08/n
ew-paper-model-of-universe-as.html
Hope you will have a visit at my essay and leave a suitable comment….
Best Regards
=snp
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on Apr. 15, 2020 @ 18:49 GMT
Dear Satyavarapu Naga Parameswara Gupta,
Thank you for the comment. Because we moved the discussion here, let me also bring the paragraph where I mention science as a negative way.
What I mean by negative way or neti neti in the context of my longer essay is mainly science as a negative way. Science allows hypotheses then rejects them. Most powerful results come as no-go...
view entire post
Dear Satyavarapu Naga Parameswara Gupta,
Thank you for the comment. Because we moved the discussion here, let me also bring the paragraph where I mention
science as a negative way.
What I mean by negative way or neti neti in the context of my longer essay is mainly science as a negative way. Science allows hypotheses then rejects them. Most powerful results come as no-go theorems, which is also the theme of this contest. The body of science grows, which gives the impression that it's a "positive growth", an accumulation of knowledge. But positivism is no longer the way of science. In some sense the body of knowledge is growing, but the attachment to the accumulated knowledge is not in the spirit of science itself, which works by negation. All of the models and theories are to be seen as provisional hypotheses, always in search for contrary evidence. It's the way of skepticism, in the proper meaning of the word, which is the same as in negative mysticism, but applied to science.What I mean by
science as a negative way is in the sense of
via negativa, applied to the study of reality rather than theology. I didn't call science
a negative way because it rejects people's novel proposals of theories in favor of the "mainstream" ones. I called it so because it keeps testing itself, or at least it is supposed to do so. And because it is never definitive, even though many think it's definitive, and many did so through the entire history of science. So, to make it clear, I didn't complain that it is negative in the sense you mention, although this may be true as well. If I would make a complaint against the scientific community, is that it is not negative enough, but in the sense I meant for the word "negative", not in the sense of rejecting new ideas.
Most of those interested to contribute to science, both gifted amateurs and professionals, have difficulties to get enough attention. Few are those blessed with the attention. Not getting attention is not a proof that the theory is wrong, getting high positive attention and esteem is not a proof that it is right, although it's a proof that at least it's interesting enough to enough scientists. A sure way to be ignored is to not master properly the field, in the most technical details. But mastering it and even solving some good problem is not a guarantee of success. And nice words said by even some authorities don't guarantee success either. They have to cite the work, to join it and develop it in their own papers. Very few are lucky like this. Most published papers are read only by reviewers, and even so, sometimes only superficially. A lot of brain power is used to produce new research, very little of it receive the light of other conscious beings. Who knows what gems are hidden and lost forever in someone's drawer, or even published in a journal but never understood by others.
Cheers,
Cristi
view post as summary
Satyavarapu Naga Parameswara Gupta wrote on Apr. 16, 2020 @ 12:27 GMT
Dear Prof Cristi,
I just cant under valuate your knowledge by calling you just Cristi!
I am just replying your post above please.... Just because the reply posts are not visible directly. Thank you for replying me here.
You are correct, the negative way of science has both the meanings, mainstream which is powerful will reject the new ideas, as well as science has the inherent way of testing the new theories in the negative way to see that if the theory withstands or not, as you discussed in your essay.
Well supported theories may not be correct some times, as well as correct theories may not have the luck. You have well analyzed the present situation in a nut shell. Some people just dont have LUCK, like me!!
I appreciate your essay and your way of writing in a best manner!!
I want to see your well learned comments on my essay soon...
Best
snp
report post as inappropriate
Eckard Blumschein wrote on Apr. 16, 2020 @ 22:07 GMT
Dear Cristinel Stoica,
Do you agree on that experience in its original meaning is exclusively based on memorized past processes, not on expected future ones?
Cheers,
Eckard Blumschein
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on Apr. 17, 2020 @ 06:29 GMT
Dear Eckard Blumschein,
Maybe. My experience doesn't go back to those time. So for the original meaning I trust
etymologists, and they say
"observation as the source of knowledge; actual observation; an event which has affected one," from Old French esperience "experiment, proof, experience" (13c.), from Latin experientia "a trial, proof, experiment; knowledge gained by repeated trials," from experientem (nominative experiens) "experienced, enterprising, active, industrious," present participle of experiri "to try, test," from ex- "out of" (see ex-) + peritus "experienced, tested," from PIE *per-yo-, suffixed form of root *per- (3) "to try, risk." Meaning "state of having done something and gotten handy at it" is from late 15c.Words evolve. Take for example the word "calculate" from the title of your essay. Its etymology goes back to
"calculus" = "pebble stones", but now it's used in a much wider sense than counting pebbles.
But I'll leave such debates to linguists. The way I use the word "experience" is closer to the way it's used
here, and I don't tie it particularly to memories or expected future processes.
Cheers,
Cristi
Eckard Blumschein replied on Apr. 17, 2020 @ 08:04 GMT
Dear Cristinel Stoica,
I very much appreciate your "maybe". You wrote elsewhere:
" As humans, very early in life we become aware that events that already happened cannot be changed, and that future events, although unpredictable, can be influenced by our present actions. This intuition is so deeply hardwired in our world view, that it seems unnatural to even question the idea that past and future do not exist, but only present does."
What a mistake! Sorry, I am almost never using such emphasis.
However, my concern is not linguistics, and I wrote "calculate" not as to consider the TND flawed as does Peter Jackson. As an engineer, I can only analyze a part of a growing "block" of more or less memorized data from past processes. The fuzzy notion present has no logical place between past and future.
Cheers,
Eckard
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on Apr. 17, 2020 @ 12:33 GMT
Dear Eckard Blumschein,
>
As an engineer, I can only analyze a part of a growing "block" of more or less memorized data from past processes. The fuzzy notion present has no logical place between past and future.This makes sense. To connect it with my essay, the memories and the growth you mention happen at the coarse grained level.
Cheers,
Cristi
Ernesto Vaca wrote on Apr. 17, 2020 @ 18:34 GMT
Dear Cristi,
I really enjoyed your essay. Thank you for submitting it. I really like your closing remark that the ontology of S could very well equal the ontology of P. It's surprisingly intuitive, though only after hearing your argument for it.
I had a couple questions. You say sentience is the ontology of system S. Are you claiming that science can not make any progress explaining an ontology? Can the hard problem ever be explained through science in your view, possibly indirectly? You say P is a mathematical structure in search of an ontology, do you think it will ever get there?
I try to avoid this type of soliciting, but if I may be so bold to ask, I would love your feedback on my essay. I am still a student, and you have experience thinking about the structure of reality as being mathematical in nature, which is a large part of my essay. If you have time of course.
All the best,
Ernesto
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on Apr. 17, 2020 @ 22:22 GMT
Dear Ernesto,
Thank you for reading my essay and for the feedback.
>
Are you claiming that science can not make any progress explaining an ontology?Yes, but I think I do more than claim, I also explain why it's the case: because science can only deal with relations, and the nature of things is not the object of science. It's just not provable in the way we consider things proven in science. Now, people use the word "ontology" in different ways. So statements like "the wavefunction is ontic" as in the PBR theorem make sense, but there the word "ontic" should be understood as an impossibility to have QM without the wavefunction or something equivalent to it, for example to replace it with just a statistical device.
>
Can the hard problem ever be explained through science in your view, possibly indirectly? Not if science limits itself to objective evidence. Now, this is a necessary limitation, which is the cause for the progress in science. But I can imagine that a "subjective science", as opposed to the "objective science" we do, can make progress, but I doubt that if we limit to objective evidence we can explain it. As for how this could be done subjective, I explained in the longer essay cited in the first footnote in the first page of my essay, in §7.2 and §7.3 how I imagine this to work.
>
You say P is a mathematical structure in search of an ontology, do you think it will ever get there?A possibility is that P=S, so the ontology of P is the same as that of S, and that of S is just what I call sentience. But I can't prove it or disprove it objectively.
Thank you very much for the comment, and for mentioning your essay to me.
Cheers,
Cristi
Ernesto Vaca replied on Apr. 17, 2020 @ 22:40 GMT
Cristi,
Thank you for getting back to me so quickly. I will take a look at your longer essay soon. That sounds very interesting.
Best regards,
Ernesto
report post as inappropriate
Satyavarapu Naga Parameswara Gupta wrote on Apr. 18, 2020 @ 00:58 GMT
Dear Prof Cristi,
Thank you for your well analyzing comments on my essay. This I posted on mys essay yesterday...........
Basically i wrote point 6 , with a view that the results of the solution to the equations used should be tangible ones, If there is a meaningless result, or if the result is not understood by any person or even to the person who developed those set of equations, then what is the USE?
Then how some body will do the experimental verification? Without any experimental verification how the theory will help to the progress of humanity or science? Is it sheer madness? Is it not a wastage well educated manpower? Is it only for earning a a degree? So NO Experimental verification required, is that so? Just going on developing on something, with a thinking that may be correct, but going nowhare.........
I suddenly remembered OLD 'Two of Us'... Boney M. song
Two of us riding nowhere
Spending someones
Hard earned pay
You and me Sunday driving
Not arriving on our way back home
We're on our way home
We're on our way home
We're going home ....................
Are we really going home?
This is happening in science in general, not only quantum physics, but in Cosmology also. Complex equation resulting to results with infinities,and searching for infinities.....
I also started thinking of working on quantum physics with straight forward equations already. Hope you will help me on some concepts....
Thank you for giving me piece of mind!
Best Regards
=snp
report post as inappropriate
Boris Egorov wrote on Apr. 18, 2020 @ 08:48 GMT
Dear Cristinel,
Your essay is one of the most interesting. You have touched a lot of problems: limits of reductionism, materialism in science, consciousness etc. You are right that modern science is far from pure materialism but I think this eternal struggle between materialism and idealism, holism and reductionism, nevertheless, pushes it forward. Without reductionism and materialism we would not have modern physics. Ostwald considered matter as energy but denied atomism. He was right to some extent matter is energy. But if physics had taken this way then we wouldn’t have quantum physics and all its results. It happens sometimes that one of the opposite standpoints in science takes over but the correct solution remains somewhere in the middle.
I wish you good luck
Boris
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on Apr. 18, 2020 @ 09:14 GMT
Dear Boris,
Thank you very much for reading and commenting.
Of course I fully agree with what you said about how these debates advanced science. Here's a reason to continue them, but these days such discussions are just cut by statements like "you can't prove it in the lab, you should not talk about it", "shut up and calculate"
etc. :) Now, my essay doesn't try to show how limited science is, just to understand if there is a boundary and where it is. And I do this for the main purpose of formulating the hard problem of consciousness. Which is one of the things that, when one mentions, one gets a dismissive reaction like the ones I mentioned above. I want the debates back :)
Good luck to you too,
Cristi
John David Crowell wrote on Apr. 18, 2020 @ 18:42 GMT
Cristinel. I enjoyed your essay and I agree with your final conclusion. I think I also have a bottom up answer to the “hypothesis that consciousness is not fully reducible to physical processes or computation.” As I try to explain in my essay there is one Successful Self Creation process that progressively creates/becomes all intelligence, the complete physical world and the SSC processing...
view entire post
Cristinel. I enjoyed your essay and I agree with your final conclusion. I think I also have a bottom up answer to the “hypothesis that consciousness is not fully reducible to physical processes or computation.” As I try to explain in my essay there is one Successful Self Creation process that progressively creates/becomes all intelligence, the complete physical world and the SSC processing that interweaves all three into every progressive self creating unit. The “foundational” ontology of this process occurs in two phases (as you say in your essay they complete each other). The first phase is the C*s to SSCU transformation of chaos to order that I describe in the appendix to my essay. This phase produces the cardinality of the mathematics of the second phase, it produces/becomes the basic algorithm of SSC computations, it produces/becomes the variables/relationships of time, space, mass, speed and direction that produce/become the forms and functions of the physical/intelligent SSCU. The SSCU is a self replicator/self organizer that scales up digitally to become the physical world, its mathematics and its computations. The same SSCU acts as the basic “node” of self creating intelligence that is in every SSC unit. In the second phase the SSCU self replicates and the copies self organize to progressively create/become larger/more complex self creating intermediates which progress to become the intelligence/SSC/physical combinations that exist today. The two self creation foundational phases “operate together - they complete each other. As to the question of irreducibility. The consciousness, sentience, feelings reduce to the C*s activities in the C*s to SSCU transformation. Their combined activities are “hidden” in the digitalized scale up of the SSCU to become the physical world and its corresponding mathematics and computations. So consciousness, sentience, feelings do not reduce to the physical components of the SSC units. However, they do reduce to the intelligence activities in the SSCU. These act as “node(s)” that in the scale up self replicate and self organize to become the intelligence-networks of universal successful self creation. These act as self learning networks that learn how to create and recreate the repeating processes that we observe and measure in the physical world. I would appreciate your comments. John
view post as summary
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on Apr. 19, 2020 @ 05:59 GMT
Hi John,
Thank you for the comment, in particular for explaining the bottom up answer to the “hypothesis that consciousness is not fully reducible to physical processes or computation.” It made me want to understand more about your "Successful Self Creation process". I look forward to find out more about intelligence and creativity in your essay.
Cheers,
Cristi
John David Crowell wrote on Apr. 18, 2020 @ 20:34 GMT
Cristinel. I forgot to add In the previous post: the SSC processing produces a quantitative progressive formation of the geometric points, lines, surface areas, volumes spheres, vortexes, etc. of the forms and functioning of the universe. In that process it redefines the currently accepted definition of a point in universal processing. Instead of a singularity (infinitely dense/ infinitely small point as a beginning of the universe or as the “internal Content” of black holes, the points in SSC have a finite precise density and size. also the hyperinflation and expanding sphere of the Big Bang is replaced by a finite measurable universal expansion to a finite size. Getting rid of the infinitesimals, infinities and 0 simplifies the math tremendously. mohn
report post as inappropriate
Paul N Butler wrote on Apr. 19, 2020 @ 22:44 GMT
Dear Cristnel,
I read your paper and find it to be very interesting. It appears that you have the understanding that each thing has an internal structure or nature that gives rise to the types of interactions that it can have with other things and what the possible outcomes from those interactions can be. This internal structure is composed of two parts, which are the basic material(s) or...
view entire post
Dear Cristnel,
I read your paper and find it to be very interesting. It appears that you have the understanding that each thing has an internal structure or nature that gives rise to the types of interactions that it can have with other things and what the possible outcomes from those interactions can be. This internal structure is composed of two parts, which are the basic material(s) or substance(s) that the thing is composed of and the way that the material(s) or substance(s) are put or joined together in the thing to make it, so that it behaves in the way that it does in external interactions with other things.
From observation, it is easy to see that the structure of the whole creation is composed of many structural levels joined together to form a complex hierarchical overall structure. As an example, at the highest hierarchical structural level of large scale things that we can see and manipulate readily, they are often composed of many smaller structures that we can see to be different from each other, such as a rock with a vein of iron rust in it, etc. all joined together into the single rock. You can define its structure at this level to be all of the different materials that you can observe in the rock. The rock as a whole or the materials that are contained within it can interact with other things at this level to produce various outcome results. With more detailed observation it can be seen that some of the materials in the rock can be broken down chemically into more simple material structures, such as iron rust can be broken down into iron and oxygen, etc., but the iron and oxygen cannot be broken down further chemically. The iron rust is, therefore, composed of two basic materials, which are combined or structured together in such a way as to produce the external interactional results that iron rust generates in interactions with other things. After performing many observational experiments, you can determine all of the basic materials that can’t be further broken down chemically into simpler materials and can then make a table of them. At this hierarchical level, you could, if given enough time, determine all of the possible structures that can be made from them and learn all of their possible interactions with each other, etc. You can then call these composite structures (like iron rust) molecules and the smallest part of the most basic materials can be called atoms. Those who were in the science community at that time could easily consider atoms to be small balls of matter. The facts that there were over ninety different atoms and if you then try to break each of these most basic materials down to their smallest part, you find that the mass effect of the smallest part of the material is different for each of them, (they were of more or less of incrementally increasing mass) which implies that they may be made up of some still smaller structure(s) , but that could be easily ignored at that time.
If you then crash heavy atoms together you find that they can be broken down into two lighter atoms, thus proving that all of the basic atoms are constructed of some more basic substance(s) that are the same in all of them. At this hierarchical level, you can call these more basic materials sub-atomic particles and you can begin to find ways that you can isolate them and see how they interact with each other, etc. As these sub-atomic matter particles were discovered it became apparent that generally all atoms and, thus all matter was basically composed of three sub-atomic particles, the proton, the neutron, and the electron. At this level you can see that these three particles are much fewer than the over ninety atoms at the previous hierarchical level of structure. Scientists still liked to look at these sub-atomic matter particles as very small balls of matter.
Over time it became apparent that the protons and neutrons were composite particles composed of three more basic particles called quarks while the electron was a basic particle. This meant that all matter is basically composed of four basic particles at this hierarchical structural level. Even though these basic particles exhibit wave behaviors and various outcomes from interactions, etc. that indicate that they have internal structures containing internal motions within them that then affect their external interaction outcomes with each other, these indications have been mostly ignored by the current scientific community, so they can still look at them as little balls of matter.
If you crash these sub-atomic particles together at very high speeds, you can observe that the interactional outcomes can destroy the particles and, in the process, several new matter particles can be produced that contain more rest mass than the amount contained in the two original sub-atomic particles. Energy photons can also be produced. The greater the linear speed of the particles before the interaction, the greater is the number and total mass of the matter particles and energy photons that are produced by the interaction. Since the only thing that differs is the amount of linear motion of the particles, it becomes apparent that some of the particles that are produced in an interaction are produced by the linear motion of the particles before the interaction. Since energy photons are also produced in these interactions, it is apparent that they are also produced by the linear motions that were contained in the matter particles before the interaction. From this we can observationally determine that at this hierarchical level matter particles and energy photons are composed of the material or substance of basic linear motion. Of course, if they are both composed of the same material or substance, that substance must be put together or structured differently in each of them so as to produce the different interactional output results of both entities. I have gone down one more hierarchical level than man in this world is generally familiar with, but I have done so in order to bring out some points that would not usually be easily understood otherwise.
First you should see that at each hierarchical level there is a type of structural material that seems to be the acceptable understanding of what a basic structural material is to those who are at that level without any knowledge that material structure can be broken down farther than it is at that level. From this you can see that the concept of the basic structural material of things should include an understanding of what it means at all hierarchical levels. It also becomes apparent that what is considered a basic structural material at one hierarchical structural level can be much different than that of another level. One general pattern that becomes clear is that as you progress down into smaller levels, the total number of basic materials at each level tends to decrease. Notice that at the level of the structural material of matter particles and energy photons there is only one basic structural material, which is linear motion. At this level fields are also composed of simple linear motion field particles. It is, therefore, currently possible from analyzing current observational information to determine the most basic structural substance from which all things are made. The problem is that most people look at things from the current maximum hierarchical level about which information has been currently obtained and understood by them and try to build the next level using the concepts that are currently understood at that level when we live in a world that contains a whole range of levels in which differences exist between the levels. If you can change from just looking at the current level to looking at the whole range of known levels, your mind can be opened to see that the next level may be much different than you would otherwise be able to understand and accept. You can then look at the current experimental observational data in a whole new light, which will allow you to see obvious things that others pass up because they don’t know how to fit them into their current theories. As an example, you can see that science is about understanding both the ways that things interact with each other and also understanding the nature of the things that interact with each other. The understanding of the nature of a thing at one hierarchical structural level comes when the next lower level becomes understood. At one hierarchical level atoms are things that can interact with each other, but you don’t know the nature of the atom, but at the next lower structural level you know that the nature of the atom is that it contains sub-atomic particles that are located and move around in the atom in certain ways, etc. Things are much more dynamic than we like to think that they are because we like to think of things to be very simple when in reality, they make up a very complicated multilayer structure of motions. Right now, man wants to believe that matter particles are the most basic level of matter structure and don’t have any internal working or moving parts, but all of the observational data says otherwise. The good thing is that matter particles, energy photons, and field particles are all explained at the next structural level to be composed of only one basic substance.
Consciousness is another area where people limit themselves to what they currently understand. The first big assumption is that it is completely contained in the matter structure of the brain. When you understand that our minds are constructed of two parts, which are our spirits and our souls and understand that our spirits generate our intents of what we will do and send those intents to our souls, which translate the intents into the thoughts that our bodies can understand and then our bodies do the work to carry out the intents of our spirits you then have a good basis to build an understanding of what consciousness is and how it works. In the Christian Scriptures it says that “God formed man from the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul.” We can easily see that our bodies are composed of the dust of the ground (matter), but the breath of life is mentioned as a separate thing outside of matter. Our spirits are also outside of matter. When our spirits generate intents the part of our souls that are the breath of life can receive and understand those intents and can translate them into the thoughts that our bodies can understand through the part of our souls that are composed of the dust of the ground (our brains) and send them to our body parts through our nervous system. Our bodies then act upon those thoughts to carry out the intents of our spirits. Because of this structure, any attempt to explain all of consciousness as brain functions will ultimately fail.
The second assumption is that consciousness is limited to what our mind can directly observe and/or control. There are many processes that continually go on in our bodies that require interactions with our spirits and souls. We are aware of some of these things, such as the need to take a breath periodically. Our spirits and souls must be conscious of and work together to control these processes most of which we are not aware of at our higher hierarchical structural level of consciousness. When the spirit leaves the body, the intents needed to continue these processes no longer occur and the body dies. This is why God says “The body without the spirit is dead.” At our hierarchical level of consciousness our minds work mainly at the level of our bodys’ sense inputs to observe both our internal structure and operation, etc. and also the structure and operation of the world around us. Our minds have the ability to store records of our current sense inputs so that we can later recall them and compare them to the current sense inputs to see what has changed in the world around us since they were recorded. This is what gives us our sense of the past even though the past does not actually exist. After recalling many previous records and comparing them, we can see patterns of change that allow us to predict that some things will continue to change in specific ways. This gives us a sense of the future even though that does not really exist either. We live in a motion continuum. The conditions of all of the motions in the universe that existed, but no longer exist because motions have moved to new locations in space are the past, but the past does not currently exist, because the motions have now moved from those positions into their current positions. The conditions of all motions that will exist, but do not currently exist because the motions have not yet moved to those positions in space are the future, but the future does not currently exist because the motions have not yet moved into those positions. Only the present actually exists, which is the current positions of all of the motions in the universe. The only way that a complete past and future could exist, so that someone could go into any point in the past or future is if a whole complete copy of the universe exists for each movement of any motion in the universe from one point in space to any other point in space. This would mean at least an almost infinite number of complete copies of the universe would have to exist. This would certainly not be according to the Occam’s razor principle. There are also a multitude of other problems with the concept of a time dimension, but I will not go into those now because this comment is getting big, so I will end it now.
Sincerely,
Paul
view post as summary
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on Apr. 20, 2020 @ 10:00 GMT
Dear Paul,
Thank you very much for providing your interesting views about these important problems. The first 2/3 of your comment, it appears to me, you argue that we can know the nature of things, because things are made of other things. I call this "structure" and I consider it to be relations, not relata. And by nature of things I mean relata, ontology. You seem to mean structure. So you...
view entire post
Dear Paul,
Thank you very much for providing your interesting views about these important problems. The first 2/3 of your comment, it appears to me, you argue that we can know the nature of things, because things are made of other things. I call this "structure" and I consider it to be relations, not relata. And by nature of things I mean relata, ontology. You seem to mean structure. So you are right, if you mean structure, then maybe we can know it, at least we managed to know a great deal of it so far. But this has nothing to do with what I mean by "nature of things". By the way, when you say
"matter particles, energy photons, and field particles are all explained at the next structural level to be composed of only one basic substance", you mean that there is always a
next structural level? Then if this never ends, how can we know the nature of things? If it does end, how can the nature of things be known by knowing the next level, when there is no next level?
Then you talk about "soul" and "spirit", which you don't define, but quote from the Bible. If you'd try to define them rigorously, you would find that you can only talk about their relations and structures, as in what I mean by
S. There is a part you can't talk about rigorously, their nature, which is the ontology of
S. I tried to be as general as possible, and leave room for various explanations of consciousness, including dualism, which may be what you have in mind. In this case
S and
P are different. I tried to discuss various possible explanations, dualism included, in my longer essay
The negative way to sentience. I tried to leave open all possibilities and see how they can make empirical predictions.
As for your arguments for presentism, you missed the point again. What I said is that you can't prove it by science, which is only about relations, because there is no relational stuff that highlights the present. This doesn't mean that presentism is wrong. You seem to think though that you can prove by an Occam's razor argument that only present exists. For an Occam's razor argument in the opposite direction, check Theorem 6 in my longer essay
The negative way to sentience. You'll see that trying to include it rigorously in a theory to make it presentist complicates it. Also note that people use Occam's razor to "prove" things, when they mean in fact that it would be simpler
for their views that things are in a certain way and not another. For example, other people use Occam's razor to deny God, which I think you wouldn't like. Occam's razor is one of the most abused things, since complexity is often relative to one's world view (for example Chaitin-Kolmogorov complexity, but also the lengths of proofs depend on the axiomatic system and there are many other examples). Returning to the problem of time, I see you rely much on Christianity in some aspects, why not when it's about time? You can check the writings of St. Anselm of Canterbury and St. Augustine for this. Also, if you want to know what I mean by
negative way, I borrowed this from theology, it's an idea that appears including
in Christian writings. I didn't mean my essay to have theological implications, but I think that the method of science itself is a
via negativa in a sense similar to that used in these writings. I think this is a nice idea which has implications that we know much little than we think, whether we're talking about God (which is the original place where the idea appeared), but also when we talk about the nature of things, when we judge other people, or in the scientific method.
Cheers,
Cristi
view post as summary
Paul N Butler replied on Apr. 24, 2020 @ 18:21 GMT
Dear Cristinel,
After I sent my previous comment to you, I noticed that I didn’t get the second letter i entered in your name. Sorry about that.
It appears that we are using different definitions or different parts of the definition for the word nature. When I talk about the nature of something in the immediate primary sense, I am talking about what it is. If it is a thing like...
view entire post
Dear Cristinel,
After I sent my previous comment to you, I noticed that I didn’t get the second letter i entered in your name. Sorry about that.
It appears that we are using different definitions or different parts of the definition for the word nature. When I talk about the nature of something in the immediate primary sense, I am talking about what it is. If it is a thing like a matter particle, for example, I mean what substance(s) it is made of and how is that substance(s) organized, structured, or built up in it to make it to be the way that it is. If it is not static, but contains one or more active functional internal processes going on within it, what are they and how do they work. If it interacts internally with other thing(s) in such a way that it and the other thing(s) act as a unit together in some way, what is that and how does it work. Also, how and in what way(s) does it interact with other external things. There are other parts to the meaning of the word nature that can apply under certain circumstances like the thing’s origin or source of its existence, but I don’t usually go into that unless I think that the person that I am talking to will likely have the ability to understand and also the desire to understand because it took me over twenty two years of scientific study to come to the conclusion that the creation could not have come about naturally by itself, but had to have been created by a being that exists outside of it, existed before it, and is extremely intelligent to have allowed him to have been able to create it. He would also need to be powerful enough to create it, of course, and possess the resources needed to make it, etc. I came to this conclusion after analyzing such concepts as evolution, the various creation from nothing arguments, the arguments for how the first living creature came into existence, and the possibility that evolution could have created all of the various living creatures that exist now and those that have existed in the past, but have gone extinct, in fourteen billion years, etc. I found that the math just does not add up to allow for natural random creation to occur. Once I came to the conclusion that God had to exist, I looked at various religious documents and found that only the Jewish Old Testament and the Christian New Testament contained the information about the creation that I had found during all of those years of research. I had searched through man’s scientific works and did not find that anyone else had found and come to understand such things. For the most part, man still has not understood these things although I have freely given out some of them over the last ten years. Of course, it may be that there are those who work in the secret (black) scientific community who have received the things that I have given out and understood them, because man in that community has come to understand how to make plasma field engines and cloaking devices for high speed air and space vehicles, etc. that indicate that such concepts may be at least somewhat understood by them. Of course, it is possible to make structured field engines without the plasma effect, but as far as I know they have not yet gotten that far. My point is that I did not find this information in any of man’s works, or in any of the other religious texts, but it is clearly in the sources mentioned above which were written more than two thousand years ago. As I have continued to search these scriptures, I have found that they also contain much information about many other things. I mentioned a few of them in my previous comment. One of the problems of current science structure is that the concept that the creation was made by a being rather than by some natural cause is automatically considered to be unscientific. This is usually based on the lack of our ability to directly observe God. At the same time man has had no problem believing in the existence of molecules, atoms, and matter particles, etc. long before they became even indirectly observable from the way that things interacted with each other. If we look at the creation from the standpoint of the ways things are made and how they interact with each other it becomes apparent that what we call intelligence had to have been involved in its creation. First it is constructed in a multilevel hierarchical form starting with simple structures and combining them together into sub-assemblies, which are then combined into still more complex assemblies, etc. until the total device performs all of the desired functions. This is exactly the way that man who is considered to be intelligent builds complex structures. Secondly, the design is such that each hierarchical level creates a complete environment of actions and capabilities to operate at that level internally within each object and externally in interactions with other entities. As an example, at the top large scale object level of structure even if you don’t know anything about the smaller hierarchical levels of its molecules, atoms, and sub-atomic matter particles, you can use stone to build buildings and other large scale structures because of its compression strength and other properties that it has at the large scale. This was designed to allow man to use large scale objects before he was able to understand anything about the smaller hierarchical levels of structure. This has allowed man to develop at a controlled rate of progress by providing the keys to the next level at the desired time. The discovery of the next level gives man new abilities of use of the materials to allow for controlled advancement. Man uses similar hierarchical structuring in the complex things that he makes. As an example, a computer programmer who understands the C programming language can write useful programs without any understanding that when a C language instruction is executed it likely causes the execution of a large number of machine language instructions in the next lower hierarchical level of structure or that the machine language instructions execute hexadecimal coded words at the next level and those words actually are executed in the binary form by the computer circuitry in the next level or that the binary likely takes the form of an electronic or magnetic circuit that can be in one of two states at the hardware level, etc. The higher C language level will likely produce a larger program than would be necessary and do things less efficiently than if it was written in machine language, so there is an advantage of also knowing how to program at that lower hierarchical level, but it is not necessary to produce a program that will accomplish the task. It is the same with the creation’s hierarchical levels. New doors of knowledge of the next lower levels can be given out at the desired time for man to understand them, thus opening up more new abilities for man when appropriate, but from the beginning man was able to live and function adequately just using information provided at the top level of structure. To get the complete understanding of the nature of something you have to understand its complete structure at all hierarchical levels, but when you are operating within only one or a portion of those levels, it is adequate to define the objects being to be the substance(s) and structure(s) and the structure’s internal operations, and external interactions included within the level(s) being used at the time. From this and other things it should be apparent that creation was designed to start man out with a very limited understanding of the world around him, but to increase his understanding over time as necessary or as desired by the creator.
If all things are made of just one thing and that thing is simple linear motion, then you have reached the end of that chain of structure because all you have in existence is simple linear motions and the dimensional system that they move in. From there the only other thing to understand is the structure of the dimensional system that allows the linear motions to move in it in such a way as to construct field particles, energy photons, and matter particles. Once that is accomplished a complete understanding of what we call the universe can be understood. The only thing lacking is that you still could not indirectly observe matter particles, energy photons and field particles. There is a next level of structure, however. Once it is understood that a matter particle is formed by transferring some of an energy photon’s motion into its fifth dimensional motion and that this motion then returns down into the lower three dimensions in a sequential manner, such that it causes the photon to take a curved path that encloses back upon itself to form a repetitive cyclical three dimensional enclosed path and that path and the photon traveling in it is what we call a matter particle and that If you then add linear motion to it to accelerate that matter particle toward the speed of light, some of the added motion is transferred into its fourth and fifth dimensional motions, you can then see that the motion added to its fifth dimensional motion causes an increase in the curvature of the matter particle’s enclosed path. This causes it to become smaller. The closer you get to the speed of light the larger is the portion of the added motion that is transferred into the particle’s fifth dimensional motion and the rate of reduction in its size greatly increases. The next step is to understand how interactions between matter particles work. There is what is called an interaction cross-section. Interactions generally do not occur between field particles because their structural points of their motions are very small making it very unlikely that they will intersect each other and come together to interact. Energy photons on the other hand not only possess a field particle in each of them that travels at the speed of light, they each also possess a fourth dimensional motion that travels at ninety degrees from its direction of travel. This gives a much larger cross-sectional area in which an interaction can occur and thus increases the likelihood that two photons can interact with each other. If one photon possesses a very high fourth dimensional motion amplitude (it generates a very high frequency) and another one has a very low motion amplitude in its fourth dimensional motion (it generates a very low frequency) and they move toward each other, the likelihood that the low frequency photon will be in a place in its cross-section where it will interact with the other photon is greatly reduced. Matter particles work in a similar way except instead of a cross-sectional area there is more of a cross-sectional volume. You can look at a matter particle’s path as a small three-dimensional sphere. When the paths of two matter particles begin to intersect an interaction can take place, but the photons within them must be located on their paths, such that they will intersect at a time that their fourth dimensional motions are also in the proper positions within each of them to allow the interaction to take place during the time that their paths still intersect each other. Again, if one particle is very small because it possesses a large fifth dimensional motion amplitude because it is traveling close to the speed of light and the other particle is much slower in that respect, which means that it is much larger, the likelihood of an interaction is greatly reduced. If you visualize the small particle intersecting with the motion path of the much larger particle you will see that the small particle will pass completely through the motion path on one side and then travel through most of the larger particle in the internal volume of the larger particle where it can’t interact with the larger particle’s photon because it is located on the enclosed path of the larger particle and not internally within it. It will then travel through the other side of the larger particle’s enclosed path. This greatly decreases the chance of an interaction between the two particles. The net effect is that our energy photons and matter particles can only interact with each other when they are both within a specific frequency range with respect to each other. This means that we live in a universe that only includes energy photons and matter particles that possess frequencies within this range. There are other universes that exist in lower and higher frequency ranges and it is possible to travel to that nice little world in a very small galaxy near, near away in your desk drawer. Of course, if you accelerate close to the speed of light, you can observe the matter particles of our frequency range to understand their composition and operation, etc. If you learn how to slow down your fifth dimensional motion, you could also be as large as one of our galaxies or travel to a very large world in an extremely large galaxy where our galaxy might be in someone else’s desk drawer. As to whether there is a bottomless pit of frequency ranges or just a few, etc. is another story. At that point you could completely understand how our frequency range functions and its internal substances and structuring at all hierarchical levels. If all of the other frequency ranges are constructed the same way you could extrapolate that knowledge to all of them and completely understand them all. There is more to the story, of course, but that is enough of that for now.
My point is that all observational evidence supports the concept that we are continually living in the present. We don’t jump back into the past and become a child again once we are grown up. Neither do we go into the future and observe things from that perspective and then jump back to the current present. We can experience the past only in the form of recordings that were made either in our minds or by other devices when that past was the current present. We can only experience a possible future in the form of extrapolations from observed patterns that we observed from past records and from present observations. We cannot actually observe the real future because it has not yet occurred. There is no observable evidence for a continual existence of the past or the future. The relational stuff that highlights the present is the observations of normal continuations of motions in their paths and the expected results from interactions that show a continuation of motion transfers in the normal expected patterns as have been observed to happen over and over in their linear motion flow patterns, etc. Clocks are only useful to us because of this continual orderly motion flow. If the clock were to suddenly start to run backwards because we started to go backward in time to the past or if it suddenly jumped forward 6 hours because we moved into the future, the clock would be useless to us to help us record the continual passage of time. They don’t do that, but just continue to move forward at the rate that the motions contained in them provides. I have found that the scriptures themselves, at least in the King James version that is not copyrighted, are very consistent and accurate. The works of men, however, are not. Even those who are said to be followers of Christ, often mix men’s science or other works into their works and since man’s works are usually at least partially in error they can’t be counted on to be completely valid. An example would be when leaders of the Roman church adopted the then current scientific concepts that considered the earth to be the center of the universe and that the sun and planets, etc., went around the earth. When it was later noticed that the planets sometimes went back and forth they just added the concept of epicycles to try to explain them away, so that they would not be seen to have made an error. Ironically, today I see just the opposite in that atheists now in the same way often make up many obviously false theories to try to continue to support concepts like natural creation of the universe or of living creatures, etc. even though current scientific observational evidence no longer supports such concepts as practical. To get a complete understanding of anything it is necessary to both understand what is in that thing (the positive way) as well as what is not in it (the negative way). Both approaches used simultaneously work best. Yes it is not just limited to science.
I am not sure what you mean about the relata and ontology that is not about the structure or relations of things. Please give me what you would consider to be the relata and ontology of matter particles that does not include the structure or relations of them. If you can, give it to me in non-mathematical terms.
Sincerely,
Paul
view post as summary
report post as inappropriate
Vladimir Rogozhin wrote on Apr. 24, 2020 @ 16:08 GMT
Dear Cristi,
You, as before, presented a very interesting, deep essay with important ideas. You "dig" to the most remote semantic depths. But there are some points where I have differences in our views - this primarily concerns the assessment of history and the results of scientific research, starting with the “second Archimedean revolution”, as well as the problems of philosophical...
view entire post
Dear Cristi,
You, as before, presented a very interesting, deep essay with important ideas. You "dig" to the most remote semantic depths. But there are some points where I have differences in our views - this primarily concerns the assessment of history and the results of scientific research, starting with the “second Archimedean revolution”, as well as the problems of philosophical ontology, observation and “grasping” (understanding) of limiting ontological meanings in Nature and thinking.
You write:
"In fact, the reason why science was so successful is precisely its ability to ignore the nature of things, and focus on their relations. I’ll explain why is so in both experimental and theoretical science.”
I believe that it was the cognitive attitudes that were laid down at the beginning of the scientific revolution of the New Time (“Physics, fear of Mathaphysics” and “Hypotheses non fingo”) impeded the development of science. Unfortunately, the mainstream in science has always dominated. This is now. It is enough to look at Lee Smolin's conclusions in "Trouble with Physics" and as well as in
An Open Letter . If there was conscious support by society and states for alternative directions of scientific thought and research, then science would not come to a modern crisis of understanding in the philosophical basis of fundamental science. Therefore, Carlo Rovelli turned to the scientific community:
Physics Needs Philosophy / Philosophy Needs Physics Then you write:
"We can compare nature with a book written in a language that we don’t understand. Science is a way to decode the book. It proceeds by identifying various words in various contexts, and the result is a dictionary, along with some grammar rules. Each word in the dictionary is defined in terms of other words, but there are no primary words whose meaning we understand. All the definitions in the dictionary are eventually circular. ” ... and bring the famous words of Galileo Galilei: "The book [of Nature] is written in mathematical language."
But Galileo Galilei specified which language Nature speaks: “The book [of Nature] is written in mathematical language, and the symbols are triangles, circles and other geometrical figures, without whose help it is impossible to comprehend a single word of it; without which one wanders in vain through a dark labyrinth. ”
I believe that in order not to “go in cycles”, we must first “grasp” (understand) first - the meaning of the “triangle” of Nature ... And then - the “circle” ... The language of Nature is the language of geometric representations, the language of absolute forms, which represent the absolute (unconditional) states of matter. Let us recall how Menelaus caught Proteus (“Proteus of Nature” - the metaphor of “matter”) in the net at the prompt of the daughter of Proteus - Eidothei, “goddess of form”. I believe that “equations” and “numbers” only encrypt the ontological primary structure of Nature (and its “language”) as an integral generating process. Overcoming the crisis of understanding in the philosophical basis of knowledge, and as a result of solving the "hard problem of consciousness" is possible only on the way to solving the super hard problem №1 for cognition - the centenary problem of justification (substantiation, basification) mathematics ("foundations of mathematics"), which means knowledge in general. I believe that the mathematician Alexander Zenkin (1937-2006) is right: “truth should be drawn ...” (
SCIENTIFIC COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN MATHEMATICS)
Yours faithfully,
Vladimir
view post as summary
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on Apr. 25, 2020 @ 15:57 GMT
Dear Vladimir,
Thank you for the careful reading and for the comment with the feedbacks. You quote that I said "In fact, the reason why science was so successful is precisely its ability to ignore the nature of things, and focus on their relations.", and you say "I believe that it was the cognitive attitudes that were laid down at the beginning of the scientific revolution of the New Time...
view entire post
Dear Vladimir,
Thank you for the careful reading and for the comment with the feedbacks. You quote that I said "In fact, the reason why science was so successful is precisely its ability to ignore the nature of things, and focus on their relations.", and you say "I believe that it was the cognitive attitudes that were laid down at the beginning of the scientific revolution of the New Time (“Physics, fear of Mathaphysics” and “Hypotheses non fingo”) impeded the development of science. Unfortunately, the mainstream in science has always dominated. " I don't see this as contradicting what I said, I said it was successful, you said it could have been more succesful :) You said "Unfortunately, the mainstream in science has always dominated." Well, this is by definition. That people are changing their minds very slowly, this is not characteristic to the mainstream, rather to most of us, mainstream or not. I believe there is an evolutionary reason why people change theid mind with difficulty, which doesn't mean it's a good thing, but only that stubborn people survived and passed their genes, even if they were wrong in some cases, the point was that their ideas worked well enough to survive. About stubbornness, for example, I can't say that I change my mind easily, and not because I am always right :)
You said "But Galileo Galilei specified which language Nature speaks: “The book [of Nature] is written in mathematical language, and the symbols are triangles, circles and other geometrical figures, without whose help it is impossible to comprehend a single word of it; without which one wanders in vain through a dark labyrinth. ”"
Maybe he specified these because this is what he knew at that time. Now we know more, but of course tomorrow we will know even more. However, there is a definitivity in the universal algebra and model theory: they are universal, and we have some metatheoretical results that are universal because of this. For example, the model existence theorem. So even if we will understand them better in the future, metatheoretical results are here to stay. But this doesn't mean that triangles are not essential somehow. They are, as well as simplicial complexes, their generalizations. Infinitesimally, this is how we can understand differential forms. Also, the metric in General Relativity can be understood as an infintesimal Pythagorean theorem in an infinitesimal Minkowski spacetime. Triangles can be used to understand the Born rule too. They're practically everywhere, indeed. We just learned to consider them understood to the level that we no longer draw or even mention them, because we just take for granted that others know this.
Thanks again for your comments. You promissed "differences in our views". They surely must be differences, but with what you wrote here I pretty much agree :) (unless your words have some subtle meanings which I am missing) I'm looking forward to read your essay!
Best regards,
Cristi
view post as summary
Edwin Eugene Klingman wrote on Apr. 25, 2020 @ 02:47 GMT
Dear Cristi,
Per your advice, I’ve read Petkov’s essay and it seems mostly to just repeat the following:
“Therefore the failure of all experiments to detect absolute motion (encapsulated in the principle of relativity – physical phenomena look the same in all inertial reference frames12) has indeed a profound physical meaning – all those experiments failed to detect...
view entire post
Dear Cristi,
Per your advice, I’ve read Petkov’s essay and it seems mostly to just repeat the following:
“
Therefore the failure of all experiments to detect absolute motion (encapsulated in the principle of relativity – physical phenomena look the same in all inertial reference frames12) has indeed a profound physical meaning – all those experiments failed to detect absolute motion (i.e., uniform motion in the absolute space) because there exists not a single (and therefore absolute) space, but many spaces (and many times) in the world; physical phenomena look the same for all observers in relative motion, because each observer performs experiments in his own space and uses his own time (e.g., the speed of light is the same for all observers in relative motion since each observer measures it in his own space by using his own time).
Now Minkowski's argument, deduced from the experimental evidence, that the world is four-dimensional, becomes evident: the world must be four-dimensional in order that observers in relative motion have different spaces (and times). Minkowski did not stress that the experimental results (that gave rise to the principle of relativity) would be impossible (i.e., the failure to detect absolute motion by experiments would no longer be observed and absolute motion would become de-tectable), if the world were three-dimensional (which would mean that there would exist a single and therefore absolute three-dimensional space and a single and therefore absolute time) most probably because he regarded it as self-evident. And, indeed, if the physical world were three-dimensional, there would exist a single (and therefore absolute) space, i.e. a single class of simultaneous events (a single time), which would mean that simultaneity and time would be absolute in contradiction with both the the-ory of relativity and, most importantly, with the experiments which failed to detect absolute motion.”
in other words, because Michelson-Morley did not detect
universal ether, he believes Minkowski.
But in 1925 Michelson-Gale
did detect
local ether, in the form of gravity through which light propagates. I only became aware of the MG experiment a year ago. It also agrees with MM experiments, in that they were conducted in a lab essentially stationary in the earth’s gravity, to within the resolution of their instruments. This is therefore compatible with the ‘zero ether wind’ of MM. There is far too much support to include in a comment, but I have, for example, written much detail in ref 11 of my current paper.
Obviously I know that academia frowns on questioning Einstein, but the facts are beginning to favor (3+1)D ontology over 4D, no matter how loudly people scream.
As Rovelli says, it’s actually very complicated, mostly because of the incorrect 4D assumptions.
Anyway, thank you for reading my essay.
I have re-written it and uploaded a version that discusses your case 2 substrate. I actually think that you would find it very interesting.
Warmest regards,
Edwin Eugene Klingman
view post as summary
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on Apr. 25, 2020 @ 19:51 GMT
Dear Edwin,
I don't think it's a matter of interpretation or opinion here, but I don't mind you having a different opinion. Michelson-Gale experiment gives result as predicted by some aether theory. But the same result is predicted by special relativity, which I think you know but just can't believe. Other Sagnac type experiments are as well consistent with special relativity. Now, you seem...
view entire post
Dear Edwin,
I don't think it's a matter of interpretation or opinion here, but I don't mind you having a different opinion. Michelson-Gale experiment gives result as predicted by some aether theory. But the same result is predicted by special relativity, which I think you know but just can't believe. Other Sagnac type experiments are as well consistent with special relativity. Now, you seem to find essential that some experiments confirm a prediction of an aether theory, but you seem to find less important that all experiments we know are consistent with special relativity, or with general relativity if gravity is important, without doing any tricks. I don't think there's an aether theory able to explain the same many phenomena with as little assumptions, and in general aether theorists tend to be blocked in time over 100 years ago, ignoring how many tests of the predictions of relativity+quantum mechanics were done, basically the entire body of physics since then confirmed it. So basically you'll have to invent all sorts of tricks, different for different situations. Rube Goldberg aether machines to explain each experiment from those that special relativity explain with a single set of principles. In my opinion, you and other people doing this are doing something useful trying to find such theories, and I'd be the first to say that it requires great ingeniosity. And I won't be so surprised if some new effects can come out of this, although I'd be surprised if these would refute relativity. My only expressed objection to the statements about special relativity in your essay was that it is not what you made it to seem - a cartoon caricature that has nothing in common to how me and others see relativity, but thanks for the tireless and inventive efforts to make us look as some idiots who conspire to oppress real scientists like aether theorists :). Minkowski explained how these things come neatly into place if we admit spacetime and the 4-dimensional ontology that follows from this. I'm glad you took my advise to read Vesselin's essay, what did he reply to your comments? For me, relativity falls in place pretty well and has all figured out neatly, at least as long as quantum gravity effects can be ignored. Me, like others, are aware that relativity may not survive, especially since it may be the case that it needs to be quantum. But quantum field theory itself is also an argument for relativity, so maybe they are not as incompatible as they appear to us. We'll see. You seem to find support in some things Rovelli said, so I think that, if you are in tune with him, since he's editor in chief at Foundation of Physics, you may have some good chances to publish there. I also checked your updated essay, for the case 2 substrate example you mention. I think it's much more ellaborate than what I mentioned in my other comment about those 3 people I heard recently mentioning a relation with gravity, who didn't show anything as detailed, to my knowledge. Good luck!
Cheers,
Cristi
view post as summary
Edwin Eugene Klingman replied on Apr. 26, 2020 @ 05:35 GMT
Dear Christi,
I don’t claim to ‘refute relativity’. I do claim to present alternative explanations to relativistic explanations. I am at fault in characterizing Einstein’s 4D worlds as ‘cartoon worlds’, which I now see can be interpreted as aggressive or condescending. This would reflect an antagonism that I do not feel. I meant it in the same sense one speaks of ‘toy model’, as a model which ignores gravity and rotational frameworks, in favor of a guaranteed transformation between geometric frames of interest.
In fact, when you say that “relativity may not survive”, you are saying that my statement of the same prediction is offensive, because I have phrased it badly. I do apologize. I have always admired your work and have felt very friendly towards you, and i would be stupid to exchange your friendship for any cheap exchange. There are legitimate questions that Thyssen mentions; the fact that the dimensionality is underdetermined by special relativity. If I have turned this into a pissing contest then I am to be blamed.
I did not challenge Petkov because a man who gets his paycheck from the Minkowski institute does not need to be attacked. I do not expect to change his mind. I only responded because you asked for a response to him.
Please accept my warmest appreciation,
Edwin Eugene Klingman
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on Apr. 26, 2020 @ 07:53 GMT
Dear Edwin,
Actually, I found your "cartoon relativity" thing humorous. I think you're a guy with great sense of humor, I'd probably love to have a beer with you someday. When reading, sometimes I tend to imagine the author as giving a talk, which was also prompted to me in your essay by the Susskind video, so I imagined you could be a stand up comedian (I love those guys). So, while I know...
view entire post
Dear Edwin,
Actually, I found your "cartoon relativity" thing humorous. I think you're a guy with great sense of humor, I'd probably love to have a beer with you someday. When reading, sometimes I tend to imagine the author as giving a talk, which was also prompted to me in your essay by the Susskind video, so I imagined you could be a stand up comedian (I love those guys). So, while I know very well what I understand by relativity and Minkowski spacetime and change of reference frame and how velocities are composed, while doing a certain thing I do when listening to other's opinion (which is to try to see the world like them), I couldn't help feeling the amusement you may have felt while writing this, and also imagine the laughs of your audience, those who think like you do about these. This doesn't mean I agree, because while I try to imagine myself in the shoes of other people, I don't forget myself. But by no means I found what you said offensive. I'm not in the business of PC police, this is a thing that sucks out the fun out of anything. I just saw your depiction as not reflecting what me and other people understand by relativity. To me, this is important in the sense that me, like anybody else, I'd like others to see how marvelous some things are, or at least how they appear to me. And relativity is marvelous, in my opinion. A fair representation would help people see this. Not as ultimate truth, but as appreciation for what it is. I see it as pervading the entire body of physics. Even if we think about quantum. The types of particles, classified by spin, as well as their free evolution equations, follow directly from Poincaré invariance, as shown by Wigner and Bargmann. Trying to explain this as a 3+1 symmetry doesn't work, because of the way C, P, and T symmetries work together, which makes sense only under the 4-dimensional Poincaré invariance. To me this is just an instance of how marvelous relativity is. This doesn't mean that I don't try to appreciate other ways to see the world, this is why I said that I appreciate the ingeniosity with which people try to come up with alternative experiments and explanations, this looks to me like a McGyver approach to science, which is spectacular and surprising. So, while I'd love others to see how marvelous relativity appears to me, I'd never push a hypothetical button that would make everyone accept it without judgment. As I said repeatedly, I think it's necessary to have people testing various alternatives, challenging relativity and anything else. And even if a God would exist, bearer of the ultimate truth, I think that even that God should be challenged, as much as possible. And since people who believe something tend to strawman the opposite beliefs, I can't trust the supporters of a theory, being it relativity, to seriously try to challenge it. So who's left to do this job wholehearted, if not those who don't believe it? Now, this is a difficult thing to do, and I don't refer here because the theory is infallible, but because indeed we tend to think this to be a closed subject long time ago. Most researchers want to move forward and build something on this foundation, and in fact there are already several floors of the building, and most of us want to work at building the topmost floor. I take it as a personal quest to try to go constantly down to the foundations and review it, in fact some of the things I did and I'm currently working at are just the result of the reconsiderations of some widely accepted points of view, which became mainstream due to historical accidents. So I fully appreciate what you're doing, and I'd thank you on behalf of science, even if I am not entitled to speak on its behalf. If it would be by me, there would be at least a journal dedicated to alternative explanations of relativity or of anything else, and maybe a department in each large University, which would at least help professor and teacher test their understanding in debates. Even if most would turn out to be wrong, I prefer people to realize this by working it out, rather than taking it for granted. As Jung said (and I'm fully aware I am quoting him out of context, but it applies very much here),
"Beware of unearned wisdom", which in this context to me it means simply don't take knowledge for granted, but only after you challenged it and arrived at the same conclusion, no matter how difficult it is. Otherwise you'll just overburden scientific research and increase the confusion. I feel no shame in admitting that, as a kid, I tried to challenge relativity in various ways, including by conceiving some atomic structure of space, and I tried this untill it fell in place for me and my "ground state" is just what I understand now by relativity. I did the same with quantum. On the other hand, in the process, I developed my own tools to question the foundations, which are neither infallible not at least the best. And, aware of my limited time and the many things I have to do or I want to do in this life, I had to choose between being an "educator" and an "explorer". And my own structure is not that of an "educator", this is why I don't care to get into debates, I am more attracted to do my own things, to fight my own battles. But make no mistake here: I fully appreciate what you and others try to do, as I explained above.
Cheers,
Cristi
view post as summary
Edwin Eugene Klingman replied on Apr. 26, 2020 @ 19:02 GMT
Dear Cristi,
Thanks for taking the time to explain. Like you, I prefer to work at the foundations, rather than attempt to build a new penthouse on top. I agree with almost every word you say, and thank you for saying it.
Take care, my friend, and stay well.
Edwin Eugene Klingman
report post as inappropriate
hide replies
Gemma De las Cuevas wrote on Apr. 27, 2020 @ 12:38 GMT
Dear Cristi,
Thanks a lot for writing this very interesting essay — I enjoyed it very much. I have some questions and comments. First the questions:
1) You say that all definitions in a dictionary are circular, and that physics is all about syntax. But there’s a sense in which the liar paradox (‘I am a liar’) can be seen as the emergence of semantics from syntax, since by...
view entire post
Dear Cristi,
Thanks a lot for writing this very interesting essay — I enjoyed it very much. I have some questions and comments. First the questions:
1) You say that all definitions in a dictionary are circular, and that physics is all about syntax. But there’s a sense in which the liar paradox (‘I am a liar’) can be seen as the emergence of semantics from syntax, since by manipulating purely syntactical rules, the system ends up saying something about itself, namely that it has limitations. (This point is made by Hofstadter in “Gödel, Escher, Bach”; I also mention it in my essay). I think that this emergence of semantics is something rather weak compared to the point you are making (since it only talks about limitations and does not explore all possible meanings), but I was wondering what your thoughts on this point are.
2) You talk about “the collection of all true statements about the physical the world”. But I worry about whether this is well-defined. If you define a set in the standard way (namely: for any property, there exists the set of elements that have that property), you can construct Rusell’s paradox, which leads to inconsistencies. You mention this after Principle 2, as if it were a limitation of what we can know, but I think it is also a limitation of what can be properly defined mathematically.
3) You say that language is only about relations. I wonder what is your stand on the problem of universals in philosophy. (That is, how do we recognize an apple if all apples are particulars of the concept of an apple. The concept is the universal, which we never experience.) I am trying to understand whether your standpoint is equivalent to saying that there are no universals.
Now the comments:
1) I liked your idea that meaning is subjective and private (and I also mention this in my essay), but I don’t find it scary, I guess I find it kind of beautiful… I see it as the power of words -- as what a poem can do to you.
2) You mention that the coarse graining of a deterministic system can be nondeterministic. In an essay for this year’s contest, Flavio del Santo makes a similar point, in particular with regard to classical mechanics.
Thanks again for your very interesting input.
Sincerely,
Gemma
view post as summary
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on Apr. 27, 2020 @ 15:51 GMT
Dear Gemma,
Thank you for reading and making interesting comments.
1) While dictionary is circular, this doesn't mean it doesn't say anything, just that it says only about the relations. Self-references are unavoidable in some cases, and they show something about the system, but not about anything else. I agree with you that Hofstadter makes excellent points in "Gödel, Escher,...
view entire post
Dear Gemma,
Thank you for reading and making interesting comments.
1) While dictionary is circular, this doesn't mean it doesn't say anything, just that it says only about the relations. Self-references are unavoidable in some cases, and they show something about the system, but not about anything else. I agree with you that Hofstadter makes excellent points in "Gödel, Escher, Bach", and in "I'm a strange loop" takes this kind of self-reference as an explanation of consciousness. I understand this still in the relational,
i.e. "easy problems", and to me real semantics has to do with the "hard problem". In my longer essay
The negative way to sentience I spend more time with such questions, but the main point is that what I mean by semantics is not something that we infer about a dictonary, because this kind of inference comes from identification meaning based on the very way we give meaning to the world. So we project it, it is not determined by the dictionary.
2) Model theory deals with just this kind of things, and it works. The point being that a structure that exists doesn't have inconsistent facts. If you add on top of the sentences expressing facts other sentences, that introduce additional constraints, like in the case of Russell's paradox, then you'll get paradoxes. But such sentences are expressions of facts of the world. So I am not worried about this. If the world is inconsistent, then the principle of explosion guarantees that everything and their opposites is true and false at the same time, and we will have nothing to talk about, not even relations, because there would be no information.
3) I think this is precisely the case. I doubt there is an universal of an apple, we just experience various instances of apples, train our neural networks, so that it starts to "recoginze" apples. But not because there is some universal of an apple preencoded in the network, or to which we have acces in a Platonic world. It is interesting that in many cases of autism, this mechanism doesn't seem to work so easily, they have problems with "generalization", and when they overcome it, it is because of much more training than it takes to neurotypicals.
Now to the comments.
1) I share your view, to me is something marvelous. I don't think that everybody does, since I've seem some strange reactions to this idea :)
2) My point is quite as old as statistical mechanics, I understand that Flavio takes it one step further.
Thanks, for your excellent comments and questions! I'm looking forward to read your essay!
Cheers,
Cristi
view post as summary
Chidi Idika wrote on Apr. 27, 2020 @ 20:01 GMT
Dear Cristi,
Exciting to see your essay. I actually looked forward to it.
You write:
“What appears macroscopically to be a state, can be in many different ways at the microscopic level, since the macro state is a lower resolution version of the micro state. This allowed Boltzmann to understand entropy as the amount of information that is
ignored when using a...
view entire post
Dear Cristi,
Exciting to see your essay. I actually looked forward to it.
You write:
“What appears macroscopically to be a state, can be in many different ways at the microscopic level, since the macro state is a lower resolution version of the micro state. This allowed Boltzmann to understand entropy as the amount of information that is
ignored when using a lower level resolution instead of the full resolution description.”
And
“The hard problem is sometimes formulated as the task to explain the fact that “there is something like to be you" (Nagel, 1974; Chalmers, 2003).”
Now, my question (or insight) is this, given that at the one-on-one scale of physical information we are each our own unique definition of mind (the physical analogue Gödel’s self-referencing state) wouldn’t it be only practical to also model every mind as own maximal (or minimal) entropy?
In which sense a mind is own Gödelian undecidable (entropy) or, put conversely, own Landauer limit.
Combining the two scales will mean that every mind is own de facto Heisenberg Cut or natural unit (and hence natural limit) of physical information. This simply is what we should mean by the quantum gravity scale.
In short, I am proposing thus that every mind should be modelled as own unique definition of the “nothing” — own quantum vacuum.
In electromagnetism this will be equivalent to modelling every mind as in any observable dispersion or spectral line of cosmic light own unit/constant refractive index or “free space”.
In the Gaussian unit of electromagnetism this may be equivalent to saying that every mind is own authentic “Planck charge” (hitherto the fine-structure constant or Coulomb force constant).
In modern cosmology this may be equivalent to saying that every mind is own unique holographic event horizon or vacuum of QCD.
In summary, my question to you is: shouldn’t we be looking seriously at the possibility that every mind is own unique quantum gravity scale, and indeed vice versa?
This will be in the sense presently that a mind is at once own natural unit and own natural limit of physical information. And what to call the unit mind? The “nothing” — the quantum vacuum or holographic event horizon.
In your relational perspective the given mind might be by definition then the Markov property. So it is as good as the norm/normal from which we are describing any system of waves.
Likewise, all mathematics start by assuming a number basis (an imaginary unit) namely a set of all sets. Whether expressly stated or not, it is source of the consistencies for it is the bases of all apparent scale.
Chidi Idika
(forum topic: 3531)
I hope you’ll find the time to see how I have struggled with such huge burden of proof (Forum topic: 3531).
view post as summary
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on Apr. 28, 2020 @ 07:58 GMT
Dear Chidi,
You made some interesting proposals, thank you for reading my essay and for the comments. In my essay I don't try to figure out consciousness, just to argue that there is a hard problem and that it worth seeing if there is something fundamental about it, which I call "sentience". Even if this basis is beyond the relational description that can be explored scientifically, it makes some predictions that I believe are testable. On the other hand, you are interested in describing the mind, which I think is complementary to what I was doing. For this, you makes some creative and bold proposals, which are interesting. I don't know enough what they mean or imply to judge, but maybe I can understand more after I visit your forum.
Cheers,
Cristi
H.H.J. Luediger wrote on May. 1, 2020 @ 12:32 GMT
Dear Christi,
I liked many ideas expressed in your essay, in particular that we are somehow caught in our private worlds. While this is necessary for us to be free, you don't show why this situation does not degenerate to solipsism. The reason may be that you think 'logically', i.e. affirmatively.
Further, isn't sentience a high level (reflective) idea over the immediate experiences of an observer? Can a reflection be foundational?
Heinz
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 1, 2020 @ 15:45 GMT
Dear Heinz,
Thank you very much for reading and commenting.
>
you don't show why this situation [that we are somehow caught in our private worlds] does not degenerate to solipsism.Well, we are somehow caught in our private worlds, but I didn't intend to address solipsism. I didn't consider it necessary, because I don't propose that only the subjective exists. I...
view entire post
Dear Heinz,
Thank you very much for reading and commenting.
>
you don't show why this situation [that we are somehow caught in our private worlds] does not degenerate to solipsism.Well, we are somehow caught in our private worlds, but I didn't intend to address solipsism. I didn't consider it necessary, because I don't propose that only the subjective exists. I don't reject for example the fact that we can know something about the "objective" world, I just explain that what we can know about it are just relations, not the relata. In particular scientific knowledge is of this kind. And since this is independently verifiable, as I explained in the essay and more in
my longer essay, clearly I didn't propose that only subjectivity exists. But if you think that I missed something and there is a danger of solipsism in my essay, you are welcome to explain.
On the other hand, on a funnier note, I think it doesn't hurt to reexamine the possibility of solipsism once in a while, rather than taking by default the position that it is absurd. We spend a lot of our time asleep and dreaming. It's a good point to ask ourselves once in a while if the people with whom we interact are independent sentient beings, or just figments of our minds. This may be useful in a nightmare for example, because it can allow us to wake up or to take control of the dream. Or even just to have a lucid dream, for fun, self-exploration, or preparation for a future event by "simulating" it in the dream. Taking the default position that solipsism can't be true makes us more prone to take seriously whatever bad characters we meet in our dreams, and suffer in that illusion instead of enjoying it by taking control. Other things that help this consist in looking for inconsistencies. The habit of observing inconsistencies helps us get lucid in our dreams.
Another point from the comparison with the dreams is the following. Suppose we have an argument against solipsism. If we apply it to a dream, it should not work, because, well, the other people in the dream are not real. But for an argument to work in some instance and not work in another one, there should be a difference between the two situation. If the dream is self-consistent like the reality is, what difference would be? So, my claim is that the only difference you can notice by passive observation is one of consistency (you can also actively make experiments in the dream,
e.g. trying to do things that are impossible in reality, which in general break the self-consistency of the dream). This means that no refutation of solipsism can do better than checking the consistency. Or, in my essay, I didn't reject the consistency of the world, I even took it as a principle. Being trapped in our minds doesn't lead by itself to solipsism any more than being trapped in the house.
>
Further, isn't sentience a high level (reflective) idea over the immediate experiences of an observer? Can a reflection be foundational?Well, what I understand by "sentience" in my essay is "what makes experience possible", or "the irreducible part of consciousness". I tried to explain it more in
my longer essay, where I "defined" it like
Nondefinition 1. In the following, I will call sentience the ingredient that makes experience possible. Whatever this ingredient may be, I’ll not try to define it.So I don't understand by sentience "a high level (reflective) idea over the immediate experiences of an observer". If you categorize it as "reflection", of course it can't be foundational. But I don't do this. It's a category mistake to identify what I mean by "sentience" with what others, who use it as a "reflective idea", mean. I had to use a word, some use "consciousness", but this indeed is in large part reflective. Rather than inventing a new word, I repurposed "sentience", and explained what I mean by it.
Thanks again.
Cheers,
Cristi
view post as summary
Luca Valeri wrote on May. 2, 2020 @ 19:51 GMT
Dear Cristi,
Your essay is well argued and interesting. However while I completely agree with your Principle 1, I do only agree with principles 2 and 3 with some qualifications, that might not correspond the picture your wording suggests.
Let me try to qualify. The problem lies in the "physical world". Physical world suggests the the existence of one unique reality to which some dynamical mathematical model P is isomorphic. It is easy to mistake this physical world with the "nature of things" which principle 1 denies is accessible. This is what I call in my essay simplistic realism.
In
my essay I probe another possibility as a consequence of principle 1: The objectively knowable relations are the invariants of some symmetry group, where the objects themselves are defined only as relational entites (as irreducible representation of the symmetry group) relative to some reference frame. Also the dynamical laws are constrained by the symmetry and maybe uniquely defined. The symmetry also defines, what a closed (sub) system is.
But – and this is the bold thesis of my essay I want to probe – the realization of the symmetry depends on the environment, which might change with time and allow the realizations of different symmetries, hence laws and objects, hence mathematical model P, which describe the physical world.
Having the possibility, of having different models P and its physical realizations at different times, changes everything. Some of it is discussed in
my essay.
I hope this made you curious about my essay. Happy to discuss some features of it with you.
Luca
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 3, 2020 @ 05:34 GMT
Dear Luca,
Thank you for the comments and particularly for challenging and putting at test the statements in my essay. You wrote:
>
However while I completely agree with your Principle 1, I do only agree with principles 2 and 3 with some qualifications, that might not correspond the picture your wording suggests.I don't think principles 2 and 3 apply only "with some...
view entire post
Dear Luca,
Thank you for the comments and particularly for challenging and putting at test the statements in my essay. You wrote:
> However while I completely agree with your Principle 1, I do only agree with principles 2 and 3 with some qualifications, that might not correspond the picture your wording suggests.
I don't think principles 2 and 3 apply only "with some qualifications". Here is why. Suppose you have a model where the laws change in time, as I understand to be the one you propose. Also suppose that at each time the state of the world is represented by a different mathematical structure. But this is still a dynamical system like the ones in my essay. Simply, you still have a state, even if it corresponds to a different mathematical structure, and you still have a rule that shows how one state connects to the next one, even if this rule changes in time. And you don't contradict
Principle 2 The collection of all true propositions about our physical world admits a mathematical model. Here's why. The collection of all propositions true about the world also include time specific propositions. All propositions about facts of the world valid at a time t have to be consistent, and admit a mathematical model, because this is a result from logic, it's not a postulate I want to impose (so you can't break it). There is also a larger mathematical model, corresponding to all true propositions, for all times, collected together. They can be for example of the form "At the time t things were such and such". To this collection of propositions corresponds a larger mathematical structure, valid for the entire history, and which includes as substructures those valid for each particular time. So
Principle 3 The physical world is isomorphic to a dynamical system P is not contradicted.
From your comment I understand that the symmetries at some time give the objectively knowable relations, hence a mathematical structure realizing those relations. And that symmetries can change. You say that this is due to the environment, so I take it that your system is not isolated, it's open. A question may be, what if you take the whole system? Will it's laws still change? But anyhow, let's focus on the possibility that you take it as open, or that even if you take the total system, its symmetries change for some reason. But when you say that the symmetries determine the objectively knowable relations, I understand from this that there is a procedure X which, given the symmetries, gives the relations, like a function relations=X(symmetries). So at least X is not changing, just its argument. Now, when you say symmetries, in general they correspond to transformations of some space (not necessarily the "physical space", it can be a space of other parameters). For example, the system may have rotational symmetry SO(3) at some time, and this be broken in a future time, so that the symmetry reduces to rotations around an axis. But this is just like in usual physics. You can have a large group of symmetries, and a particular state may not be invariant to the full group, but only to a subgroup. So, from changing symmetries I don't think it follows a change in the laws. But, as I explained, even if the law changes in the most crazy ways, there will still be a dynamical system P and Principles 1-3 will still hold. You wrote "I hope this made you curious about my essay". Yes, I am looking forward to read your essay.
Cheers,
Cristi
view post as summary
Luca Valeri replied on May. 3, 2020 @ 11:53 GMT
Dear Cristi,
thanks for taking the time to reply. Let me clarify from my side. What I have in mind is crazier. First of all concerning the environment. I primarily think of closed or closable systems. This is needed in order to have well defined realizations of symmetries, which define the concepts, within which the model is formalized. If that is possible, we can also start to describe open system, but only then. In order to be able to realize separable closed systems, the interactions must be not to strong and the environment must be kind enough. For instance for the Poincaré symmetry to be realized (an so having the standard model as physical model), space must be almost empty
and gravitational forces not to strong.
Now imagine at a time 0 a model P0 is realized, such that principle 2 and 3 hold approximately within P0. And at a later time another P1 is realized, such that the two principles hold. However let us imagine that P1 is the richer system in the sense, that P0 is contained in P1. Than there are things that can happen in P1 (there are propositions in P1), that cannot be described in P0 just because of the lack of language. There are propositions in P1 that cannot be decided in P0 (principle 2) does not hold. Also there is no dynamical evolution from P0 to P1, because in P1 there are concepts/quantities that are new and did not in exist in P1. Reversely events of the past (P0) can be explained or even retrodicted from within P1.
On a fundamental cosmological level I imagine some crystallization process, that brings more and more complex structures to light.
But one may also think that in empty space Poincaré symmetry (with particles of the standard model) is realized and speculate that near black holes on the event horizon symmetries of a 2 dimensional space are realized. And in between? Well this is the million dollar question. But it is thinkable that no unified separable symmetry might be realizable.
Hope this makes sense for you.
Luca
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 4, 2020 @ 08:00 GMT
Dear Luca,
Thank you for the additional details. Your explanations about the Poincaré symmetry requiring that "space must be almost empty and gravitational forces not to strong" make sense to me. Then you say "Now imagine at a time 0 a model P0 is realized, such that principle 2 and 3 hold approximately within P0." I don't understand what it means for principle 2 to hold only approximately. You mean that P0 is not logically consistent? Because if "the collection of all true propositions about our physical world that apply at the time t0" is logically consistent, then it admits a mathematical model. Also, what you mean by P0, is the same what I call "P" but valid at the time t0? Because what I call "P" is a dynamical system, so principle 3 holds. Another thing you say makes me interested. You said "Reversely events of the past (P0) can be explained or even retrodicted from within P1" I tried to see what you mean by this. I checked your essay, and now I know what you mean, although I don't think it is as crazy as you said :). Nevertheless, as I explained, even if the theory changes in time, it can't break principles 1-3 unless it is not self-consistent. I like what you said, "on a fundamental cosmological level I imagine some crystallization process, that brings more and more complex structures to light", and I agree with this. Thanks again for the comments and good luck in the contest!
Cheers,
Cristi
Luca Valeri replied on May. 4, 2020 @ 20:12 GMT
Dear Cristi,
many thanks for your precious comment in my blog. Let me clarify here about the approximate models. I think we agree that the objective knowable part of nature is the relation of things and not the things themselves. That is why (as you write) mathematics is so effective for physics. So even the things from which we only know their relations are manifestation or realizations of...
view entire post
Dear Cristi,
many thanks for your precious comment in
my blog. Let me clarify here about the approximate models. I think we agree that the objective knowable part of nature is the relation of things and not the things themselves. That is why (as you write) mathematics is so effective for physics. So even the things from which we only know their relations are manifestation or realizations of exactly these relations. So the realized physical structure is in a way isomorphic to the model. (For me to a certain extent even identical, if we identify the mathematical structure with operations that can be physically realized, like counting, or moving a thing by a specific distance.)
But these operations to be exact depend on that objects or systems within the whole can be separated from the rest. This
separability is always only an approximation. I am actually not so sure if I am contradicting myself or whether the non-separability shall or must be modelled by a random field causing the loss of phase information like in the objective collapse theories. Such as external influences might only be detectable as such because the laws within the system have been fixed. The expected behaviour of the separable system can be observed as disturbed.
This is not the point, I want to make. The point is, that in specific configurations specific relation emerge or manifest described by the model. Within this manifestation rulers and measurement apparatuses can be build. Objects themselves manifest with contingent properties, that can be measured and predicted within the dynamical model during a period of time t0.
If the objects now for instance come to near to each other, the approximate separability must be given up. New kinds of relations begin to manifest and new separable objects and systems within the new configuration manifest with new dynamical laws and contingent properties. This new system is in itself again a well defined mathematical structure/dynamical model P1 which describes itself approximately well.
Do you understand, why I think, both cannot be necessarily unified into one dynamical model? For this we should have access to the nature of things themselves. Which we do not. Even not the things themselves.
Thanks for the conversation.
Luca
view post as summary
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 4, 2020 @ 21:41 GMT
Dear Luca,
I know what you mean, but not because you translated it to me in terms of things I mentioned in my essay, that translation is too approximate. In principles 2-3 I don't talk about our models of the world. I talk about the mathematical structures that are models, in the sense of Model Theory, of the collections of propositions true about the world, regardless of what we think...
view entire post
Dear Luca,
I know what you mean, but not because you translated it to me in terms of things I mentioned in my essay, that translation is too approximate. In principles 2-3 I don't talk about our models of the world. I talk about the mathematical structures that are models, in the sense of Model Theory, of the collections of propositions true about the world, regardless of what we think about them. Here's another, final, attempt to explain what I said: 1) there are facts of the world, that are true, even if we don't know them precisely or at all. 2) It is not necessary that these facts hold for all times to be true, it is enough to have factual statements about facts of the world at given times specified in the proposition. For example "At date and time t is raining in Rome". This will remain true even if at the time t2=/=t is not raining in Rome. Because that proposition is not universal, it refers specifically to a time and place and a state. You can have such statements for each time in which it makes sense to talk about Rome. The collection of all these states doesn't need to follow any rule, and there is nothing in the environment that is ignored, but, once taken into account, would make these propositions change their validity. This example is a particular fact. There may also be universal facts, like "momentum is always conserved", which may be true or false, even if we don't know it or we can't verify in all instances. 3) The collection of the propositions expressing these universal and particular facts is logically consistent. 4) From 3, according to Model Theory, there is a mathematical structure in which these are true. Period. No room to smuggle in this some presumed approximation, there's nothing approximate here. What I said has nothing to do with the models we cook up as we try to understand the world. Nothing to do with the evolution of our understanding of the world. Also, if I say "the collection of all true propositions about our physical world", there's no environment that I could've left out, no separation I left out, because I referred to the totality of the facts of the world, not of a subsystem, not about the opinion of some people who live at a certain time and not another. Talking about separation in this case is like me saying "all", and you talking about "the things I didn't include in 'all'". So I don't see a connection between what you said I said, and what I really said. I understand your points, and your generous attempt to try to explain them to me in terms of what I wrote in my essay, but I don't think what you think I said is what I said. Fortunately I read your essay, where you explain them in your terms, so I understand, but you don't understand what I said, and this is why you think you found some exceptions to principles 2-3. There's no such exception. You think there is because you have an approximate understanding of what I said.
>
Thanks for the conversation.Thanks for the conversation.
Cristi
view post as summary
hide replies
David Jewson wrote on May. 3, 2020 @ 09:41 GMT
Dear Cristi,
So, I agree it is a hard problem to explain consciousness from a starting point of unconscious physical objects. But do you think it might be possible to do the reverse: so, to start with consciousness and explain everything else? After all, when we come into this world, we only seem to have conscious perceptions to work with as a starting point for making any theory.
It is also interesting what you say about relations. So, is there anything that relates conventional physics and consciousness? I think it would be fair to say that quantity, direction and change are a part of conventional physics and they are also things that can be directly experienced, i.e. they are also part of consciousness.
So, if you can build a ‘Theory of Everything’ using just the concepts of quantity, direction and change, then you have built a conventional theory of physics out of directly experienced things, i.e. out of consciousness, and then the hard problem of consciousness disappears. (If you are interested, my essay tries to do exactly that: explain everything using quantity, direction and change).
All the best,
David
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 4, 2020 @ 05:35 GMT
Dear David,
Thank you for the comments! You ask an interesting question:
do you think it might be possible to do the reverse: so, to start with consciousness and explain everything else? I agree that
we only seem to have conscious perceptions to work with as a starting point for making any theory. And indeed, whatever we learn about the world, and whatever theories we make to explain it, this is based on consciousness. But if someone would ask a stronger question, that we can explain everything about the world just from consciousness, in the absence of any perceptions of the external world, this would likely not be enough. But from perceptions and consciousness, we can do a lot of things, and we know the results obtained so far are obtained like this.
You make another interesting point here
I think it would be fair to say that quantity, direction and change are a part of conventional physics and they are also things that can be directly experienced, i.e. they are also part of consciousness. I guess it's about what Kant calls "a priori" cognition, which exists before the experience, and we map to the "a posteriori" cognition that follows from experience associated to perceptions. This is an interesting idea. It may be difficult to prove in practice, but I think it worth being investigated seriously. Thanks for suggesting me your essay for more details.
Cheers,
Cristi
Malcolm Riddoch wrote on May. 4, 2020 @ 11:49 GMT
Hi Cristi,
thank you for this essay on the hard problem of consciousness! I too have come through the philosophy of mind to wonder on the fundamentality of consciousness and its relation to physicalism and thus fundamental physics. This is a hard topic to broach given the many orthogonal viewpoints available. Here's my perhaps somewhat oblique take on your take.
“Principle...
view entire post
Hi Cristi,
thank you for this essay on the hard problem of consciousness! I too have come through the philosophy of mind to wonder on the fundamentality of consciousness and its relation to physicalism and thus fundamental physics. This is a hard topic to broach given the many orthogonal viewpoints available. Here's my perhaps somewhat oblique take on your take.
“
Principle 1 Science deals with relations only, and not with the nature of things.”
For me, this principle would require a specific definition of ‘relations’, where for example it is specifically empirical scientists who deal with the calculable relations between observable things. And observation here would require said scientists to be at least conscious, and preferably sentient, while observing those things and then contemplating their relation to other things. Otherwise, how can we empirically say that unobserved things have mathematically calculable relations with other unobserved things? Even dark matter and dark energy, being unobservable by definition, are posited to explain observable and thus calculable phenomena. Likewise, entangled quantum states are unobservable by definition but their wave functions calculate potential observables to a fine degree of precision.
Observation, conscious sentience, and calculation would seem to me to all play a part in scientific relational thinking, at least phenomenologically speaking.
And then, what is the ‘nature’ of these relational things beyond their givenness in the scientist's empirical experience of the things that they observe and analyse? If these things can even be said to have an ‘innate nature’ beyond their relational character, would it then be an ‘experiential nature’? And this because I have no idea of how a non-conscious non-experiential science might be practiced!
Might Principle 1 then be rewritten as ‘science deals with the calculable relations of experiential things'?
"
Problem 1 If relations can’t fully explain consciousness, then what’s the missing ingredient?"
So for me again, what’s missing is a definitional distinction between a calculable ‘relation’ and its relation to observers being conscious of things, where even consciousness isn’t just a property attached to things (as in various panpsychisms) but is itself (as you point out) a dynamic relational process of being conscious of—or sentient of—or aware of—things given in empirical/phenomenal experience. But then I’m just a Husserlian pan-experientialist when it comes down to it! And as someone mentioned up thread, Strawson is a strong exponent of this view.
Best regards,
Malcolm Riddoch
Je suis, nous sommes Wigner!
view post as summary
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 4, 2020 @ 22:15 GMT
Hi Malcolm,
Thank you for reading my essay and for the interesting comments you made. I hope my
longer essay sections 6-7 explain more the possible relations between sentience and physical facts, and how these possibilities can be tested empirically. I like the title of your essay, "Je suis, nous sommes Wigner!", and I'm looking forward to read it!
Cheers,
Cristi
Michael James Kewming wrote on May. 7, 2020 @ 21:14 GMT
Hi Cristi,
Thank you for a really interesting essay! The debate around consciousness is one I try to avoid, but you wrote a very useful and well argued piece on it. I wholeheartedly agree that the relations and not the things themselves are important, otherwise we are just stamp collecting. Your caption you write 'we select some data and ignore the rest of it' reminds me of a quote I heard about learning; something like 'you need to forget data to learn, otherwise its just memory'. You talked about open/closed Turing machines, but I was wondering if you though that the thermodynamics of a machine in a physical world are an essential component to sentience?
Your arguments regarding the thermodynamics of Turing machines and the brain considerably overlap with my essay ``noisy machines'' and you might find it an interesting read. While I don't delve into conscious, many of my arguments would carry across to the limitations of the brain if it were assumed to be a Turing machine.
Overall, really enjoyed the essay!
Thanks again,
Michael
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 8, 2020 @ 07:49 GMT
Hi Michael,
Thank you for reading, and for the very interesting comments.
> "I was wondering if you though that the thermodynamics of a machine in a physical world are an essential component to sentience?"
It is essential for the brain to work, so for consciousness too, at least for the "easy problems" of consciousness. You said it well "noisy machines", I look forward to read more about this.
Cheers,
Cristi
Michael muteru wrote on May. 10, 2020 @ 20:51 GMT
Dear Stoica. Great work in your essay on consciousness... I think we are surely headed to the core of it all though gradually.i Learnt something on sentience,Thanks.i too have something on consciousness in my simple essay here-https://fqxi.org/community/forum/topic/3525.Hope you kindly take your time to review. meanwhile, Wish you all the best in the essay contest.
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 11, 2020 @ 04:56 GMT
Dear Michael,
Thank you for reading and for the comments. And for the link to your essay. I wish you the best too!
Cheers,
Cristi
Lachlan Cresswell wrote on May. 11, 2020 @ 09:16 GMT
Dear Cristi,
You wrote a fine philosophical essay that was very readable and enjoyable.
In your abstract you ask the question:
“Can consciousness be completely reduced to physical processes or computation?”I would argue that yes it can be reduced to physical processes, but that not all such processes are amenable to computation based on the fact that ideal Turing...
view entire post
Dear Cristi,
You wrote a fine philosophical essay that was very readable and enjoyable.
In your abstract you ask the question:
“Can consciousness be completely reduced to physical processes or computation?”I would argue that yes it can be reduced to physical processes, but that not all such processes are amenable to computation based on the fact that ideal Turing machines do not and can never exist.
I would categorize myself as adhering to a variety of kinds of monism. My existence monism posits that only energy exists, it forming the Universe. My substance monism (?) posits that only two kinds of particles exist each with a set of properties and states, and these particles cannot be separated in the current stage of evolution of the Universe. My priority monism posits that all existing things of nature perceived by humans are emergent, but point back to a source that is distinct from them but causally connected.
Given that I believe in mathematical structures as approximations of the object reality of the Universe, I suppose that would mean I am also an adherent of skuld monism (Sentient monism). But I do not believe in determinism! You state:
“The coarse graining of a deterministic system can be nondeterministic” and I would argue that emergent skuld beings such as ourselves are a form of coarse-graining.
I originally used the term sentient in my
essay, which according to the Oxford dictionary means “able to see or feel things through the senses”. To my thinking that means bacteria, amoeba and other similar lifeforms are sentient, and although this word is commonly used as I intended in science fiction, I felt that this word does not provide the meaning I needed. So, I coined the term “skuld entity” to mean an entity that has self-awareness, metacognition, awareness of others and awareness of the future. Skuld originates from the Old Norse literature name for the Norn of fate that represents the future.
In Old Norse literature the three Norns (demi-goddesses) of fate are female Jotuns (giants), named Urd for past, Verdandi for the present and Skuld for the future. Norns are always present when a child is born, and they decide its fate. Look up Norns and Jotuns on the internet for some fascinating insight to another culture’s myths and legends.
Using Verdandi as the name of the Norn of the present, mentioned above, I coined the term “Relative Verdandism”. This refers to my claim that one set of defined energy exists relative to another set of defined energy with dynamical force laws that describe the relative motion of both the energy forms in the Now (present). Ultimately Verdandism is able to do away with the concepts of space, time and spacetime, which are merely creations of skuld organisms, leaving only the object reality of my Ginnungagap Theory, which describes the Universe solely in terms of its constituent matter and force particles, and their respective properties and relations.
In your expanded essay “The negative way to sentience”, you state:
“Therefore, the histories of dynamical systems are as eternalist as the block world of the theory of relativity.” I disagree with this analysis, in the sense that unless the histories are stored in a permanent system (which is, of course, not possible) then they are not eternalist at all.
We cover many of the same ideas but from differing perspectives, generally in agreement. Sometimes it is semantics, and the brevity of answers that gets in the way of understanding.
I shall continue to read your longer version with interest.
I hope you have a chance to read my essay where I contemplate the 3 Un’s with respect to my own interests.
Kind regards
Lockie Cresswell
view post as summary
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 12, 2020 @ 04:36 GMT
Dear Lockie,
Thank you for reading my essay, and for the intriguing and thought provoking comments. Also for mentioning to me your essay, which I hope to read soon. Interesting connections and parallels you made in your comments. Good luck with the essay!
Cheers,
Cristi
Rajiv K Singh wrote on May. 12, 2020 @ 11:28 GMT
Dear Cristi,
You make a profound observation, "science deals with relations only, not with the nature of things", and yet you let that slip out of hand. Consciousness is indeed explainable only in terms of 'relations of things', not by the underlying nature of things. Relations are observable reality. Constancy of relations are the brute definite properties.
> "Theories are guess...
view entire post
Dear Cristi,
You make a profound observation, "science deals with relations only, not with the nature of things", and yet you let that slip out of hand. Consciousness is indeed explainable only in terms of 'relations of things', not by the underlying nature of things. Relations are observable reality. Constancy of relations are the brute definite properties.
> "Theories are guess about the laws of the structure, the relations between the states of a system at different times."
You did not emphasize here that state descriptions are also relative, and system descriptions are constructed of constancy of state descriptions. For instance, an identity can be created out of constancy of rest mass energy of 0.511 MeV, charge of negative 1 electronic charge unit, and spin of half, and is labeled as an electron. Therefore, states and systems also have only relative descriptions.
> "The book [of Nature] is written in mathematical language -- Galileo Galilei".
A profoundly approximate statement, misses the reality. The trouble with math is that we begin to expect strong determinism expressible by math, where as we must allow limited indeterminism in our mathematical description to be able to construct the descriptions in relative terms alone. Besides, it is the indeterminism that makes the universe come into existence, or in reality. An entirely deterministic universe may not come into existence and may not vanish into non-existence. Moreover, it allows the relative descriptions to be constructed, without going into the underlying nature of things.
> "Since the collection of all true statements about everything in the world should be logically consistent, it follows that there is a mathematical structure which describes anything that can be said, which is relations only."
If one is saying all orderly patterns will have mathematical description, then it is understandable. But why logically consistent, why not observationally consistent, because logic requires mathematical consistency, ruling out any role for limited indeterminism? How can one make things indeterminate, yet have processes that cause definite consequence? See my essay.
> "Each neuron works by collecting some input signals and returning an output signal. These signals and the way they are processed can be sequenced, discretized, as precisely as needed. So, ultimately, nobody is able to distinguish more than a discrete (in fact a finite) number of states of the brain, and there’s no need for this to describe its processes. This makes the brain’s states and processes practically equivalent to those of a Turing Machine."
Differences from Turing Machines: (1) Asynchronous parallelism, (2) Discrete states of neurons capture continuous dynamics, (3) Inherent randomness, and (4) neural structure and connectivity change with time in interaction with inexhaustible (infinite) environmental conditions. Without a process of continuous dynamics in Turing machine, combination of states remain finite. A random number generator also has to be a Turing Machine, which would be repetitive for a finite system, however large -- genuine randomness goes away due to discretization. Random number generator then becomes part of the environment.
> "So even if we take into account the environment with its unpredictable inputs, it can be simulated by a Turing machine."
It can only be statistically simulated. A statistical simulation of a system does not capture the specific information of causal correlation of actual state of a system at a given moment in real time. Lower resolution argument gives up the specific information represented by the state, which amounts to definite abstraction, but no one seems to care. Evolving non-deterministic relations is not bounded by timeless tapestry.
> "If relations can’t fully explain consciousness, then what’s the missing ingredient?"
Relations with limited indeterminism can explain consciousness, but one has not presented yet what is consciousness. Without such a knowledge, consciousness naturally remains inexplicable mystery. Once you are interested in taking the discussion forward, I will define consciousness and request you to critique.
> "Can the task of solving Problem 1 be expressed as finding out the correct relation between P and S?"
YES. P is an observable state of a system and S is the information of its causal correlation. All states depend on specific relation among precursor states of physical systems, one has to simply formulate how such information builds with organized interaction. Not only the signals (states) interacting at logic gates amount to processing information, but all interactions result in certain processing, which can be quantified by a formal expression, which also shows how differs from absolute determinism. That is, processing in or by the physical system is out of bounds to Godel's theorems. Godel's theorems lose their shine due to their inapplicability to real systems. See doi:10.3390/info9070168
> "If P and S interact, the evolution law of W should contain an interaction term".
P and S do not interact, they are non-separable, as the states of P causally represents S by virtue of constancy of natural causation. S does not affect P, S is the natural outcome of P and inseparable -- there is no existence to P without S.
I hope, you enjoyed a different perspective, even though we agree on purely relational description of universe. But I cannot match your eloquence in presenting substantive ideas with such clarity and ease.
Rajiv
view post as summary
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 13, 2020 @ 04:56 GMT
Dear Rajiv,
Thanks for the interesting comments, and for pointing out both ideas with which you agree and with which you disagree.
Cheers,
Cristi
Rajiv K Singh replied on May. 13, 2020 @ 06:52 GMT
Dear Cristi,
What a pity, you declined to take the discussion forward. It appears, you have such strong logical rationality against my arguments that it is not worthy of further discussion at all. Your rationality must be mathematical for it to give such certainty of mind.
I can see that others too have noted the strength and clarity of arguments and simplicity of presentation, that most could follow with ease. This is what I call eloquence.
Have fun addressing the diverse comments from the readers.
Rajiv
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 13, 2020 @ 13:21 GMT
Dear Rajiv,
Thank you for returning. From my experience, people often think they can reduce consciousness to information, computation, processes, relations
etc, but they usually talk about the
easy problems. I realized that it is usually unhelpful to engage in such discussions, because they are about different things, and this leads to misunderstandings. I tried to give a...
view entire post
Dear Rajiv,
Thank you for returning. From my experience, people often think they can reduce consciousness to information, computation, processes, relations
etc, but they usually talk about the
easy problems. I realized that it is usually unhelpful to engage in such discussions, because they are about different things, and this leads to misunderstandings. I tried to give a grasp of what the hard problem is with the example with the tapestry. It seemed it didn't work for you, so I thought that our discussion will be just an exchange where each of us talk about different things. This doesn't mean that I must have a mathematical way to refute you, it may simply mean that I expect this discussion to be very difficult, and pointless, since we would talk about different things. But since you think is so important, as it follows from your reply, I looked in my draft and recovered the reply I wrote for you before deciding not to post it. I completed it a bit, and I am posting it below.
>
You make a profound observation, "science deals with relations only, not with the nature of things", and yet you let that slip out of hand.Well, thank you, but you could point out where I let it slip out of hand. Or perhaps it just went in a direction you disagree with?
>
Consciousness is indeed explainable only in terms of 'relations of things', not by the underlying nature of things. Relations are observable reality.I see. You seem to think that consciousness is reducible to relations. Do you think it is somewhere in the tapestry of the Rule 110 Cellular Automaton? Probably not, and probably you think that it's because this one is discrete and not random.
>
You did not emphasize here that state descriptions are also relativeIf they're descriptions, sure, they're relative.
>
The trouble with math is that we begin to expect strong determinism expressible by math, where as we must allow limited indeterminism in our mathematical description to be able to construct the descriptions in relative terms alone.I doubt that math forces determinism. There is indeterminism in math too. Probabilities and statistics are branches of math too. Sure, it forces things, in the sense that it makes it wrong to say that the result of 2+2 is anything but 4.
>
Differences from Turing Machines:[...]What I said is that the reason why some people think it is reducible to computation is because you can have Turing machines that do all these to any degree of approximation.
>
Relations with limited indeterminism can explain consciousness, but one has not presented yet what is consciousness. Without such a knowledge, consciousness naturally remains inexplicable mystery. Once you are interested in taking the discussion forward, I will define consciousness and request you to critique.I am pretty sure from what you say that you refer to easy problems of consciousness. Those you can try to define. It is not this.
>
P is an observable state of a system and S is the information of its causal correlation.I don't recognize my S and P in your S and P, here or in your essay.
>
Once you are interested in taking the discussion forward, I will define consciousness and request you to critique.I could ask you to explain what is the hard problem. That would be particularly useful since you seem to think that you know what is meaning. But it is not this, this is just a label.
>
What a pity, you declined to take the discussion forward. It appears, you have such strong logical rationality against my arguments that it is not worthy of further discussion at all. Your rationality must be mathematical for it to give such certainty of mind.You should not jump to conclusions. There may be different reasons. My reason was simply that we talk about different things, which can lead to misunderstandings. No reason to be offended by this, I hoped. If my essay was not clear enough to explain what is the hard problem and why it is not the same as the easy problems, then hopefully
this longer version may help.
I appreciate your interesting and thought provoking comments, and wish you well in the contest.
Cheers,
Cristi
view post as summary
Rajiv K Singh replied on May. 17, 2020 @ 11:34 GMT
Dear Cristi,
Thank you indeed for re-opening the discussion, I thought you had closed it. And I must say, I liked the intensity and forthrightness of your later response as truly heart warming. I am sure, you must be socially and professionally successful for keeping such fierceness within, and presenting only the kind of response you offered me first. I have not learned this...
view entire post
Dear Cristi,
Thank you indeed for re-opening the discussion, I thought you had closed it. And I must say, I liked the intensity and forthrightness of your later response as truly heart warming. I am sure, you must be socially and professionally successful for keeping such fierceness within, and presenting only the kind of response you offered me first. I have not learned this trick.
I respond only to one point you mentioned that includes several contentious issues between us. Let me apologize upfront for this being long, yet non-comprehensive, I do trust in your acute abilities to discern and see things beyond what is presented. For detail, please refer to
Fundamentals of Natural Representation . I would request you to be kind first to give a serious consideration, then to be exceedingly critical.
>> You make a profound observation, "science deals with relations only, not with the nature of things", and yet you let that slip out of hand.
> Well, thank you, but you could point out where I let it slip out of hand. Or perhaps it just went in a direction you disagree with?
Most of us have not seen yet that the relations are all that we can observe, not the underlying reality, which may not be deterministic. Every observation is relative to some configuration of instrument, every deduction is relative to a reference, every description is an expression of relations, and every information is constructed of relations only. It troubles most that how can one create a definition or a description of an object in terms that are not in themselves absolute; that is, a description is not complete without a firm basis. But the absolute basis does not exist. Even the definition of an electron is based on constancy of certain relative causal state descriptions, (rest mass 0.511 MeV, 1 negative electronic charge, and one half spin) that remain preserved under transformations; the accountable constancy of causal states gives it an identity.
Fundamental primitive (elemental semantics) of all descriptions is the causal power of physical systems, so let me define the limits of natural causation first. Natural universe, as observed from within, undergoes change. Changes exhibit certain uniformity and regularity (constancy), such that an observable state S of a physical system P bears dependence on certain other states {S_i} within limits, where {S_i} may include relative static or dynamic values (rates of change). That is, if {S_i} were not to form a part of contextual reality within the limits, the state S of P could not have an existential reality either. Therefore, if a state C bore a dependence on B, and B on A, then it is possible to define an order on the sequence of dependence. A mutual dependence indicates conjugate state variables evolving together. It is ascertainable then that A is a precursor to B, while A and B are to C. It is noteworthy that A is not said to cause B, but rather B depends on A; B may depend on other factors in conjunction or disjunction. This relation of `precursor to the consequence' is referred to here as `natural causation'. It is referred to as `natural' to imply the independence of this relation from any model or interpretation, to mean what really exists, an ontological connotation.
From the first principles of constancy of causal relation in the nature of change, if an interaction among physical systems results in an observable state S of a physical system P, then S of P must remain congruent with, or correlate with the information of the causal context effecting the change. Otherwise, measurements do not have an interpretation relating to the cause. Let me be forthright and ask, can we deny this? One must take a moment to either except or deny this for this is critical. If not, then we have an ontological basis to existential reality of information of causal correlation, independent of an interpreter.
Causal context includes precursor state descriptions of interacting systems. For example, mass of a physical system Q denotes its causal power in an interaction, which constitutes Q's function or the basis of its relation with other systems. If a system P interacts with Q and gains a state S due to this causal function of Q, then S of P is said to correlate with this information; `mass' is mere label for the causal power of Q. Causal power of Q (mass) forms a semantic primitive from which higher level structured semantics can be constructed. This is how semantics gets grounded in physical function. The information of causal correlation of state S is referred to here as semantic value represented by the state S; this statement connects the term `semantics' to the physical function while also defining `representation'. That is, the term semantics is used only to refer to what value (relation) an information expresses.
For the same reasons of natural causal dependence, S of P also must correlate with what the observed precursor states of interacting systems correlate with. This is a second order correlation which inductively takes into account all causal descriptions responsible for S of P. Can we deny this either? It is the second order correlation that allows construction of all structured and abstract semantics as shown in the cited publication above.
A few more definitions:
Object: An object has a specification in terms of functional relations with other objects, or in terms of a structural relation among its components, it is always expressed in relative terms; therefore, an object description or definition is equivalent to a semantic value. Structural and functional relations suffice to construct specification.
State: A description of causal quality associable to a physical entity having an observable consequence defines an element of state.
Relation: A relation among objects is an expression (description) of constancy that holds over the objects even when objects undergo change or transformation. The term `constancy of relation' refers to this description. Therefore, a relation functions as a constraint over objects related.
Interaction: An interaction is defined by the `observable transitions in the states of physical entities' that are accountably interdependent on the description of causal powers (qualities) of the states.
From the perspective of a transition to an observable resultant state S of a physical system P, an interaction is equivalent to a specific transition from a priori configuration of precursor states of accountable interacting systems to the state S of P. An interaction is describable as a disjunction of specific conjunctions (configuration) of precursor state descriptions of respective interacting systems that result in the observable state S of P. That is, information processing occurs at each interaction by this expression. Furthermore, this expression forms a constructor of all expressible semantics. Please refer to the cited publication above.
Abstract and abstraction: The term `abstract' as an adjective is used as a qualifier to refer to a definite class of objects or instances, or to a relation that describes the class. `Abstraction' refers to the process of forming a class, or the emergence of a class from its instances. Therfore, a reference to an enumerable set of instances, or to a range of values is a reference to a class descriptor, an abstract entity, which is describable as disjunction of discrete values, or overlapping range of values.
As promised earlier, a proposed definition of consciousness is as follows:
Consciousness is a phenomenon of representation of structured information that specifies objects and their inter-relations, where one of the objects refers to the very system of representation at a level of abstraction that includes the system as an observer, and effector of change. The generic term object includes all that is referable. Every term used in this definition has already been related to causal function, thereby avoiding any intermediate hidden miracles. This definition is stated to be minimal, which only requires a representation of an observing self relating with other objects to control action. A stronger definition is one where a step higher abstraction of structured self is required that includes specific references to self as an observer of observing and controlling self.
Though I had not planned to enlist what you let slip out of hand, even though you captured the most critical element about the role of relations in science, but since you asked, let me state.
1. The most fundamental causal qualities (states) that give rise to all observable changes can have only relative description. That is, observations are limited to relations, and we can never have direct access to physical reality of causal states.
2. All information is only expressions of explicit or implicit relations. This recognition takes the discussion away from Shannon's measure of information to the semantics of information, and to semantic processing.
3. The reality of information is associated with the observable states of physical systems as given by causal relation among precursor states, not with the system itself. Whereas, among several other considerations of information in physics today, one is the information content of a physical system is a description of its own (model) state such that a measurement in specific context conforms to it. If it were to be so, then no matter what information processing occurs via physical interaction, information can never be anything but a state description, never the kind what a brain represents and processes. That is how we have created an artificial barrier. That is why universe appears to compute its own evolution. Funny thing is, even in the domain of computing, artificial semantic values (information) are associated with (assigned to) the states of registers rather than to the registers themselves. In the natural context, the relation of causal dependence forms the ontological reality of information.
4. If information processing occurs at logic gates in computing devices, so it must take place at all interactions in natural context; all that one requires is to found a generic expression of relation that holds true at each interaction. The constructor expression stated above serves this purpose. Now, all that is required is processing in modular hierarchy to construct higher level semantics as neurons do. No coding or decoding is required, a neural state correlates with specifics of information intrinsically, and given by disjunction of conjunctions of semantics represented by pre-synaptic neurons. This is only mechanism suggested so far on how information processing occurs in neural system. Neurons representing contextual elements in coarse coding method share synchrony, which can then be used to activate other neurons in hierarchy. A preliminary simulation is presented in the cited work.
5. Since, information cannot be separated from observable states, the only knowable reality is information, even though not directly measurable, everything else is interpretation. And, as defined above consciousness is constructed of specific information, that includes a semantic description of self as an observer, as an actor, as a controller, and so on, along with its relation to all other represented objects, even the phenomena of consciousness has a basis in relation, and information. Please note that objects are created by relations, they have no absolute correspondence to external reality.
First para from my essay: If we look around, we observe objects and their inter-relations embedded in 4.pi steradian (sr) space; consider relations as objects too. We particularly note that all of the observable descriptions are constructed of information. For instance, the paper or the computer right in front, is constructed of shape, size, color, texture, brightness, distance from us, material it is made of, and its placement relative to the table which in turn has a description made up of similar information, and so on. Next we notice is the ontological realism of all this information. Here, we are not concerned with whether or not the computer and the table exist, not even with the consciousness that relates this information to the observing self, merely with the descriptive information. Are we in a position to deny the existential reality of this information? Observe carefully! One may draw an immediate inference that all elements of consciousness, including the self and its relation with other objects, are constructed of information based on natural causation.
Sir, you read my essay, but did not offer any comments, for you may have determined the futility of such an exercise. Sometimes, one observes the strength of an argument, when one tries to critique it. Of course, I am at loss to understand why. Yet, it may make sense to visit the above cited work, which does not deal with consciousness, only with physics of information, where every inference is drawn from established experiments in physics.
We have a choice to make, either we observe every detail in our consciousness as information, representation of which can be shown to arise from second order causal correlation alone, or we continue to consider that as mystical. Indeed, the hardness of the hard problem arises when we consider the feel as ontologically fundamental, rather than the feel being a representable semantics of feel related to representable self; naturally, the feel is as real and as concrete as the self. One often asks how can a represented information feel like any thing, but they forget to see that the self is also the represented semantics in the same domain of reality with causal power of control. Hardness also arises when we refuse to see and evaluate consciousness as emerging from ontological reality of information. It is the correlation of physical state with causal information that connects the physically observable state with the non-measurable information bridging the gap between material universe to consciousness.
We have no problems now accepting that the sense of pain in a phantom limb is an attribution of pain to a non-existent limb, or even the dreams do not need a reality to be present, just the semantic representation of objects constructed merely via relations, but we have tremendous problem in accepting that the sense of consciousness is yet another representable semantics attributable to semantics of self as a sensor, an observer, and an actor. If the object descriptions were not based on relations, requiring presence of absolute objects (absolute feels in absolute limbs), one cannot have phantom limb and dream experiences.
Rajiv
view post as summary
report post as inappropriate
Rajiv K Singh replied on May. 28, 2020 @ 05:54 GMT
Dear Cristi,
I would appreciate to learn if you happened to read my last response. No, reading is not a requirement, just the information.
Rajiv
report post as inappropriate
hide replies
Christian Corda wrote on May. 12, 2020 @ 16:45 GMT
Hi Cristi,
Once again, you wrote a remarkable Essay. Congrats. Your statement of Principle 1 that "Science only deals with relations, not with the nature of things." is quite strong, but I find enlightening your discussion on it. Concerning your Principle 2 that "The collection of all true propositions about our physical world admits a mathematical model." I think that sometimes it works also for wrong propositions! In general, I think that physics goes ahead through a series of subsequent approximations, which will give us more and more accurate predictions over a wider and wider range of phenomena. This is more difficult concerning the approach to consciousness. In any case, I find very interesting your Essay and deserving a very high score. By the way, I send you my congrats also for your PRA paper on the wave function on the three-dimensional space. Another excellent work.
I wish you very good luck in the Contest.
Cheers, Ch.
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 13, 2020 @ 05:03 GMT
Dear Christian,
Thank you very much for the comments and for reading my essay.
>
Concerning your Principle 2 that "The collection of all true propositions about our physical world admits a mathematical model." I think that sometimes it works also for wrong propositions! In general, I think that physics goes ahead through a series of subsequent approximations, which will give us more and more accurate predictions over a wider and wider range of phenomena.Yes, I fully agree. We may never know the right mathematical structure, though we certainly both agree that General Relativity is very close to certain aspects of it. For the arguments I made here, I was interested in the existence only, not to effectively construct the solution of the problem "what mathematical structure corresponds to reality". For this much more ambitious project, we both are doing our parts.
>
By the way, I send you my congrats also for your PRA paper on the wave function on the three-dimensional space. Another excellent work.Thank you, this means a lot for me coming from you!
Cheers,
Cristi
Mihai Panoschi Panoschi wrote on May. 12, 2020 @ 21:47 GMT
Dear Cristi, If science doesn’t strive to reach the heart of reality or to comprehend things in themselves and it’s simply a bunch of relations then what does?...Is it art, religion, philosophy?
You say, I quote “If you ever wondered why is math so effective in science, here’s the answer: because like science, math is about relations, and relations are math.
A mathematical structure is (1) a collection of sets (the nature of its elements is irrelevant), and (2) a collection of relations between those sets. Mathematically, relations are subsets of Carte- sian products of the sets.” quote closed.
In this statement you seem to reduce relations even further to sets, subsets or the set of subsets so relations in maths is no longer a primitive concept, and since I mentioned concepts I wonder why you left those out too from science since in my opinion without concepts you can’t have relations at all wouldn’t you say (i.e. what would GR be without the fundamental concept of manifold as defined by Riemann or the concept of force introduced by Newton or group by Lagrange, Galois or Lie etc?)
Logically speaking relations are between things, facts, acts, concepts, sets, classes etc.assumes the a prior existence of these objects as something more fundamental than the relations among them as such.
From a holistic (even Daoist)point of view however I can see your point if we are to agree that everything that exists is somehow inter-connected and therefore those connections, those structural relations become essential in undertaking the structure of reality and yes in that sense perhaps one can take this ultra reductionist view.
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 13, 2020 @ 05:24 GMT
Dear Mihai,
>
If science doesn’t strive to reach the heart of reality or to comprehend things in themselves and it’s simply a bunch of relations then what does?...Is it art, religion, philosophy?First, I didn't say "science doesn’t strive to reach the heart of reality", scientists definitely want this. What I said is it can only capture relations, not "the heart of...
view entire post
Dear Mihai,
>
If science doesn’t strive to reach the heart of reality or to comprehend things in themselves and it’s simply a bunch of relations then what does?...Is it art, religion, philosophy?First, I didn't say "science doesn’t strive to reach the heart of reality", scientists definitely want this. What I said is it can only capture relations, not "the heart of reality", unless this hart is relations only. And I explained that experiment is based on finding relations (to measure is to compare, to look at the structure is to find relations
etc.), and theory is based on finding relations between the experimental data. But if I am wrong, maybe you can give an example of "nature of things" found by science (or even art, religion, philosophy, because if they can, then science perhaps can absorb it). When I ask people for such an example of "nature of things" or "heart of reality", found by science or other means, sometimes they tend to become emotional, as if I offended some god of science ☺. When people get emotional, they tend to misinterpret and make quick judgments. But it's understandable ☺.
You then said I left out "concepts". I think concepts are labeled representations, and I discussed both labels and representations in my longer essay. When you give as examples
"the fundamental concept of manifold as defined by Riemann or the concept of force introduced by Newton or group by Lagrange, Galois or Lie etc", somehow you ignore that these are mathematical structures and can be defined precisely in terms of sets and relations as I said. What difference makes the fact that we represent them in our minds somehow, and we label them, and call them "concepts"? They are what they are.
>
Logically speaking relations are between things, facts, acts, concepts, sets, classes etc.assumes the a prior existence of these objects as something more fundamental than the relations among them as such.This doesn't mean that we can know those fundamental things from studying the relations between them.
>
From a holistic (even Daoist)point of view however I can see your point if we are to agree that everything that exists is somehow inter-connected and therefore those connections, those structural relations become essential in undertaking the structure of reality and yes in that sense perhaps one can take this ultra reductionist view.This is an interesting remark, although I don't understand it. As for the
ultra reductionist view, if you think that my essay was about this, then you missed the point, it was in the completely opposite direction ☺. It was rather a reductio an absurdum proof against reductionism.
Cheers,
Cristi
view post as summary
Mihai Panoschi Panoschi replied on May. 13, 2020 @ 14:57 GMT
Cristi, concepts are not simple representations or worse mere labels: they are much more than that and potentially they are and they’ve always been the key into deeper meanings of reality. It was the revision of the classical concepts of time and space that led Einstein to SR and GR and which ultimately even made the classic relation between them disappear into 4-dim Minkowski space-time and the 4-dim pseudo-Riemannuan manifold respectively. That simple concept revision hugely changed the paradigm in classical physics by pointing out the equivalence between mass and energy or the nature of gravity from being a force with Newton to being the curvature of space-time with Einstein, just to give one example of how gravity came to be understood deeper just by changing the conceptual framework, theory that was indeed confirmed through measurement and observation subsequently or as you say through relating data with the theory but only because we had a theory built on rigorous mathematical concepts, postulates, empirical evidence, philosophical and logical principles, relations and connections etc, in the first place so a whole mix of entities not just relations and mere syntactical labels.
I don’t dispute the fact that the way we understand nature of gravity now may not be the ultimate reality in itself due to quantum gravity problems but who is to say that one day someone will not come along and teach us that mind/ consciousness also plays a role in it and maybe we may even be able to bend objects at a distance just like in Matrix or levitate objects like in Stars War...
More example of the same nature you can find in my essay Logic, Formalism and Reality if you’ll be curious to read it as well as a more historically realistic view as to the role the mind/ consciousness through mathematics and logic plays in physics.
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 13, 2020 @ 15:54 GMT
Mihai,
Your examples of the role of concepts are true, and they are important for our understanding and the progress of science. But what I was refering to is what science is about, what can be proven objectively, not what is helpful pedagogically even for the progress of science. They are different things, and you brought the notion of concepts to oppose what I said, but it was not the...
view entire post
Mihai,
Your examples of the role of concepts are true, and they are important for our understanding and the progress of science. But what I was refering to is what science is about, what can be proven objectively, not what is helpful pedagogically even for the progress of science. They are different things, and you brought the notion of concepts to oppose what I said, but it was not the same thing. Also, I repeat, those concepts are our representations of for example semi-Riemannian geometry, but this geometry like any other mathematical structure are expressable in terms of sets and relations. So you see, I agree with your statements, but it is you who opposed them to my statements out of context. I was simply defining the context. In the context of my essay, the point was to show that there is indeed a hard problem, and it can't simply be reduced to science as usually understood as being about objectively or independently verifiable facts. These things are relations only. The personal touch each of us give to them when we interpret them or represent them internally, the labels we give when we use words as shorthands to communicate with others whom we expect to know what we are talking about, these are outside, meta, even though they are useful. Even so, they can be encoded as information to any desired level, but at the end there is the problem of converting this information into meaning, and I think here is again where we hit the hard problem of consciousness.
>
I don’t dispute the fact that the way we understand nature of gravity now may not be the ultimate reality in itself due to quantum gravity problemsI don't dispute it either, I even expect that the most important parts of General Relativity will survive in the final theory, even though the majority of physicists searching for it seem to me to be drifting away of it. I worked a lot to
fix issues that people consider as arguments to throw General Relativity away. I don't know how this relates to my essay, but since I see that you are interested in this, I gave you a link.
>
who is to say that one day will not come along ...Not me.
I am pretty sure that you unpacked my essay differently than I intended :) It's my fault, I had to reduce it 4+ times, and it changed in the process. Maybe
the longer version is clearer, though I am not sure even of this.
Cheers,
Cristi
view post as summary
Mihai Panoschi Panoschi replied on May. 13, 2020 @ 18:53 GMT
Cristi; it has by now become clear to me that you’re not a Platonist like me so you don’t believe in logical objective reality of concepts such as number, set, structure, system, even relation as such understood as mapping or function. For instance, Godel, a notorious Platonist used to say that numbers and sets are as real and primitive as objects but only few can perceive them as such and one...
view entire post
Cristi; it has by now become clear to me that you’re not a Platonist like me so you don’t believe in logical objective reality of concepts such as number, set, structure, system, even relation as such understood as mapping or function. For instance, Godel, a notorious Platonist used to say that numbers and sets are as real and primitive as objects but only few can perceive them as such and one can only judge the truthfulness of one’s philosophy by how fruitful it is in ones endeavours and in his case it’s been quite fruitful I’d say. You keep asserting that in physics ( I don’t think you include all sciences in the same category especially the humanistic ones where measuring things is more problematic than in physics, eg in psychology where one can hardly say that one can reliable measure feelings, moods, sentience or the like) concepts play no major role and it’s all down to relations ( and more recently you cared to include sets too although as I pointed out to you some type of relations can be reduced to the set of subsets or the power set as Cantor duly proved) and that the concept of manifold it’s just a structure, a mere representation of our minds but you seem to forget that structure as such is only a modern concept in maths and physics no more than 100 years old. In the end, numbers, sets, relations , structures are all concepts with various degrees of naiveté or subtlety or complexity so if you reduce them all to the concept of relation ( which you only defined in the context of measurement in physics but in QM the measurement has its share of problems too)you still have to explain the concept of concept and then you’d really get stuck in a vicious cycle circle type of argument wouldn’t you?...
It’s true that Kant asserted that we cannot ever truly know the things in themselves but only deal with their phenomena through mental representations but let’s not forget that he also used another 11 categories of thought over and above that of relation as inherence, causality, and correlation so even at Kant’s the relation is more than a mere concept; it was actually an a priori category of understanding made up of three dialectically inter-related concepts, along the categories of quantity, quality and modality and their inner conceptual movements, plus the two forms of intuition, space of time whose meaning since Kant has seen so many dramatic changes, especially with Einstein whose theory asserts that space-time is affected by mass-energy and vice-versa so what was once just mere concepts or representation in our mind suddenly became as real as physical matter...I think that this example refutes yet again your thesis that concepts have no logical or objective reality and that only relations derived from observation and measurement.
view post as summary
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 13, 2020 @ 19:46 GMT
Mihai, I don't know how you do it, but again, every single statement you attribute to me is wrong. I'm impressed.
>
Cristi; it has by now become clear to me that you’re not a PlatonistNot sure why you say so. This was the core of my essay.
>
You keep asserting that in physics [...] concepts play no major role and it’s all down to relationsIt seems that once you unpacked it the wrong way, there is no way back but to insist in that direction :) I didn't say any of these things you claimed I said. I neither say they play no major role, nor that it's all down to relations in the way you mean it. I'm sorry to see I failed so miserably to convey a simple message.
>
and more recently you cared to include sets tooWhat do you mean by "more recently"? In the very first comment you quoted from my essay "A mathematical structure is (1) a collection of sets (the nature of its elements is irrelevant), and (2) a collection of relations between those sets. Mathematically, relations are subsets of Cartesian products of the sets." How less recent than this being already in my essay you wanted it to be?
... that the concept of manifold it’s just a structure, a mere representation of our minds.
I didn't say that "a structure" = "a mere representation of our minds". By structure I mean precisely
mathematical structures, you just call them "concepts". I said concepts are representations of our minds, and you can
look this up too, but for some reason you seem to be calling these structures.
I am impressed that the correlation between what I said and what you understood is quite large, but it's negative. No worries, it doesn't matter.
Bye,
Cristi
Mihai Panoschi Panoschi replied on May. 14, 2020 @ 00:14 GMT
Cristi I hope we’re both reading the same essay: yours
Here’s what you say I may have misunderstood (just a few samples but the list is much longer):
“Principle 1 Science deals with relations only, and not with the nature of things.”
Which science are you referring to or you say in general, referring rather to a certain scientific method, mainly the one used in...
view entire post
Cristi I hope we’re both reading the same essay: yours
Here’s what you say I may have misunderstood (just a few samples but the list is much longer):
“Principle 1 Science deals with relations only, and not with the nature of things.”
Which science are you referring to or you say in general, referring rather to a certain scientific method, mainly the one used in physics?
“Language is as well about relations only.”
Which kind of language are you referring to? If you mean the natural language than there is more to language than syntax, there is semiotics and semantics, there is linguistic, poetry, metalanguage, etc and many more aspects of language that are not reducible to relations. To give just one definition belonging to Heidegger who states that ‘language is the house of Being’ Do you agree to that? I think that Eminescu would...Just a hunch not a theory.
“If you ever wondered why is math so effective in science, here’s the answer: because like science, math is about relations, and relations are math”
I think we commented already too much on this statement and how you can actually reduce even relations to sets so it’s self- contradictory because you first state maths is relations, then it’s sets and relations and then you hide the relations into Cartesian subsets so you’re left only with sets as the only primitive concept to define a mathematical structure.
‘Principle 2 The collection of all true propositions about our physical world admits a mathematical model.’
Well here with this state you have several issues:
1. What do you mean by a collection? Is it in the sense of set as defined by Cantor or in the sense as defined by Dedekind or neither? Is in in the sense of class as defined by Von Neuman and in what sense ‘a collection of all true proposition’ true in what sense? Does such a collection even exist or you simply postulate as if it existed as a working hypothesis? and do you mean by a mathemical model? Is in in the sense of a metalanguage in set axiomatic sense or in Tarski sense where the truth is not definable in a given language and needs a metalanguage?
‘And since many apparently independent phenomena were described in terms of these elementary constituents, we expect that this will continue to work. In particular, it is often believed that consciousness is reducible to a complex arrangement of particles. ‘
I must admit this statement is mind blowing, especially the bit that consciousness is reducible to a complex arrangement of elementary particles!!...why should we expect so? Has anyone proved that consciousness/ human mind, although as I say in my essay - the most amazing thing in the Universe - is a strictly physical phenomenon or it’s still assumed a more complex psychic one therefore more to with the mental phenomena rather than the brain? Then again, you introduced along with consciousness the concepts of elementary particles referring at fermions and bosons which makes me wonder again whatever happened to Principle 1 ‘physics is only about relations and not things in themselves’ Doesn’t the SM of physics indicate that we’ve somehow reached, up to an isomorphism as you say, the very things in themselves when we talk about the fundamental constituents of matter and when you even want to reduce consciousness or maybe life as such to them? I think in a sense it does but as you say... nevermind!
view post as summary
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 14, 2020 @ 04:12 GMT
Mihai,
You said
>
"Cristi I hope we're both reading the same essay: yours"If anyone in the world knows what someone means, it's the person who's saying it. And if that person tells you that you misunderstood, you have two reasonable options.
1. Try to read it carefully, without trying to second-guess, and when you don't know the meaning of words like "mathematical structure" you look it up. Preferable following the references.
2. Give up, you are under no obligation to try to understand what everybody says.
There is a third option, which I think is not reasonable:
3. After you are told that it is not what you understood, insist in cherry picking and twisting the meanings of the words, just to prove that you were right in the first place.
If you choose 2, this is fine to me. If you choose 1, we can take it easy and walk you through this. From my part, you are also free to choose 3, but in this case I hope you will understand why I wouldn't want to cooperate. At this point, things seem to indicate that you are very dedicated to 3.
Just an example of how you chose 3: if I wrote "it is often believed that X", you somehow interpret this as if I say that "X" is true, when the entire purpose of my essay is to show the opposite. And unfortunately, the same holds for nearly all of your comments on my essay.
Cheers,
Cristi
hide replies
Member Tejinder Pal Singh wrote on May. 13, 2020 @ 03:30 GMT
Dear Cristi,
Your beautifully written and understandable essay made a lasting imression on me. I still need to dwell a little more on the last section, and the proposition P=S. [I readily aagree there is a hard problem of consciousness].
Some of my own earlier thoughts on this subject came to my mind while I was reading your essay. I make a distinction [and I think you do too] between mind (thoughts, emotions, ...] and the underlying substrate of self-awareness/consciousness. Perhaps consciousness is a full body experience, confined not just to the brain-mind system?
Also, I had imagined consciousness to be a timeless state...self-awareness without any thoughts-every moment identical with the next; devoid of mind, there is no flow of time, and hence no experience of time, or perhaps a reversible time experience, very different from how mind perceives time. Are we in disagreement on this aspect: can consciousness be treated as a dynamical system?
Earlier, I also had this idea that at the most fundamental level, there is no distinction between the physical world and the mathematics which describes it. The two become one and the same. And that consciousness is the state when physical aspect of self equals mathematical description of self. I don't know how to prove this, but were it to be true, it would be different from how we treat emergent physical systems [reductionism]. Is your proposal P=S in any way related to this idea, or something entirely different?
You have written a thought-rovoking and very enjoyable essay, and I hope it will do very well in the contest.
Tejinder
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 13, 2020 @ 06:57 GMT
Dear Tejinder,
Thank you very much for reading and commenting and for the visit!
>
Your beautifully written and understandable essay made a lasting impression on me.Thank you, this means a lot to me.
>
I still need to dwell a little more on the last section, and the proposition P=S. [I readily agree there is a hard problem of consciousness].I...
view entire post
Dear Tejinder,
Thank you very much for reading and commenting and for the visit!
>
Your beautifully written and understandable essay made a lasting impression on me.Thank you, this means a lot to me.
>
I still need to dwell a little more on the last section, and the proposition P=S. [I readily agree there is a hard problem of consciousness].I just want to remind something, because it can go unnoticed in my short essay, as I realized from some comments. By
S I mean the mathematical description of the relational part of sentience. By
sentience I mean
the ontology of S.
>
Some of my own earlier thoughts on this subject came to my mind while I was reading your essay. I make a distinction [and I think you do too] between mind (thoughts, emotions, ...] and the underlying substrate of self-awareness/consciousness. Perhaps consciousness is a full body experience, confined not just to the brain-mind system?I agree. There is a second "brain", which from historical-biological perspective happened before what we now call "brain". It is the enteric nervous system, and Damasio explains well in what sense this is a brain. At any rate, I think that even when we see ourselves as very rational and logical, we are in fact just rationalizing our emotions and hunches. Relations between the gut and the development and functioning of the brain are something that we are just starting to understand. Imbalances in the gut bacteria can lead to many health issues, but also affects the brain, and is one of the major factors that are connected with autism (I have personal reasons to be very interested in this relation, one of my kids being severely autistic). Anyway, while answering you, I recalled the huge differences in nutrition between India and the US, and this prompted me to check if there is also a difference in the incidence of autism.
Indeed, in India is 0.23%, while in the US is 1.47%! (although the article doesn't mention the gut).
Here is a link about the relation between gut and autism.
>
Also, I had imagined consciousness to be a timeless state...self-awareness without any thoughts-every moment identical with the next; devoid of mind, there is no flow of time, and hence no experience of time, or perhaps a reversible time experience, very different from how mind perceives time. Are we in disagreement on this aspect: can consciousness be treated as a dynamical system?I think it's timeless, no disagreement between us here. I think physics is timeless. Dynamical systems are timeless, time is just a parameter on the curve representing the succession of states. I gave a proof that there's no way to introduce
presentism in a dynamical system in
my longer essay. So both
P and
S are timeless. I think sentience is timeless too, although I can't prove much about sentience (sentience is
the ontology of S, but not S itself). The impression that present is more "real" and time flows comes from the limited perspective of the states, they have memories of the past, not of the future. But they are confined to a particular time, just like they are at one place and not everywhere, so their perspective is presentist and not eternalist, for the same reason why we have a location in space, and we are not everywhere. So time is a matter of perspective, which, since it correlates with the time in the dynamical system, we think it's supported by physics. But there is nothing even in the dynamical systems that would make present more actual than other moments of times, except that the state has limited knowledge of the entire history.
My views on time in physics are more complicated to be explained in a comment, but
I attach a paper about this, in the form that was accepted for publication recently.
>
Earlier, I also had this idea that at the most fundamental level, there is no distinction between the physical world and the mathematics which describes it. The two become one and the same. And that consciousness is the state when physical aspect of self equals mathematical description of self. I don't know how to prove this, but were it to be true, it would be different from how we treat emergent physical systems [reductionism]. Is your proposal P=S in any way related to this idea, or something entirely different?I view everything as a timeless mathematical structure whose ontology is sentience. It becomes manifest in systems like humans, able to exhibit purpose and meaning, but I think it is unreachable by objective means, including studying humans under the microscope (although
S itself may be). Metaphorically, I can put it like this: the foundation of consciousness and experience, which I named "sentience" to be able to speak about it, but took caution to call this naming "nondefinition", is all that is. It is also a mathematical structure because it is consistent. A more detailed view I have is that it is undifferentiated, timeless, dimensionless (I explained how this can be in my last essay,
Indra's Net - Holomorphic Fundamentalness, particularly note 8). I see it like a germ of a holomorphic field (I explain why I think fields are holomorphic in that essay), or rather an equivalence class of such fields. It has no dimension, no time. But it contains in it the field, including spacetime, as the power series expansion of the data in the germ. So there is only one undifferentiated thing, which has "inside" it, intrinsically, many differentiated perspectives of the world. But it can be any other mathematical structure, if I am wrong and physics is not like this. It can be something like your matrix dynamics theory, or maybe this and the holomorphic one are just isomorphic somehow. Anyway, I think that that the ontology of that mathematical structure is sentience. I can't remember since I had this view, but the holomorphic germ idea came to me 25-30 years ago. And somehow, at that time, I started to read some Eastern philosophies like Taoism and Advaita Vedānta, and I had the feeling that they were saying the same. I factored out the stories that people developed out of these experiences, which resulted in various mythologies that too often don't seem factual enough to me, I think these are just attempts to conceptualize that experience. Pretty much like Descartes, who doubted deeply (his
dubito), but instead of sticking to
neti neti, he filled the experience with concepts based on his own preconceptions, which led him to derivate Catholocism out of this. I think this happened to many people, trying to think of the unthinkable, to speak of the unspeakable, and this filled the world with myths that contradict one another and facts.
>
You have written a thought-provoking and very enjoyable essay, and I hope it will do very well in the contest.Thank you, I appreciate this very much! I loved your essay as well, and I wish you the best in the contest and research! And if you will give a Zoom talk about your work, please count me in!
Cheers,
Cristi
view post as summary
attachments:
1_post-determined-block-universe.pdf
Georgina Woodward wrote on May. 13, 2020 @ 22:11 GMT
Hi Cristinel, nice essay. Some thoughts spring to mind about brain and neuron function. 1.threshold of neurotransmitter input at junction needing to be met before firing of a neuron can happen. In many cases input will
not result in output. 2.Learning by new neural junctions forming. 3. Brain plasticity; 'Pruning' of unused neuronal connections related to forgetting the unimportant.'strengthening' of well used ones. 4. Brain derived neurotophic factor increased by exposure to novel situations, exercise and some dietary components/ supplements. Overall showing the brain not fixed in architecture like a machine but undergoing growth and /or decline. meaning there are far more potential states of the brain than its architecture at one time would suggest. Kind regards Georgina
report post as inappropriate
Georgina Woodward replied on May. 14, 2020 @ 00:33 GMT
I forgot to mention, fasting also increases brain derived neurotropic factor. I've also been thinking that the experiences an individual will have are potentially extremely diverse, from what it chooses to learn, to what it more passively 'takes in' as it navigates through, and interacts with its environment and other beings; Affecting the fine structure of the brain. I don't think all of the conceivable, possible variations of experience, giving different permutations of brain 'wiring' and interconnections can be quantified.
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 14, 2020 @ 04:28 GMT
Dear Georgina,
Thank you very much for the very insightful comments about neurons. I fully agree with you, and I find these facts about brain and neurons both amazing and helpful in the brain development. Neuroplasticity of the human brain is amazing. The whole point of my essay was to show that consciousness is not reducible to computation. Now, it may appear to some that there is nothing there that can be modeled, and indeed, it is possible to make machines that change as they are exposed to new data, but my point is that even if we would do this, this is not enough. There's something about consciousness that can't be captured in computation. So, my central argument is that if it would be reducible to computation, then we would all be isomorphic to parts of the two-dimensional tapestry generated by a Rule 110 cellular automaton. So, if we disagree with the conclusion that we are part of that tapestry, then we must reject the hypothesis, that consciousness is reducible to computation. My argument was conceived like a "proof by reductio ad absurdum", targeted at the hard-core reductionism which seems to dominate currently in science. Thanks again for your comments on neurons and the brain, and I wish you good luck with the contest!
Cheers,
Cristi
Vesselin Petkov wrote on May. 14, 2020 @ 02:08 GMT
Dear Cristi,
Thank you for the excellent and thought-provoking essay!
I have several questions but will formulate the most important, I think. I read carefully your essay (and similar arguments by other authors), but have always been totally unable to understand the explanations of why "science is only about the relations between things, not about the nature of things themselves."
With regard to "nothing of the nature of the things is accessible to measurement or observation," how would you explain the common view that physics does studies physical objects, not just their relations? E.g., we measure the locations of planets and the sun (even we see them directly or through telescopes!) I agree that we may never have absolute (full) knowledge about them, but physics does measure such objects (not only their relations) and in this way proves their existence. The word “planet” means to other people essentially the same thing (whether it is exactly the same or not, I think does not challenge the fact that we see and measure (all in perfect agreement) an object that we call a planet.
And, of course, my favourite example that physics does deal with the nature of things - Minkowski's explanation of length contraction demonstrates that length contraction would be impossible if the worldtube of a contracting rod were not a real four-dimensional OBJECT (length contraction showed that the name "3D rod" was incorrect and we have no choice to call it "a 3D rod", because the rod turned out to be a 4D object). I believe this is most evident from the more visualized version of Minkowski's explanation - the thought (which can be made a real) experiments - an image is given on my essay's page in my response to Harrison Crecraft and H.H.J. Luediger.
Best wishes and good luck,
Vesselin
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 14, 2020 @ 06:02 GMT
Dear Vesselin ,
Thank you very much for reading and commenting my essay! I enjoyed very much yours as well, and I am happy that you are visiting my page.
>
why "science is only about the relations between things, not about the nature of things themselves."The intention of scientists is of course to know the nature of things, not merely their relations. But their...
view entire post
Dear Vesselin ,
Thank you very much for reading and commenting my essay! I enjoyed very much yours as well, and I am happy that you are visiting my page.
>
why "science is only about the relations between things, not about the nature of things themselves."The intention of scientists is of course to know the nature of things, not merely their relations. But their means are operational. I think a good example is the difference of approaches between Einstein and Minkowski. Einstein tried to understand and explain Special Relativity by operational procedures, rods, signals, etc. He used physical objects like rods and clocks, but as means to derive relations between lengths, durations, etc. Historically, this operationalism worked well, and led to the rejection of the "realist" position existing at that time, that aether explained electromagnetism. So Einstein came up as operationalist and aether theory was abandoned*. Minkowski's position is different. He proved indeed that reality is four-dimensional. So he put back reality in its place, and was not merely operationalist. But we can interpret this in two ways. One is that the four-dimensional objects Minkowski talks about are "matter", and the other one is that they are geometric entities. My position is that we know at least that they behave like geometric things. We don't know what is "matter", but we know what is geometry. But both "matter" and "geometry" are metaphysical concepts. People can agree on the Lorentz transformations, but some can interpret it as geometry, and others as matter having geometric properties. So science, to allow the exchange of ideas and independent verification, avoids making metaphysical assumptions, and relies on what can be shared. And operational procedures can be shared. As well, when we have theoretical explanations, we formulate them mathematically, but we don't go into the interpretation of the underlying nature of the things in our equations. The only time we do it is when we can describe things in terms of other things whose description we already have. This is why I say it's about relations, and can't go beyond them.
Take Minkowski's spacetime. It is a geometric space. This means it's a mathematical structure. A general definition of mathematical structure is given in Universal Algebra, in terms of sets and relations. Like a parenthesis, I don't quite like the term "universal algebra", because I see those rather geometrically, but this is a matter of personal taste. Anyway, my point is that Minkowski spacetime is a real element of the Theory of Special Relativity, and I take it in a geometric sense. As a geometry, it is a mathematical structure in the sense of Universal Algebra. So all there is about it is captured in the sets and relations. But the nature of the elements of the sets in themselves play no role in Universal Algebra, than to allow the definition of relations. In fact, Universal Algebra can be reduced to relations alone, by replacing the elements by 0-ary relations.
So we have the description of the world obtained from observations and making theories, as relations, and we have the underlying mathematical structure, which is also as relations. And ideally, when we will have the right theory, the two will be isomorphic. Whatever new we learn by operational means about the objects will simply add more relations. This doesn't mean that there is no underlying reality, no ontology. There is ontology. My claim is just that we can't put the finger on it by operational means, the best we can do is to find relations.
>
With regard to "nothing of the nature of the things is accessible to measurement or observation," how would you explain the common view that physics does studies physical objects, not just their relations? E.g., we measure the locations of planets and the sun (even we see them directly or through telescopes!) I agree that we may never have absolute (full) knowledge about them, but physics does measure such objects (not only their relations) and in this way proves their existence. The word “planet” means to other people essentially the same thing (whether it is exactly the same or not, I think does not challenge the fact that we see and measure (all in perfect agreement) an object that we call a planet.There is an object called planet, of course. It is not like the object is different to each observer, it may look different, but it is the same. We share the same reality. We even agree that it is made of atoms. And we agree that atoms are made of particles. And here is a place where we no longer know what is the nature of things. Particles, fields, wavefunctions, pure probabilities? This is another discussion. Einstein wanted here to keep having a realist description. But Bell's theorem, by using the very EPR experiment, shows that Einstein had to choose between a fixed reality at each time, and locality. But sorry, I divagate. When I say that we can't really know objectively the nature of things, I mean it in a much broader sense. I would say the same in a classical world. The object is there, Einstein criterion of reality is satisfied, but I would still complain that we can't know its nature. I think what I mean is that, to know the nature of something, there is no other way for that object to be, so that what we can measure and observe about it is the same. For example, consider a classical, Newtonian world, where all the elementary objects are balls, cogwheels, pins, etc, all made of steel. And suppose, for the sake of explaining what I mean, that all these elementary objects, identical in density, can't be broken or X-ray-ed. Suppose that there are "people" made of these things, and they try to understand that world. If these steel elementary objects are all there is in this world, can anyone know that they are made of steel? There is no notion of steel there, unless the people they call steel a particular organization of those objects. But they don't know what they intrinsically are. It could be anything, from cheese compressed well enough to have the same density and assuming it is unbreakable, to any other material. We can just call it "adamantium" or whatever. In such a world, we could never know the material. This is what I mean by "their nature". So the objects exist, they can be measured by comparing them to one another, their inertia can be measured, and what we would get are relations only. Nothing about their nature. Of course, we could analyze a planet in that world, and see that it is made of ultimate parts like these, but that would be the end.
>
"And, of course, my favourite example that physics does deal with the nature of things - Minkowski's explanation of length contraction demonstrates that length contraction would be impossible if the worldtube of a contracting rod were not a real four-dimensional OBJECT (length contraction showed that the name "3D rod" was incorrect and we have no choice to call it "a 3D rod", because the rod turned out to be a 4D object). I believe this is most evident from the more visualized version of Minkowski's explanation - the thought (which can be made a real) experiments - an image is given on my essay's page in my response to Harrison Crecraft and H.H.J. Luediger."You are right, of course. It is not the reality of objects that I doubted in my essay, but the "material" so to speak. Somehow, the material is immaterial to science, only the relations. I am using the word "ontology" or "nature of things" in this sense. I was doing this in my essay to make the case that there is something irreducible about consciousness. When people think they can understand consciousness, and it's just computation or processes, they usually make a lot of assumptions on top of what they really know. My thesis is that, once we remove those assumptions that color them, and let computation or what we call processes to be bare, it becomes clearer why this reductionism doesn't work. My personal view is that all there is is geometry+sentience. Geometry is the form, and the substance is sentience. Not sure if this choice of words is very suggestive. It can be compared with Russell's monism, although I am not sure that they are the same.
Cheers,
Cristi
____________________________________
* Side note: Einstein's approach is very similar to how Bohr tried to explain the quantum world operationally, by relying on classical physical objects like the measurement apparatus. This may seem paradoxical, because Einstein changed completely the approach and opposed Bohr's operationalism, trying to understand reality instead. I think this is due to Minkowski, who showed that spacetime is real. Einstein, I think, was influenced by this, and this reconceptualization helped him to discover General Relativity, where the reality is curved spacetime, and also made him expect similar level of realism from Quantum Mechanics. While Bohr remained, paradoxically, faithful to the operationalist position similar to Einstein's original position. I know this reading of history is very personal, but I try to explain what I mean.
view post as summary
Mihai Panoschi Panoschi replied on May. 14, 2020 @ 09:19 GMT
That was precisely my point too Vesselin! Sadly, that’s not the only fallacy in the essay, despite what I’d otherwise call an heroic attempt to bring consciousness ( whatever that means?)into the cold world of science. However, it never ceases to amaze me how human mind tries to build castles out of sand and then expect them to hold water!...Luckily we have people like a Minkowski and Einstein that come along every 100 years to wake us up from our hypnotic illusions or save us from the bankruptcy of common sense.
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 14, 2020 @ 13:39 GMT
Mihai, you still didn't give a single example of "nature of things" or "heart of reality" or "thing in itself" (as opposed to relations) that can be known scientifically or objectively,
i.e. in an independently verifiable way. The only examples you gave are from mathematics, which was precisely my point in the essay.
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 15, 2020 @ 18:22 GMT
Dear Vesselin,
I forgot to mention something. I make a distinction between ontology and
ontology candidate, which I defined for dynamical systems in The negative way to sentience. I consider ontology to not be part of physics (hence science), but of metaphysics. I considered this also in this paper published last year, Representation of the wave function on the three-dimensional...
view entire post
Dear Vesselin,
I forgot to mention something. I make a distinction between ontology and
ontology candidate, which I defined for dynamical systems in
The negative way to sentience. I consider ontology to not be part of physics (hence science), but of metaphysics. I considered this also in this paper published last year,
Representation of the wave function on the three-dimensional space. I could've claimed that I showed that the many-particle wavefunction has a 3D ontology in nonrelativistic QM (NRQM), and a 4D one in the relativistic ones, as opposed to the 3N-dimensional configuration space ontology it has in NRQM. But since it was a paper of physics, and since physics is a science, and since ontology is a metaphysical thing, I preferred to call my finding "representation" (which is, mathematically), but I didn't call it ontology. And I preferred to say that it allows interpretations of QM to consider the wavefunction as their ontology. This is an example of what I called "ontology candidate". What Bell calls "beable" are part of ontology candidate, when we discuss physics, but can be part of ontology when we discuss philosophy of physics. In interpretations of QM like pilot-wave and GRW, there is a discussion about ontology. Pilot-wave theory, according to Bohm and Bell, contains both the positions of the particle and the wavefunction in the ontology. The more recent version of it, called "Bohmian mechanics", considers ontology only the positions of particles, but this can only be an incomplete ontology, because the same positions can go together with different wavefunctions. Similarly, in GRW, there are two versions of ontology, the mass density ontology (GRWm) and the flash ontology (GRWf), both of them being incomplete, because they can't recover the wavefunction, so I call them "partial ontologies". Anyway, since there is no empirical difference between BRWm and GRWf, it means that the ontology is not testable in an objective, independent manner. So it is not part of physics. So, going back now to the Minkowski spacetime, the shapes are 4 dimensional, as he said. 4 dimensional shapes can be ontological, speaking metaphysically, but science has nothing to say about them except their symmetries, which are relations. From physical point of view it's irrelevant what makes those shapes, what is their "true nature", such talk is metaphysica. Now, to explain "the common view" is a perhaps psychological or sociological question. I don't know. What about the common view that planets are three-dimensional, or that the present exists, but the past and future don't? It's a view, and it is still common, over 100 years since Minkowski's proof that shapes are four-dimensional and time doesn't flow. If one wants to take as evidence against my statement the fact that there is a "common view that physics does studies physical objects", perhaps one should take as evidence against Minkowsi's spacetime the fact that there is a common view that things are 3d and time flows, but we don't take it, for good reasons.
Anyway, in both my essay (first half of page 2) and in
the longer version (first half of page 4) I showed that experiments and theory deal with relations only. I couldn't find a single example of experiment or theory dealing with the nature of things. And nobody gave me an example that, at a closer look, doesn't turn out to be about relations only. All such examples come from overlapping our mundane intuitions over the abstract notions of science. Just like people overlap their experience of time and space over physics, and have the opinion that time flows and things are 3d. In fact, I gave the particular example with the presentist view in my longer essay, along with the materialist view and others. Of course, my view that sentience is the ontology of experience and in fact of the system
S from my shorter and longer essays, it is also metaphysical, but I think it makes some falsifiable predictions.
Cheers,
Cristi
view post as summary
Mihai Panoschi Panoschi replied on May. 16, 2020 @ 10:05 GMT
Cristi, any domain of knowledge that is able to turn from a domain dealing with (supposedly)real objects, magnitudes and relations found in the outer ‘outer world’, into an autonomous discipline that is able to take care of its own foundations by thinking itself and using key concepts produced ‘from within’ could therefore be considered a ‘think in it self’ in Kant’s sense or as something that reaches the essence or strikes into the heart of the that domain, enabling us to understand reality in a much deeper way. Mathematics for instance started out as the ‘science of magnitudes’ but it has undergone repeated and gradual reconstructions of its basic and most fundamental concepts and ideas, and which eventually finished in the belief all mathematical theories can be considered extensions of set theory and hence a thing that’s worth studying in itself and for itself ( as Hegel would say).Modern physics, or rather its foundations, is heading in the same direction so I guess one could say that physics in itself is mathematics, but that of course will be a gross underestimation of other powerful unifying concepts in physics such as field, symmetry, conservation law, etc
report post as inappropriate
hide replies
Lawrence B. Crowell wrote on May. 15, 2020 @ 12:26 GMT
Hi Christinel,
I wrote the following on my blog area:
Thanks for the boost. Try to read Szangolies’ essay on a related development, and Palmer's on the fractal geometry.
Your paper works with the connection between Gödel theorem or self-reference and consciousness. I have thought that consciousness is a sort of epiphenomenology that is an illusion having an illusion of itself. I have not read it in its entirty, and I do see you connect with what look like fractals.
I have been slow. I have had Covid-19. It hit me at the 3rd week of March and lasted about 10 days. It relapsed in April and the fatigue part of this was serious. I still sleep more than I used to, but the most pernicious aspect of this has been dogging me. It is as if my brain has been rewired, or maybe hormone setpoint levels changed. I am not quite the same person I was; I feel as if I am an abruptly changed person. The worst part of this change is that I am more depressed and irritable than I was. It has been hard for me to participate much in this contest.
Cheers :LC
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 15, 2020 @ 18:25 GMT
Dear Lawrence,
Thanks for the visit. I am very sad that you got Covid-19, I hope it is the easiest form and you'll be well as soon as possible. Don't worry about my essay until you get well, but please get well, because I would love to hear some feedback from you, if possible about
the longer version, even if it will be long after the contest ends.
>
Your paper works with the connection between Gödel theorem or self-reference and consciousness. I have thought that consciousness is a sort of epiphenomenology that is an illusion having an illusion of itself. I have not read it in its entirty, and I do see you connect with what look like fractals.I didn't appeal to self-reference or fractals, although I'd agree with you that they play a role. But it has strong relation with no-go theorems. As for consciousness, I am interested in the hypothesis that there is something irreducible about it (this irreducible I called "sentience"), and I try to see if this makes testable predictions. My claim is that it does. Indeed, for many who think consciousness is irreducible, the epiphenomenal position seems a good refuge, since it makes the hypothesis unfalsifiable. But I think we should be brave and don't avoid the fact that it does make predictions. So we can test it. We risk, those who deny it risk to see the predictions confirmed, but they can still continue to deny it, since the test of a prediction is not necessarily a proof of what led to the prediction. A rejection of the prediction is a rejection of what led to the prediction, so it is more risky for those who endorse the position that consciousness is not fully reducible. If we want to bring the hard problem into science, we have to take this risk.
I wish you to get back in shape soon!
Cristi
James Arnold wrote on May. 15, 2020 @ 14:36 GMT
Cristi,
This is a stunning essay, beautifully written. I do have an issue with your regard for mathematics, relatively measured though it is. You write “theories in physics” to be mature need “to be logically consistent and mathematically well formulated.” I believe there is another requirement, often missing in quantum physics in particular, that they need to be natural. Just to...
view entire post
Cristi,
This is a stunning essay, beautifully written. I do have an issue with your regard for mathematics, relatively measured though it is. You write “theories in physics” to be mature need “to be logically consistent and mathematically well formulated.” I believe there is another requirement, often missing in quantum physics in particular, that they need to be natural. Just to take one example, “the collapse of the wave function” is an absurdity owing to the inattention to the natural consideration that a “wave function” is actually a purely mathematical “curve function”, which merely describes a cognitive transition from not knowing to knowing. An absorption in mathematics has become increasingly detrimental physics – Black Hole physics is a prime example,
I’m not sure you mean to be endorsing “since the collection of all true statements about everything in the world should be logically consistent, it follows that there is a mathematical structure which describes anything that can be said”, and “all true propositions about our physical world admits a mathematical model.” But to say “I am sentient” is of course not one of those things that can be said. And later you write “consciousness is irreducible to relations, physical processes, or computation.” Assuming you’re not inconsistent, it seems you need to distance yourself from those statements in the beginning.
Some of my favorites:
“If there is something fundamental about time, this is outside the realm of physics and science in general, since science deals with relations only. Maybe it’s the sentient experience of time.”
“We doubt that science can fully explain consciousness, even in principle.”
“What feature of matter can create experience? Should we update the definition of matter to include sentient experience, and pretend that the word ‘matter’ still means what it always used to?”
“The claim that there is nothing but relations is a metaphysical assumption.”
“Dualism, materialist reductionism, property dualism, panpsychism, idealism, neutral monism etc., [address] the possible relations between [a dynamical system in which all the true propositions about the world are satisfied] and [a dynamical system, which admits a mathematical model too but includes sentience as well as relations].” (Do these admit a mathematical model?)
Beautiful: “The most direct experience we have is that of our own consciousness. We know that we are sentient by direct, unmediated experience. Anything about the external world is secondary, being present in our own consciousness only as a representation.”
“We think we are sentient because we are” and “this means that there is a causal relation [between] the system[s]” of sentience and non-sentience.
To be part of science, [consciousness] has to be based on objective evidence, which can be verified independently” so “the ontology of [sentience] is therefore unknowable through the methods of objective science.”
If they “have distinct ontologies, how do they combine” and “the simplest answer is that sentience, the ontology of experience, is also the ontology of [all true propositions about the world].”
I’d invite you to have a look at my paper “Quantum Spontaneity and the Development of Consciousness” in Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 26, Numbers 1-2, but the copyright seems to have been sold to ingenta connect, and it’s no longer free.
My thesis is that the universe is fundamentally spontaneous (not random or causal), and consciousness is just the organized, convergent (rather than emergent) manifestation of universal spontaneity.
view post as summary
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 15, 2020 @ 18:28 GMT
Hi James,
> This is a stunning essay, beautifully written.
Thank you!
> I do have an issue with your regard for mathematics, relatively measured though it is. You write “theories in physics” to be mature need “to be logically consistent and mathematically well formulated.” I believe there is another requirement, often missing in quantum physics in...
view entire post
Hi James,
>
This is a stunning essay, beautifully written.Thank you!
>
I do have an issue with your regard for mathematics, relatively measured though it is. You write “theories in physics” to be mature need “to be logically consistent and mathematically well formulated.” I believe there is another requirement, often missing in quantum physics in particular, that they need to be natural.Well, you can take my condition as necessary, but not necessarily sufficient then.
>
Just to take one example, “the collapse of the wave function” is an absurdityI think the same, although we may have different reasons for this. Some of mine are for example
here and
here.
>
owing to the inattention to the natural consideration that a “wave function” is actually a purely mathematical “curve function”, which merely describes a cognitive transition from not knowing to knowing. An absorption in mathematics has become increasingly detrimental physicsI am aware of the fashion of blaming mathematics for the failures in physics, or at least successes that are awaited for long time and didn't appear. I would say that we should rather blame the misunderstanding of the math.
>
Black Hole physics is a prime exampleBlack Hole physics is a prime example where the reason is precisely the misunderstanding of the math, and not math itself. I wrote a very critical article against the current trends,
Revisiting the Black Hole Entropy and the Information Paradox. The point was exactly that black hole physics became a freestyle abuse of math, but taking math seriously does a better job and show that a lot of myths that lead to thousands of papers are just myths.
>
I’m not sure you mean to be endorsing “since the collection of all true statements about everything in the world should be logically consistent, it follows that there is a mathematical structure which describes anything that can be said”, and “all true propositions about our physical world admits a mathematical model.”I refer to results in
model theory.
>
But to say “I am sentient” is of course not one of those things that can be said.I am sentient. Once I've got to say it, it became just a physical process. But what's the source of this thought? Can this make testable predictions? I think it does.
>
And later you write “consciousness is irreducible to relations, physical processes, or computation.” Assuming you’re not inconsistent, it seems you need to distance yourself from those statements in the beginning.Assuming that I am inconsistent, maybe you can show it to me, because I don't want to be inconsistent.
>
Some of my favorites:...Thank you, these are among my favorites too :)
>
“Dualism, materialist reductionism, property dualism, panpsychism, idealism, neutral monism etc., [address] the possible relations between [a dynamical system in which all the true propositions about the world are satisfied] and [a dynamical system, which admits a mathematical model too but includes sentience as well as relations].” (Do these admit a mathematical model?)Well, yes. In
The negative way to sentience I show how various interpretations of QM connect to different of these positions. Of course, I am talking about
P and
S from my essay, sentience is not
S, sentience is the ontology of
S.
>
I’d invite you to have a look at my paper “Quantum Spontaneity and the Development of Consciousness” in Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 26, Numbers 1-2, but the copyright seems to have been sold to ingenta connect, and it’s no longer free.Thank you for the invitation!
>
My thesis is that the universe is fundamentally spontaneous (not random or causal), and consciousness is just the organized, convergent (rather than emergent) manifestation of universal spontaneity.Sounds very interesting!
Cheers,
Cristi
view post as summary
Alyssa Adams wrote on May. 15, 2020 @ 23:01 GMT
Hi Cristi!
Bravo, this is a fantastic essay! I really love how you talk about the hard problem of consciousness along with the idea of coarse-graining and reproducibility. The organization of ideas flows extremely well and the essay is very well-organized.
My questions for you are these: Why do you think nature, particularly biological processes, has some need to coarse grain states? Why at all do you think it occurs, and could it be some unexpected result of thermodynamics for example?
I think a state gets coarse-grained according to the physical abilities of an observer. Observers with vision have the ability to coarse-grain groups of atoms according to color in a painting, while observers that do not have vision would coarse-grain a painting in an entirely different way, based on other senses like touch. The whole process of reproducibility seems to rely so much on the ability of an observer.
Consciousness seems like it could be a special case of an observer coarse-graining itself. Observers are not entirely separate from their environment most of the time, and are embedded as a part of the environment in most cases in biology. I'd be curious to hear about your thoughts here!
Cheers!
Alyssa
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 16, 2020 @ 07:18 GMT
Hi Alyssa,
Thanks for the visit and for reading, and I'm happy that you enjoyed my essay!
You ask great questions:
>
Why do you think nature, particularly biological processes, has some need to coarse grain states? Why at all do you think it occurs, and could it be some unexpected result of thermodynamics for example?It is possible, I think, to imagine...
view entire post
Hi Alyssa,
Thanks for the visit and for reading, and I'm happy that you enjoyed my essay!
You ask great questions:
>
Why do you think nature, particularly biological processes, has some need to coarse grain states? Why at all do you think it occurs, and could it be some unexpected result of thermodynamics for example?It is possible, I think, to imagine numerous possible physical worlds, with their laws, which don't present coarse graining. By this I mean that if we try to coarse grain the state space or the phase space, the dynamical law of the system will ignore the coarse graining and cross it as if there is nothing there. But some dynamical systems admit coarse graining that is consistent with the dynamics, that is preserved well enough to make coarse grained level systems emerge. Ours is like this. The dynamical law doesn't preserve perfectly the coarse graining, and this is why the emergent systems are impermanent. But there are important gains. First, the states at the coarse grained level can be made in different ways at the detailed level. Second, but most important, coarse grained level systems can self-organize without having to do it to the finest detail, and they can store information, and, essentially, forget information, dissipate. There would be no evolution without forgetting. So I think coarse graining is needed for biology, and thermodynamics helps systems evolve while forgetting information. The second law may seem like an enemy to life, and it is indeed, but it also makes possible new, more evolved life. Growth and evolution require thermodynamics, and the price to be paid is deterioration and death. But it's worth paying it.
>
I think a state gets coarse-grained according to the physical abilities of an observer. Observers with vision have the ability to coarse-grain groups of atoms according to color in a painting, while observers that do not have vision would coarse-grain a painting in an entirely different way, based on other senses like touch. The whole process of reproducibility seems to rely so much on the ability of an observer.I absolutely agree, and it is fascinating that at the same time there seem to be a coarse graining, the one that accounts for thermodynamics in terms of statistical mechanics, which seems to be independent of the observer, seems objective. But it is objective to the observers that live in the same coarse grained level, because they are coarse-grained subsystems in that level. There may very well be other levels where information flows consistently and self-organizes, but we don't perceive it, because they are different level of coarse graining. Just like a computer is not able to gain information about the detailed physics of its own processor, it is confined to work at the level of its logic gates and memory chips.
>
Consciousness seems like it could be a special case of an observer coarse-graining itself. Observers are not entirely separate from their environment most of the time, and are embedded as a part of the environment in most cases in biology. I'd be curious to hear about your thoughts here!This is an intriguing possibility. Indeed, we coarse grain ourselves, we approximate ourselves rougher than the coarse grained level that can be explored from the macro level is. This may explain why we are able to claim that we are the same person as years ago, when our bodies and brains may have changed dramatically at the level of coarse graining that corresponds to thermodynamics, for example our cells, particularly neurons. So a question comes naturally out of this: are we capable to undo the coarse graining we impose on ourselves when we define ourselves, i.e. to perceive our own sentient experience at a more detailed level? Can we increase the resolution of self-perception? That would make us aware of how our thoughts come to be. See how they are automatic, and that in many cases when we think we're rational, we are just rationalizing some emotions, biases, or biological needs. Increasing the resolution through awareness could reveal how our thoughts materialize out of more primitive elements that we ignore, ideas, images, feelings etc. And keep going beyond these. And if we can see the moment when a thought arises in our mind, maybe we can change its course. Be able to overcome depression, anger, numerous biases we have, simply by not letting the snowball become an avalanche. And we could also be able to transform some intuitions into logical arguments, and see where they fail and where they are right. But of course this would require that, within our own consciousness, something higher-resolution exists than our mundane thoughts. That sentience indeed comes from a lower level, from the ignored details of the coarse graining of our regular thoughts. This may be computationally difficult to extract by looking at our brain with fMRI or other tools, for the same reasons you excellently exposed in your essay. But it may be possible by subjective self-exploration, assuming we're not creating yet another coarse graining that we take as finer graining :) This is in fact a huge trap for those who try to explore their own consciousness by means like introspection or meditation. On the one hand, a finer level of awareness would help with all these, on the other hand, as soon as we leave that state and try to put it in regular thoughts and words, we are back at the coarser grained level. This is the reason why, despite having flashes or longer experiences of the finer grained level, we usually end out by distorting them by processing them at the coarse grained level as just regular thoughts. Maybe this interplay between finer and coarser levels are captured by Lao Tzu in the words
He who knows, does not speak. He who speaks, does not know.Thank you very much for the brilliant questions, and good luck with your excellent essay!
Cheers!
Cristi
view post as summary
Pavel Vadimovich Poluian wrote on May. 16, 2020 @ 16:48 GMT
Dear Cristi Stoica!
We reviewed your work. The text contains many important and original ideas. We share the initial assumptions made in the article. Yes, science is studying relationships. But there is an ontology - a philosophical theory of being. You correctly noted that there is Time - a strange entity. But in the world there is something called GENESIS - this is an expression of Time. Therefore, we believe that the very principles of mathematics need a deeper clarification. For example, Hegel tried to see the genesis in logic. We think it makes sense to look for the genesis in mathematical structures.
We wish you a successful scientific work!
Truly yours,
Pavel Poluian and Dmitry Lichargin,
Siberian Federal University.
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 17, 2020 @ 05:36 GMT
Dear Pavel and Dmitry,
Thank you for the review and the very interesting comments. I'll read your essay in time.
Cheers,
Cristi
Peter Jackson wrote on May. 17, 2020 @ 15:06 GMT
Cristi,
Glad I got to your essay. Well up to the expected standard. I agree about relationships of course, indeed I've long argued that also finding ways to explore the
'what is' will be the only way to escape our present poor understanding (the other 99 thousandths of 1%!). You seemed to agree, if in a diffuse way!
I also agreed much of your thinking on consciousness, very much in line with my own in my essay 2yrs ago, though I did actually describe a 'what is' ontological layered feedback mechanism which could replicate it. Speculative of course but its architecture is similar to the latest advanced AI.
Nicely written, but I was left wondering about the connection with the topic, which seemed to be rather obtuse. None the less good on all other scoring criteria and nothing I feel the need to take issue with.
I hope you may get to mine, very fundamental in allowing is 'what is' approach, identifying sound evidence for a simple physical mechanism for uncertainty at 'measurement' momentum exchange!
Very best
Peter
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 18, 2020 @ 07:02 GMT
Peter,
Thanks for visiting my page and reading the essay and for leaving interesting comments.
>
"I also agreed much of your thinking on consciousness, very much in line with my own in my essay 2yrs ago, though I did actually describe a 'what is' ontological layered feedback mechanism which could replicate it. Speculative of course but its architecture is similar to the latest advanced AI."This sounds impressive.
>
"Nicely written, but I was left wondering about the connection with the topic, which seemed to be rather obtuse. None the less good on all other scoring criteria and nothing I feel the need to take issue with."The central starting point of my essay is that, since science can only deal with relations,
1. The nature of things is undecidable from within science, which is only about relations.2. The nature of experience is undecidable from within science, which is only about objectively and independently verifiable.So it's very topical I think.
Despite this undecidability, I take the hypothesis that sentience is fundamental and show that some of its variants make empirically falsifiable predictions.
>
"I hope you may get to mine, very fundamental in allowing is 'what is' approach, identifying sound evidence for a simple physical mechanism for uncertainty at 'measurement' momentum exchange!"This sounds very appealing!
Cheers,
Cristi
Torsten Asselmeyer-Maluga wrote on May. 17, 2020 @ 23:18 GMT
Christi,
at the end I had the chance to read your essay. Sorry to be late but this year everything is totally different.
Thanks for the wonderful essay which I gave my highest possibel vote.
I'm glad that we agree that relations are more important, also relations between relations (as often used to define a mathematical structure).
You wrote also about onsciousness and its reducability. I also analyzed onsciousness from a math point of view. Here, onsciousness is also purely relational and I'm not sure that the fact that it consists of matter is important.
See the
paperBest wishes Torsten
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 18, 2020 @ 07:08 GMT
Dear Torsten,
Thank you for reading my essay and for the comments!
>
"I'm glad that we agree that relations are more important, also relations between relations (as often used to define a mathematical structure)."Yes, both what we can talk about and what can be made into a mathematical structure are relations of various arity and including between relations.
>
"You wrote also about onsciousness and its reducability. I also analyzed onsciousness from a math point of view. Here, onsciousness is also purely relational and I'm not sure that the fact that it consists of matter is important."If something is reducible to relations only, its material substrate shouldn't matter. My point is that, when it comes to consciousness, reducibility to relations corresponds to the "easy problems". Thank you for the link to your article!
Thanks again for the comments, and good luck in the contest!
Cheers,
Cristi
John Joseph Vastola wrote on May. 18, 2020 @ 02:08 GMT
Very nice essay! Clearly written and interestingly argued. Aesthetically the prettiest-looking essay I've seen. I like the use of blue for various headings/citations, and the figures you produced are all very beautiful and clear.
The point about Wolfram's Rule 110 cellular automaton was strikingly mind-boggling. I can't even object on the grounds that there is some infinity-related trick being used, because the set of all sequences of conscious thoughts (given finitely many brain states and finite human lifetimes) is finite...
I agree that science is all about relations. The idea of a particle's mass, for example, is only meaningful insofar as it helps us predict how a particle will behave when interacting with other particles. But on the other hand, this makes me worried when it comes to consciousness. I feel like the hard problem of consciousness is deliberately posed to exclude all scientific investigation (experimental, modeling, etc)---like you said, if you can measure it, it's not part of the 'hard' problem anymore.
Maybe I did not read carefully enough, but I am not sure I understand the consequences of your argument. How can the collection of all true propositions about the world, and the collection of facts about sentient experience, be equal? Does that mean the world may be one big collective dream?
John
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 18, 2020 @ 07:39 GMT
Dear John,
Thank you for the comments and for reading my essay!
> "The point about Wolfram's Rule 110 cellular automaton was strikingly mind-boggling. I can't even object on the grounds that there is some infinity-related trick being used, because the set of all sequences of conscious thoughts (given finitely many brain states and finite human lifetimes) is...
view entire post
Dear John,
Thank you for the comments and for reading my essay!
>
"The point about Wolfram's Rule 110 cellular automaton was strikingly mind-boggling. I can't even object on the grounds that there is some infinity-related trick being used, because the set of all sequences of conscious thoughts (given finitely many brain states and finite human lifetimes) is finite..."I agree with you.
>
"I agree that science is all about relations. The idea of a particle's mass, for example, is only meaningful insofar as it helps us predict how a particle will behave when interacting with other particles. But on the other hand, this makes me worried when it comes to consciousness. I feel like the hard problem of consciousness is deliberately posed to exclude all scientific investigation (experimental, modeling, etc)---like you said, if you can measure it, it's not part of the 'hard' problem anymore."Part of the reason I constructed this argument was to explain the fact that there is a hard problem, and it's not just some way to move some cherished belief in a gap where science momentarily didn't arrive yet. Nothing has changed in the definitions of sentience as a result of the advance of science. I mean, people always identified it with something unreachable by objective means. But, what I also try to bring with this essay, is that some variants of the hypothesis that sentience is fundamental make empirically falsifiable predictions. More details in
my longer essay.
>
"Maybe I did not read carefully enough, but I am not sure I understand the consequences of your argument. How can the collection of all true propositions about the world, and the collection of facts about sentient experience, be equal? Does that mean the world may be one big collective dream?"In
my longer essay I analyze more possible relations between
P and
S. Here I mention one of them, which is the simplest that solves
Problem 2, of unifying the ontologies of
P and
S. One way to interpret it would be the one of a big collective dream that you mention, but I think this metaphor wouldn't do justice to the proposal that
P=S. First, as we explore deeper the physical world
P, we realize that at finer grained levels things are not how they seem at the coarse grained level, and in fact are very different from what we used to think. I expect nothing less from exploring
S. So in this case, "dream" is just some manifestation at the coarse graining of
S. And even so, "just a dream" assumes that we have any clue what dreams are, but we don't really know. We hallucinate even when we are awake, but we do it in a consistent way in tune with the others, and our brains create representations that we describe to others and since we all use them, we think reality is like this. But this is what we think it is, see endnote 5 of my essay. A distinguishing characteristic of dreams is that they are unstable and inconsistent, while the world
P seems rather consistent and persistent.
P=S would not break this persistence and consistency, it would just provide it with an ontology, one able to endow it with experience, rather than a cold dead ontology.
Thanks again for your excellent observations, and good luck with your essay!
Cheers,
Cristi
view post as summary
Vladimir Nikolaevich Fedorov wrote on May. 18, 2020 @ 04:34 GMT
Dear Cristinel,
Glad to read your work again.
I greatly appreciated your work and discussion. I am very glad that you are not thinking in abstract patterns.
"Interested especially in the geometric aspects of the physical laws".
It is necessary to understand that all elements of matter from the micro- to macroscales have a quantum and fractal structure of their geometry. This is given and experimentally confirmed in my work.
While the discussion lasted, I wrote an article:
“Practical guidance on calculating resonant frequencies at four levels of diagnosis and inactivation of COVID-19 coronavirus”, due to the high relevance of this topic. The work is based on the practical solution of problems in quantum mechanics, presented in the essay FQXi 2019-2020
“Universal quantum laws of the universe to solve the problems of unsolvability, computability and unpredictability”.
I hope that my modest results of work will provide you with information for thought.
Warm Regards, `
Vladimir
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 18, 2020 @ 07:47 GMT
Dear Vladimir,
Thank you for reading my essay and for the interesting observations.
>
"I greatly appreciated your work and discussion. I am very glad that you are not thinking in abstract patterns.I'm just a neural network, with all the inherent biases and training-dependency features, that work well in some setting but fail in other settings. At least from the point of view of
P. So what may seem abstract or concrete in my thinking depends on the context and the interlocutor, of course.
>
"It is necessary to understand that all elements of matter from the micro- to macroscales have a quantum and fractal structure of their geometry. This is given and experimentally confirmed in my work."This seems very interesting to hear more about it.
>
"While the discussion lasted, I wrote an article: “Practical guidance on calculating resonant frequencies at four levels of diagnosis and inactivation of COVID-19 coronavirus”, due to the high relevance of this topic. The work is based on the practical solution of problems in quantum mechanics, presented in the essay FQXi 2019-2020 “Universal quantum laws of the universe to solve the problems of unsolvability, computability and unpredictability”."Thank you for sharing this here!
Best luck with your essay and with fighting the pandemics!
Cheers,
Cristi
Syed Raiyan Nuri Reza wrote on May. 18, 2020 @ 12:09 GMT
Dear Professor Cristinel Stoica,
I found your line of reasoning demonstrating the hard problem of consciousness in fact exists, and its centrality to our conception of reality using arguments grounded in mathematics both ingenious and beautiful.
I will keep a copy of your work for further reading, and references ( if any circumstances arise).
What also pleases me is that I sense in between your work and ours ( link: https://fqxi.org/community/forum/topic/3563) we share mutual ground, and we conclude indeed limitations of mathematics are equivalent to limitations of natural science along very similar lines of reasoning; something which you nicely summarize as:
"But even if we would know with what mathematical structure our world is isomorphic, it
wouldn’t mean we would know everything, because our knowledge can only be expressed in a finite
number of axioms, and our proofs can only have finite length. Our knowledge will always be limited
by G¨odel incompleteness (G¨odel, 1931) and Turing’s noncomputability result (Turing, 1937)."
Indeed we share a similar stance to what you have said, "Science
is a way to decode the book. It proceeds by identifying various words in various contexts, and
the result is a dictionary, along with some grammar rules. Each word in the dictionary is defined
in terms of other words, but there are no primary words whose meaning we understand. All the
definitions in the dictionary are eventually circular. And the grammar rules, which correspond in
this metaphor to the laws and principles we propose to describe the world, are purely syntactical.", and propose a grand lexicographic project for constructing a complete dictionary for Nature.
We hope you have time to read our work!
And thank you for your marvelous entry and the joy and insight we found in your work is reflected in our rating!
Kind Regards,
Raiyan Reza, and Rastin Reza
report post as inappropriate
Mihai Panoschi Panoschi replied on May. 18, 2020 @ 16:10 GMT
Rayan, Rastin,
I couldn’t disagree with you more as I’ve openly disagreed with Cristi also.
First, if you analyse carefully this his statement you quoted : “But even if we would know with what mathematical structure our world is isomorphic, it wouldn’t mean we would know everything, because our knowledge can only be expressed in a finite number of axioms, and our proofs can only have finite length. Our knowledge will always be limited by G ̈odel incompleteness (G ̈odel, 1931) and Turing’s noncomputability result (Turing, 1937) you could right away notice many anomalies:
1. It’s not even grammatically correct ( “But even if we knew everything...it wouldn’t mean... “ is the correct syntax in English but Cristi is grammatically thinking in his mother tongue so I can understand and overlook the root of his error.
2. It’s logically inconsistent since Gödel’s results express exactly the opposite, namely, the even in mathematics there can never be a complete and self-sufficient system of knowledge grounded on a finite set of axioms, therefore mathematics is inexhaustible in itself. Chaitin, for instance, went even further to assert that mathematics as such, after Gödel, is ruled by uncertainty and randomness just like the one discovered in QM. He could be right in the sense that whenever and wherever actual infinity pops up(especially since Cantor open the way in set theory)so does uncertainty and randomness, so in a way, the so-called hidden order that science strives to discover in the Universe, seems paradoxically to be both opposed to randomness/chaos/disorder and necessary to it!...
3. Finally, it’s semantically meaningless because it’s a speculative and arbitrary hypothesis about an isomorphism of ‘nothing concrete’ with something abstract, that is, a clearly defined concept of a mathematical structure such as a topological or metric space for instance that are not only rigorously defined axiomatically.
report post as inappropriate
Syed Raiyan Nuri Reza replied on May. 18, 2020 @ 16:54 GMT
Dear Mihai Panoschi Panoschi,
Thank you for your response!
Since you disagree with Professor Cristinel Stocia, you should direct your disagreements to them.
Grammar errors and such are something I can look over. I am also failing to see how the statement goes against Godel's Incompleteness Theorems and its computational analogue, Turing Machine.
To quote you, "It’s...
view entire post
Dear Mihai Panoschi Panoschi,
Thank you for your response!
Since you disagree with Professor Cristinel Stocia, you should direct your disagreements to them.
Grammar errors and such are something I can look over. I am also failing to see how the statement goes against Godel's Incompleteness Theorems and its computational analogue, Turing Machine.
To quote you, "It’s logically inconsistent since Gödel’s results express exactly the opposite, namely, the even in mathematics there can never be a complete and self-sufficient system of knowledge grounded on a finite set of axioms, therefore mathematics is inexhaustible in itself."
Actually, Godel merely says if a formal system can express or encode arithmetic then it cannot prove its self consistency with a finite set of axioms. So if a finite set of axioms strong enough to encode or interpret arithmetic is incomplete in the sense we will have statements which we cannot decide it is true of false with the statements we have. Which is what Professor Cristinel Stocia's clearly states; if there exists a mathematical structure isomorphic to our physical reality, we cannot prove its self consistency. The implicit assumption is that such a structure much include formal systems strong enough to encode or interpret facts about arithmetic. They state, " Our knowledge will always be limited by Godel incompleteness (Godel, 1931) and Turing’s noncomputability result (Turing, 1937)". It is very clear to those familiar with Godel and Turing's results. The limitations are we cannot verify the consistency of the mathematical structure.
As for the hypothesis being unfalsifiable, that itself is not true. Read Principle 2, "The collection of all true propositions about our physical world admits a mathematical model"
Thus, if have a mathematical model ( which we can derive from the said mathematical structure), that produces all the true propositions as verified through observation, measurement, and experiments we have a way of connecting the mathematical structure to the physical world. Whether or not they are the mathematical structure itself is a useful abstraction or actually exists is a separate question.
Professor Stocia cites Tegmark, and I think if you refer his work you would fine a more detailed explanation of a mathematical structure, how it is corresponds to our physical world ( by doing a set of mathematical operations deriving physical symmetries) and such.
Again, I am no expert here, but the extend Professor Stocia detailed her work, and from what I know I see and understand I cannot detect any "anamoly", and grammar errors while unfortunate is something I have no interest in penalizing someone for.
Kind Regards,
Raiyan Reza
view post as summary
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 18, 2020 @ 17:23 GMT
Dear Raiyan and Rastin,
Please call me Cristi.
>
I found your line of reasoning demonstrating the hard problem of consciousness in fact exists, and its centrality to our conception of reality using arguments grounded in mathematics both ingenious and beautiful.Thank you very much for reading my essay and for your insightful remarks.
>
I will keep a copy of your work for further reading, and references ( if any circumstances arise).I would recommend the longer one,
The negative way to sentience, in case you are interested.
>
What also pleases me is that I sense in between your work and ours [...] We hope you have time to read our work!You definitely made me interested to hear more about your essay!
Thanks again for the visit, and I wish you good luck in the contest!
Cheers,
Cristi
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 18, 2020 @ 17:28 GMT
Mihai,
Thank you for the lesson in English grammar, dully noted! I am also flattered by your attention with the second part of your comment. May I remind you that I defined what a
mathematical structure is in my essay, and I also even gave you a link in replies to some of your comments, where you mistook it for "a mere representation of our minds" (which is not what I mean). Now you are mistaking
mathematical structure for an axiomatization of it (which, again, is not what I mean, and I'm pretty sure Plato didn't mean this either!). As an example, think of the set of natural numbers, along with the operations of addition and multiplication defined as subsets of NxNxN. This is an example of a known mathematical structure. Now think at some axiomatization of it, and Gödel's incompleteness theorem, and see why the structure can be known, yet not everything about natural numbers can be known.
Cheers,
Cristi
Mihai Panoschi Panoschi replied on May. 18, 2020 @ 17:47 GMT
Raiyan,
Wittgenstein warns and teaches us that grammar/syntax plays an important role within the semantic universe of a given language. The “If Clause” in English has a very precise and well defined temporal structure that we need to pay attention to when we write something of (supposedly) importance such as a scientific essay. For instance, I again fail to comprehend what you’re trying to say in this sentence: “Thus, if have a mathematical model ( which we can derive from the said mathematical structure), that produces all the true propositions as verified through observation, measurement, and experiments we have a way of connecting the mathematical structure to the physical world. Whether or not they are the mathematical structure itself is a useful abstraction or actually exists is a separate question.” and what type of “If Clause” you’re trying to use...
Since it is not a clear cut of a cause/effect type 0 relationship like in “if it rains, the ground gets wet”, and it’s something more hypothetical and problematic, I think what you’re trying to say is that “ Thus, if we had a mathematical model....then we would have a way...” which for me resembles more of a wishful naïve thinking rather than serious logical argumentation with its further implications.
But maybe you’re trying to say something else in which case I may be wrong but we’ll both agree that in both cases correct grammar plays an important role for our understanding to have a common starting ground and thus make the transfer of ideas between two minds possible. So, it’s not necessarily about penalising but about comprehension and communication of our thoughts mostly.
report post as inappropriate
Syed Raiyan Nuri Reza replied on May. 18, 2020 @ 19:38 GMT
Dear Cristi,
Thanks for replying and sharing the longer version of your work, we will read it with great interest!
We wish you all the for this essay contest and research!
Raiyan and Rastin
report post as inappropriate
Syed Raiyan Nuri Reza replied on May. 18, 2020 @ 20:01 GMT
Dear Professor Mihai Panoschi Panoschi,
I apologize for missing an honorific in my first response.
Thanks for replying and your thought provoking comments!
That said, yes I fully agree grammar and syntax play an important part in semantics of sentences and indeed cited Wittgenstein in my own work to advocate my stance, though I by no means claim your level of expertise or depth.
Having said that, in day to day conversation we rely on "informal" systems to communicate.
Unless you propose to reduce everything we have said to a formal system ( which is time consuming) than some degree of leniency on regards to grammar, and syntax is warranted, even in scholarly works.
That said, I am confused you attribute cause/effect to the sentence, "If it rains, the ground gets wet". Implication is not causation, something I remember being from my Discrete mathematics course. Let us attribute false value to the proposition p," it rains", and truth to the proposition ," the ground gets wet", the truth value for p implies q would still be true. However, a causal understanding would tell us a different scenario.
Again, thanks for your detailed critique and replying here!
All the best for this essay contest and researches! And, I suppose apologies for semantic ambiguity and resembling "naive wishful thinking".
Best Wishes,
Raiyan Reza
report post as inappropriate
hide replies
Member Kevin H Knuth wrote on May. 18, 2020 @ 18:33 GMT
Dear Cristi,
I am very glad to see that your essay is doing well.
I really enjoyed it!
The consciousness question is both difficult and fascinating. And I think that the fact that we have so much of ourselves invested in the solution does not help us to attain an honest understanding.
I have long thought that consciousness arises from the brain modeling (describing )...
view entire post
Dear Cristi,
I am very glad to see that your essay is doing well.
I really enjoyed it!
The consciousness question is both difficult and fascinating. And I think that the fact that we have so much of ourselves invested in the solution does not help us to attain an honest understanding.
I have long thought that consciousness arises from the brain modeling (describing ) itself, which is inherently self-referential. If so, we should expect some element of strangeness or surprise. What precisely that would be, I am not in the position to say. That by itself would be an interesting question. What predictions could this hypothesis (that the brain describes itself) make? Certainly, answering this is necessary for falsifiability.
I would agree that science focuses on relations and not things.
This really is the essence of my work on Influence Theory, which has shown greater promise than I had originally expected.
In that work (Influence Theory), we make it clear that the only properties that one can know about are those properties that affect how an object influences others. Despite the validity or invalidity of Influence Theory as a foundational theory, I still believe that this idea is correct.
So what does this say about Consciousness in terms of it being a result of relations or substance?
Well, if consciousness is a property that arises from properties of a substance, then we can only know about this property consciousness because it affects how objects influence one another. In fact, further thought reveals that the characteristics of that property are defined (operationally) by the affect it has on such influence. Since influence is a relation, and that is the only means we have to know about or describe properties, then consciousness cannot really be the result of a property of a subtance, because it would be indistinguishable from the property of any other substance that affected influence in an identical manner.
So, I would have to conclude that consciousness must arise from relations, like most everything else.
I'd like to hear your thoughts on that.
As for me, I still think that consciousness arises from the brain modeling itself.
Thoughts??
Thank you, again, Cristi, for your enjoyable and thought-provoking essay!
Sincerely,
Kevin
view post as summary
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 18, 2020 @ 21:14 GMT
Dear Kevin,
Thank you for visiting and reading my essay, and for the excellent question.
> "In that work (Influence Theory), we make it clear that the only properties that one can know about are those properties that affect how an object influences others. Despite the validity or invalidity of Influence Theory as a foundational theory, I still believe that this idea is correct....
view entire post
Dear Kevin,
Thank you for visiting and reading my essay, and for the excellent question.
>
"In that work (Influence Theory), we make it clear that the only properties that one can know about are those properties that affect how an object influences others. Despite the validity or invalidity of Influence Theory as a foundational theory, I still believe that this idea is correct. So what does this say about Consciousness in terms of it being a result of relations or substance?"As my argument aims to prove, if consciousness is 100% reducible to relations, then one must also admit that a rule 110 cellular automaton with suitably chosen first row can have consciousness. This despite being a flat timeless tapestry. There are certainly people who think this, and even I take this view as true about anything that ignores sentient experience. And there are people who don't accept this, because they know that they are in a way beyond the mere relations, roles in society, processes, computation
etc. Relations are about the "easy problems". And, while I agree that the behavior of consciousness, and all of its relations, including the causal relation that makes Descartes say "I am", are, of course, 100% reducible to relations, like the structures
P and
S mentioned in my essay, my whole claim is that this is not what makes experience possible. This is what makes conscious-like behavior possible. By sentience I understand what makes experience possible, its nature, its ontology. So consciousness is 100% relations by any objective and independently verifiable means, yet it's 100% sentience by its ontology, which is not accessible by the objective and independently verifiable means. Incidentally, while this position is usually associated to an epiphenomenalist position, I think that it can make testable predictions, so it's falsifiable. And in my longer essay
The negative way to sentience I explain what variants of the relations between
P and
S correlate to what interpretations of Quantum Mechanics, and that some of them make testable predictions. If you are interested in this issue, I'd very much appreciate some comments to that longer essay, especially since you take the position that you take. No rush with this. And who knows, maybe you'll find the more elaborate arguments more compelling ;-) Or maybe you'll change my mind (just kidding about the latter, I doubt everything I think, except for the fact that I am sentient).
Thanks again for the insightful comments!
Cheers,
Cristi
view post as summary
Yutaka Shikano wrote on May. 18, 2020 @ 19:18 GMT
Dear Cristi,
I really enjoyed reading your essay to cover several academic fields.
In Section 5, you discussed the relationship between thermodynamic context and information theory or computational viewpoint. In the past essay contest, I wrote the specific part of this fundamental question as seen in
my past essay. Your point is reductionism. Is this related to the operationalism?
Best wishes,
Yutaka
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 18, 2020 @ 21:16 GMT
Dear Yutaka,
Thank you for reading my essay and for the interesting comments. You mention a past essay of yours, I read it at that time and commented. I look forward to read your current one.
>
"Your point is reductionism. Is this related to the operationalism?"I am not sure that my point is reductionism
per se. I am fully for trying to push reductionism to its natural limits as much as possible. I discussed these limits in
a previous essay. As for the relations with operationalism, there must definitely be such relations. And I take here the position that science cleaned of all of its assumptions is about relations only, which is close to operationalism. I am not an adept of operationalism in my work though. And particularly when talking about sentience, I think sentience (stripped of all form and relations) is what's beyond relations.
Cheers,
Cristi
Jonathan J. Dickau wrote on May. 18, 2020 @ 20:07 GMT
This paper was fun to read Cristi...
I'm grinning right now like someone who looked in the back of the book in the section called 'solutions to problems.' Or maybe I've just been actively exploring the other side of the coin from what you set out. If Science is only in the realm of relations and theory arises only in the form you describe; what I have been doing is not Science nor...
view entire post
This paper was fun to read Cristi...
I'm grinning right now like someone who looked in the back of the book in the section called 'solutions to problems.' Or maybe I've just been actively exploring the other side of the coin from what you set out. If Science is only in the realm of relations and theory arises only in the form you describe; what I have been doing is not Science nor theoretical Physics.
Instead; I discovered something in pure Maths that boggles the mind, almost by accident while trying to find something else, and as with Haldane struggled for years to understand what I had discovered and to learn its relevance. I spent 33 years grappling with questions like "Why does it explain so much?" and more recently with "How do I avoid getting scooped again?" when someone comes out with a theory proposing something I'd learned years ago.
For the record; I do think consciousness is primal, or essential. I think the evolution of consciousness is possible to express mathematically, however, or resides naturally in the octonions as the vehicle for projective geometry, the geometry of perspective and hence of observation. I have just published a collection of "Octonion Poetry" (link below) with a section explaining how that algebra explicates the dynamic of involution and evolution, leading to a specific syntax and yielding sentences that sound like aphorisms or poetry.
"One, open, as multiplicity and formless nothingness, finds peace in true relation, and knows all as self." - J. Dickau
So if true; this means that consciousness cannot arise by its local relations alone, but only in relation to the whole, or global relations. One can think about this in terms of Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler, chap 44 sec 5, talking about pregeometry as the calculus of propositions. Oneness --> openness --> postulation --> repetition, and so on. The same words can serve as a formula for quantum gravity or for the evolution of consciousness. It's kind of a personal credo for me, but it is suitable for scientists. Proceeding as if we are a multiplicity of things and a sea of nothingness between them acknowledges reality as it is.
Anyhow; you get high marks from me, and you leave me with about 144 more pages of comments to make. So I'll leave off here for now.
Regards,
Jonathan
Unity, Oneness & Numbers: Octonion Poetry
view post as summary
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 18, 2020 @ 21:20 GMT
Dear Jonathan,
I appreciate your visit and comments!
Take my detour through "science as the study of relations but not relata" as a way to remove assumptions from science. Because without this purification, people would project, due to their mirror neurons, sentient-like properties on whatever models they make for consciousness, when in fact they are about the "easy problems" only. To see the naked truth that "consciousness is primal, or essential", as you well say, within the framework of science, one needs first to go through this process of austerization of science.
>
"I think the evolution of consciousness is possible to express mathematically, however"Evolution of consciousness probably corresponds to what I call the system
S. If this is the case, it is possible to express mathematically. Octonions may play a role here, I have to look in your essay to see what you mean, and I look forward to do this.
I like very much your remarks in the second part of your comment, and you made me curious. I was going to read your essay, but time ran too quickly. But I will read it in time.
Cheers,
Cristi
Mihai Panoschi Panoschi wrote on May. 18, 2020 @ 22:12 GMT
Cristi, I seem to recall mentioning that the concept of mathematical structure came out of the set theoretical approach only in modern times, especially with Bourbaki in the 50s. What I’ve said earlier was that if a certain concept or structure is rigorously axiomatised, like the example you picked with the set of natural numbers N, then the additional structure you wish to add to it, e.g....
view entire post
Cristi, I seem to recall mentioning that the concept of mathematical structure came out of the set theoretical approach only in modern times, especially with Bourbaki in the 50s. What I’ve said earlier was that if a certain concept or structure is rigorously axiomatised, like the example you picked with the set of natural numbers N, then the additional structure you wish to add to it, e.g. operations of addition, multiplication, ordering etc. the respective functions or relations will still be still based on
the fundamental axioms system, Peano-Dedekind in this case or ZFC if you want to prove other theorems unprovable in Peano-Dedekind. Therefore I’m not mistaking mathematical structure for an axiomatization of it but rather I take it as the ground of it and I'm also quite sure that Plato wouldn’t disagree either, since it is since Plato that we’ve been thinking in terms of noumena/ essences as the ground or root of phenomena/ appearances and our mental representations of them.
Therefore rigorously speaking, addition as a function on NxN -> N is based recursively on the ‘successor’ injective function S and the ‘0’ number as defined axiomatically by Peano- Dedekind. Therefore you need ‘0’ and the ‘successor’ injective function S first as primitive concepts to build up other simple relations or structures on N or richer algebraic structures such as that of group, ideal, module, ring or field. Having said that, an interesting question in the context of your essay however will be ‘where do you get the intuition of successor or the number ‘0’ or ‘1’ from?’ Do we get them from the ontology ( Being) of experience as it enfolds in Time or from the phenomenology of Mind ( (thinking, self-consciousness). If one reflects properly, I’d say that absolutely all beings ( things, concepts, relations, structures, systems, processes, etc) presupposes a ‘thought’ or ‘consciousness’ having that entity as its object and consequently ‘being-thinking’ are two terms of a disjunction and for this reason oneness is not to be found in one or the other but in the connection of both!!...
This question will take us back to the very same problem posed by the Greek philosophers, namely, to the relation between Being and Thinking as to which one is more fundamental but, with few exceptions, not many people actually cared to understand deeper their connection as Truth and Certainty which is why probably we have more to learn from Lao Tzu (as Bohr once remarked), Parmenides, Plato, Hegel, Heidegger’s or Noica’s treatises of ontology etc. than from a modern text book on symbolic logic.
view post as summary
report post as inappropriate
Edwin Eugene Klingman wrote on May. 21, 2020 @ 17:36 GMT
Christi,
Congratulations on winning the community scoring. I gave you a ten on the last day to help put you there, but I see that fqxi has knocked you below someone with only two scores. I was the winner of the community scoring last year, but fqxi then changed the scoring so that I ended up number two.
These contests are valuable for presentation and exchange of ideas, but once fqxi enters the picture, the fix appears to be in for conformity with the academy. Congratulations again on your winning the other authors’ approval.
Edwin Eugene Klingman
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on May. 21, 2020 @ 19:45 GMT
Dear Edwin,
Thank you, and also thanks for the news, it was because of the notification about your comment that I know the result. This edition was again a great opportunity to exchange ideas, a lot of interesting essays here. Also the chosen theme was good.
Cheers,
Cristi
Member Markus P Mueller wrote on Jun. 3, 2020 @ 19:56 GMT
Dear Cristi,
congratulations to a wonderful essay! I’ve finally found the time to read it, and I enjoyed it a lot.
I agree with many of your arguments. This I found great: “For example, call the nature of things `matter´. Once we get used to the words, we can have the illusion of understanding, and forget that we know so little”. And you make a very good point for the “hard problem”.
I’m not sure I fully agree with the way quantum theory enters at the end of the essay, because I believe that we could be part of a fully “classical” word, be conscious, and wonder about the very same questions. But this would be a topic for a longer discussion I guess. :)
All the best,
Markus
report post as inappropriate
Author Cristinel Stoica replied on Jun. 4, 2020 @ 08:04 GMT
Dear Markus,
Thank you very much for reading and for the reply, and congratulations for your essay too!
> "I believe that we could be part of a fully “classical” word, be conscious, and wonder about the very same questions."
I believe this too, we have various relations between
S and
P, which are possible in both quantum and classical worlds. There are two...
view entire post
Dear Markus,
Thank you very much for reading and for the reply, and congratulations for your essay too!
> "I believe that we could be part of a fully “classical” word, be conscious, and wonder about the very same questions."
I believe this too, we have various relations between
S and
P, which are possible in both quantum and classical worlds. There are two reasons for me to focus on quantum theories here. The first one is that it is more easier to find relations in which sentience is causally active, as opposed to merely epiphenomenal, in quantum theories. Being causally active allows for testable predictions, while being epiphenomenal doesn't. It is logically possible that sentience is an epiphenomenon, but this would make irrelevant reasonings of the form "I know I am sentient because I experience it, and I know I experience it because I think about this experience and talk about it, and I know that others are sentient because they talk about being sentient". If we want such inferences to really be due to sentience and not to some whatever mindless evolutionary reasons that make us talk as if we are sentient as opposed to really being, I think philosophical zombies should not be taken seriously. I mean, I think sentience must be causally active, rather than a mere epiphenomenon. And I think most classical theories, at least the known ones, only support this kind of relation between
S and
P. In them, talking about sentience is still possible, but it's a zombie talk. Not all classical ones, I think that at least the known classical theories in physics allow only epiphenomenal sentience, and can't be tested empirically for sentience. By contrast, a causally active type of sentience is in my opinion more easier to accommodate in quantum theories, and in
my longer essay I discuss various options, and it seems that most types of interpretations of QM allow it. This is interesting, because each type of interpretation of QM comes with a different answer to the question "what is the difference between the quantum and the classical", which means that classical theories that have certain features that quantum theories have, and by this allow for causally active sentience, are possible. I think something forces this possibility of causally active elements of a theory, and it may be a common denominator to all quantum interpretations: the existence of a quantum micro level and a quasi-classical macro level. The macro level is described in terms of the quantum level as a very small, zero-measure subset of the set of all possible quantum states. This is unlike in classical theories, where the macro states are well defined for any possible micro state. So this was my main reason to focus on quantum theories. And the second one is that the world is quantum.
But I also agree with you that "this would be a topic for a longer discussion" :), which I hope we'll have someday, because I am very interested to hear what you specifically have in mind about this.
Thanks again, and good luck with the contest!
Cheers,
Cristi
view post as summary
Login or
create account to post reply or comment.