Stefan:

"But this would mean that „free will“ is just an illusion – compared to the true circumstances that govern our behaviour. Our behaviour would be determined by the initial conditions since the advent of time."

Yes and No. It all depends upon what is meant by "determine". Obviously everything that I do is determined by my actions - by definition. And my actions are, of...

view entire post

Stefan:

"But this would mean that „free will“ is just an illusion – compared to the true circumstances that govern our behaviour. Our behaviour would be determined by the initial conditions since the advent of time."

Yes and No. It all depends upon what is meant by "determine". Obviously everything that I do is determined by my actions - by definition. And my actions are, of course, determined by my history and memories - by definition.

But that is an uninteresting definition of "determine". The question raised by Laplace and other philosophers and physicists, is "Can something else other than me, determine what I will do, before I do it?" Which, in turn, only is interesting, if they can determine what I will do, before they see me actually do it.

Thus, my point is, if no one can "determine" what IS happening until AFTER it has happened, then there is no reason to be impressed by their trivial determinations. The only interesting, non-trivial, definition of "determinism" is that something else (a cosmos that does not yet include my existence), can determine (make a correct prediction of my future actions) before my history and memory (the foundation of "me" and my "will") ever even exists.

Think of a game like chess. The existence of fully deterministic rules for the game, do not enable any known entity to predict the outcome of every game. The question is, is such an entity even a logical possibility? The answer is no, if the initial conditions have a higher information content, than can be stored in any subset of the cosmos (the supposedly "all-knowing" entity). Nevertheless, the game can be played, and someone will win, because the cosmos, as a whole, is sufficient to enable the game to exist, but is nevertheless NOT sufficient to determine what will happen, in any other manner than by just letting it happen. After the fact, it is always possible to determine who won. The point is, "So what?" No one ever seriously doubted that that is possible.

Rob McEachern

view post as summary

Georgina:

Agreed, but sometimes it comes down to making unconscious things conscious (by knowledge for example). The judges are able to eat (chocolate) or drink (coke instead of water) something that increases their blood sugar level, so that they must not sentence in an inappropriate manner before lunch.

Moreover, the subconscious is important, no doubt on that. But what is...

view entire post

Georgina:

Agreed, but sometimes it comes down to making unconscious things conscious (by knowledge for example). The judges are able to eat (chocolate) or drink (coke instead of water) something that increases their blood sugar level, so that they must not sentence in an inappropriate manner before lunch.

Moreover, the subconscious is important, no doubt on that. But what is unconscious can be made conscious – by free will to explore it. I think this would give a higher degree of personal freedom from deterministic influences, since after having made some things conscious, one can decide wether or not one wants to react the same way or other.

Robert:

“The only interesting, non-trivial, definition of "determinism" is that something else (a cosmos that does not yet include my existence), can determine (make a correct prediction of my future actions) before my history and memory (the foundation of "me" and my "will") ever even exists.”

Yes, and that’s the only case I refer to. I thought it would be clear by mentioning the multiverse (and its “wave function”).

“Think of a game like chess. The existence of fully deterministic rules for the game, do not enable any known entity to predict the outcome of every game.”

It’s not only the rules themselves. Chess does not play itself, it needs conscious agents. These agents have some ideas and simulations in mind, partly triggered by the last move of the opponent, but surely also triggered by – I don’t really know – emotional, intuitive reasonings. Despite the fact that the origins of these reasonings may not be fully known to the player, nonetheless the player can decide to follow those reasonings or follow some other reasonings. Therefore it is surely not possible to forecast with a 100% certainty who will definitely win.

“After the fact, it is always possible to determine who won”

Sure, because the rules are clear as water. The question is has the looser moved the wrong figures at the wrong time in the wrong direction.

“Can something else other than me, determine what I will do, before I do it?”

Here the question arises for me how to properly define “me”. Is it just the physical body and its biology or is it more?

“Obviously everything that I do is determined by my actions”

I would not agree, since this is a somewhat circular statement. I would rather state that everything that I do is *caused* by my actions. Nonetheless “action” and the word “do” are different words for the same thing, so it is no wonder that they have a strong “causal” link.

view post as summary

Stefan,

"what principle(s) leads to the phenomenon of consciousness?" Sensory signal processing, on a massive scale, in order to establish how the "self" should behave towards future sensory experiences. This should be fairly obvious, if you reflect upon how humans usually test a person in a coma (not conscious); they test to see if they respond to sensory experiences. Failure to respond to...

view entire post

Stefan,

"what principle(s) leads to the phenomenon of consciousness?" Sensory signal processing, on a massive scale, in order to establish how the "self" should behave towards future sensory experiences. This should be fairly obvious, if you reflect upon how humans usually test a person in a coma (not conscious); they test to see if they respond to sensory experiences. Failure to respond to such a test may not rule-out the existence of consciousness, but the mere fact that this is the first test employed, is indicative of the fact that people intuitively understand that there is an intimate connection between sensory responses and consciousness.

"What does the theory of evolution say about the usefulness of consciousness? Why did it evolve?" It evolved as a side-effect, that serves no great purpose. Once sensory signal processing power evolved enough to make sense (enhance survivability) of the external world, it was also used to monitor/control the body's internal world.

The importance of consciousness is over-rated. The only reason it seems so important to you, is because it is you - the only thing that you are actually aware of, which is, in fact only a tiny fraction of what is actually going on within your own body. Consciousness is like the CEO of a corporation - useful to have around, but the corporation will survive, and sometimes even thrive, without one - even though the CEO often believes otherwise, because CEO's tend to be more concerned about their own existence, rather than the corporation as a whole. That, by the way, is also why people are so enamored by the possibility of an afterlife - the CEO gets to move on to a bigger and better job, even after his old corporation is ruined.

Evolution does not produce entities with a purpose (teleology). It merely produces entities that are able to continue to exist, within their environment. Consciousness does not usually interfere with continued existence, so it continues to survive - but when it does interfere, it may be appropriate to consider the individual for a Darwin Award.

Rob McEachern

view post as summary

Robert,

you wrote

„There is a simple reason, for why free-will exists, even when the laws of physics are entirely deterministic: In order to "determine" the future state of the cosmos, it is necessary to know not just the laws of nature, but all the initial conditions. But if no subset of the cosmos has sufficient information storage capacity to store all those conditions, then no...

view entire post

Robert,

you wrote

„There is a simple reason, for why free-will exists, even when the laws of physics are entirely deterministic: In order to "determine" the future state of the cosmos, it is necessary to know not just the laws of nature, but all the initial conditions. But if no subset of the cosmos has sufficient information storage capacity to store all those conditions, then no subset can "determine" (AKA predict) the future of the whole. And no subset can have sufficient storage capacity, if the initial conditions are truly random, thus requiring an infinite storage capacity, for even a tiny, finite cosmos.”

Let’s take this at face value: All things happen entirely deterministic. But then – with your own words from above

Darwin’s theory of Evolution *is an unnecessary hypothesis; It explains nothing that needs to be explained*. Why? Because in the case of an entirely deterministic system, your statement

“Sensory signal processing, on a massive scale, in order to establish how the "self" should behave towards future sensory experiences. This should be fairly obvious…“

is simply false (and far from obvious). In an entirely deterministic system no consciousness whatsoever can alter the course of any event. With that, Darwins Theory must be labeled as an unneccessary hypothesis that explains nothing that needs to be explained. In this scenario the only thing that perhaps has to be explained could be why some initial conditions were as they were.

Nonetheless I think your example with the CEO has some truth in it.

I would beg you to think about all this twice, since you use two mutually exclusive and contradicting principles to *explain* all there is: a strictly deterministic system and Darwins Theory of Evolution.

“It was also used to monitor/control the body's internal world”. Again: in a strictly deterministic system there is no “use” and no “control” – all things happen inevitably due to some initial conditions. In a strictly deterministic world, even suicide happens inevitably.

By the way this reminds me of Boltzmann, who presumably took his own findings to serious and felt forced to do suicide (amongst some prominent others like Turing, Gödel, Ehrenfest).

So, at least either your belief in a strictly deterministic world or your belief in Darwinian Evolution must be just wishful thinking; and your link to this Darwin Award does no justice to men like Boltzmann, Turing, Gödel and Ehrenfest, especially if one believes in a strict determinism.

view post as summary

Stefan,

"In an entirely deterministic system no consciousness whatsoever can alter the course of any event."

Of course it can: by simply being THE "necessary" final, deterministic step, leading up to the event. The whole rationale of Laplacian determinism is to EXCLUDE that possibility, by proclaiming that the "end" can be determined - even when THE supposed necessary thing...

view entire post

Stefan,

"In an entirely deterministic system no consciousness whatsoever can alter the course of any event."

Of course it can: by simply being THE "necessary" final, deterministic step, leading up to the event. The whole rationale of Laplacian determinism is to EXCLUDE that possibility, by proclaiming that the "end" can be determined - even when THE supposed necessary thing (consciousness) could not possibly be present, because it has yet to be born.

Deductive logic is based upon a chain of reasoning. Hence, it is only as strong as THE weakest link. Laplacian determinism, in effect, claims that if there is a chain, suspended between two walls, if THE last link in that chain (my existence) is removed, then the now unattached chain, will still miraculously hover above the floor, just as it would have hovered, when THE last link (my consciousness) was in place. But it will not; my existence is "Necessary" to ALL the events occurring in my life - conscious or otherwise.

"I think, therefore I am." But where there is no "I am", there can be no "I think" either. Laplace threw the baby, out with the bathwater. So Laplace was correct, when he said that when I am not there, my consciousness cannot possibly be there either. But his argument, literally says nothing about what can happen when I AM there; it explicitly excludes that case from the argument - I was not yet born, so I AM not there.

Unless one HAS (past tense) perfectly predicted everything that will ever occur, then determimism has not BEEN proven. Simply assuming that it can be predicted, proves nothing. And presenting a logical argument, that claims to have proven it, but is ultimately based upon a false premise (which is what Laplace did) also proves nothing.

Here is what Laplace actually said:

"An intelligence which in a single instant could know all the forces which animate the natural world, and the respective situations of all the beings that made it up, could, provided it was vast enough to make an analysis of all the data so supplied, be able to produce a single formula which specified all the movements in the universe from those of the largest bodies in the universe to those of the lightest atom."

My point is, that to "know" "the respective situations of all the beings" and being "vast enough" is a logical impossibility, if "the respective situations" are random and thus require not merely a "vast", but an infinite machine, to predict behaviors within a finite universe. Infinite symbolic storage machines do not exist within finite universes.

Rob McEachern

view post as summary

Robert,

“My point is, that to "know" "the respective situations of all the beings" and being "vast enough" is a logical impossibility, if "the respective situations" are random and thus require not merely a "vast", but an infinite machine, to predict behaviors within a finite universe. Infinite symbolic storage machines do not exist within finite universes.”

i think so...

view entire post

Robert,

“My point is, that to "know" "the respective situations of all the beings" and being "vast enough" is a logical impossibility, if "the respective situations" are random and thus require not merely a "vast", but an infinite machine, to predict behaviors within a finite universe. Infinite symbolic storage machines do not exist within finite universes.”

i think so too.

But this does not rule out logically the possibility of a strictly deterministic world. The world could nonetheless be strictly deterministic and at the same time offer no chance to prove it (due to practial or in-principle reasons). That’s not my cup of tea, but many people believe in such a deterministic universe (multiverse).

Therefore I agree with

“Unless one HAS (past tense) perfectly predicted everything that will ever occur, then determimism has not BEEN proven. Simply assuming that it can be predicted, proves nothing. And presenting a logical argument, that claims to have proven it, but is ultimately based upon a false premise (which is what Laplace did) also proves nothing.”

But again: a logical argument that claims to have proven a strictly deterministic universe by some false premise does not rule out that unprovable things can really exist!

You wrote

“Of course it can: by simply being THE "necessary" final, deterministic step, leading up to the event. The whole rationale of Laplacian determinism is to EXCLUDE that possibility, by proclaiming that the "end" can be determined - even when THE supposed necessary thing (consciousness) could not possibly be present, because it has yet to be born. Deductive logic is based upon a chain of reasoning. Hence, it is only as strong as THE weakest link. Laplacian determinism, in effect, claims that if there is a chain, suspended between two walls, if THE last link in that chain (my existence) is removed, then the now unattached chain, will still miraculously hover above the floor, just as it would have hovered, when THE last link (my consciousness) was in place.”

If your concept of the emergence and functionality of consciousness is based solely on the hitherto known laws of physics in a strictly deterministic fashion, I cannot see why “the last link (my consciousness)” should be more important then, say, the middle link. I think with the lines you wrote above, you forget what you wrote to me some posts earlier, namely

“The importance of consciousness is over-rated. The only reason it seems so important to you, is because it is you - the only thing that you are actually aware of”.

If this statement is true, then there is no “last link”, the deterministic chain in nature surely does not stop when it arrives at an "agent" (you), only because it’s “you” that triggers another event. And this event will again trigger another event… and so on. Nature in this case does not discriminate between an event triggered by a conscious agent and an event triggered by a non-conscious thing. But again: this is only true if we handle the universe and the phenomenon of consciousness on the same level, namely as some strictly deterministic mechanism.

My comment at the beginning of our conversation was to merely point out that in a strictly deterministic universe the notion of “free will” is simply a misnomer (together with “Darwinian Evolution”).

view post as summary

Stefan,

"I cannot see why “the last link (my consciousness)” should be more important then, say, the middle link." You are not alone in that deficiency. That was exactly my point, when I have previously discussed "the Physics Community’s profound misunderstanding of exactly what a single, classical “bit” is, in the context of Shannon’s Information Theory"

Shannon's...

view entire post

Stefan,

"I cannot see why “the last link (my consciousness)” should be more important then, say, the middle link." You are not alone in that deficiency. That was exactly my point, when I have previously discussed "the Physics Community’s profound misunderstanding of exactly what a single, classical “bit” is, in the context of Shannon’s Information Theory"

Shannon's "information" is about perfect, absolutely perfect, reconstruction; if you get a single-bit wrong anywhere at anytime, then you FAIL. There is no such thing as "graceful degradation". You either have perfect reconstruction, or catastrophic failure.

Consequently, if you look at the long history of "yes/no" decisions (did "this happen or did "that" happen) in a predicted sequence of events, it makes no difference WHATSOEVER, how many trillion, trillion, trillion predictions you got correct in the past. As soon as you EVER fail to predict a single bit value ANYWHERE at ANYTIME, then you have totally failed altogether. Because that single-bit error IS the failure of determinism. This has nothing to do with free-will. It is the very definition of determinism.

Consider a universe with just two entities; Laplace's "vast intelligence" (a trillion, trillion galaxies of matter and energy organized into a single, vast computer) and a single dust speck. Could such a vast intelligence use the correct, deterministic laws of nature, to EXACTLY predict the motion of the dust speck, if it does not know where the dust speck is? No. And can this vast intelligence EVER know where this dust speck is, if it has consumed every last bit of its "information storage capacity", in an effort to describe the locations of its own constituents? No. Under such circumstances, it cannot even predict what a single dust-speck will do, much less what a human being will do. That is what determinists have utterly failed to comprehend. But that is what "random" initial conditions mean, in information theory - a "one-time pad" - meaning there is no possibility of representing an information sequence with ANYTHING that is less complex than the sequence itself. Hence, the "vast intelligence" can only represent itself, and can never know anything about the dust speck, without having to over-write (and thus lose) some absolutely critical information about itself, and thereby disabling it from EXACTLY being able to account for its own behavioral impact upon the dust speck.

The point is, there is no such thing as a "most" or "least" significant bit of "information" - they are all equally significant, because the ENTIRE sequence is being treated as a single, alphabetic symbol. Consequently, a single bit-error, anywhere in the sequence, may result in the "decoding" of a different alphabetic symbol, triggering an entirely different, subsequent behavior; an inability to predict anything, even in a universe with entirely deterministic laws, and even when all but one, just one bit of information, is missing from the "vast intelligence". Unlike physics, such behaviors is what Information Theory is all about.

A subset of a one-time-pad, cannot be used to correctly predict every value in the entire one-time pad. There will always remain something that is unpredictable, even if there are fully deterministic laws. This is related to Godel's incompleteness theorem.

Rob McEachern

view post as summary

Robert,

thanks for your extensive reply. A pleasure to read your point of view on these topics!

„As soon as you EVER fail to predict a single bit value ANYWHERE at ANYTIME, then you have totally failed altogether. Because that single-bit error IS the failure of determinism. This has nothing to do with free-will. It is the very definition of determinism.”

Ah, now I come...

view entire post

Robert,

thanks for your extensive reply. A pleasure to read your point of view on these topics!

„As soon as you EVER fail to predict a single bit value ANYWHERE at ANYTIME, then you have totally failed altogether. Because that single-bit error IS the failure of determinism. This has nothing to do with free-will. It is the very definition of determinism.”

Ah, now I come closer to your definition of determinism. For me, a strict determinism is something nature does or doesn’t (I don’t know for sure), but it is independent of wether or not a machine or a human consciousness should be able (in practice or in-principle) to predict every step in the future of a strictly deterministic system (given the correct initial conditions are “known”).

I understand that there can be no exact representation of the information content of the whole universe in just a part of the universe.

“There will always remain something that is unpredictable, even if there are fully deterministic laws”.

Yes, we know this from chaos theory.

“There is a simple reason, for why free-will exists, even when the laws of physics are entirely deterministic”

This line of reasoning is not tracable for me yet.

Robert, you wrote

“The question raised by Laplace and other philosophers and physicists, is "Can something else other than me, determine what I will do, before I do it?" Which, in turn, only is interesting, if they can determine what I will do, before they see me actually do it.”

Why is it only interesting if they can predict my doing? Surely, this would be a kind of proof for the believers in a strict determinism. But we already deduced that such a proof isn’t feasable. So we have to examine the claims of a strict determinism indirectly. It’s – at least for me – nonetheless interesting wether or not the claims of strict determinism make overall sense.

As I pointed out in the posts above and elsewhere, if strict determinism is true, then not only Darwins Theory of Evolution and natural Selection is absurd, but moreover the whole universe including all human and non-human actions. Because some mysterious initial conditions were such that all human and non-human actions do make sense (at least in most cases) and are fine-tuned towards each other (and *mimick* Darwinian Evolution). So, logically, these assumed initial conditions would follow some logical imperative. Even if our universe is part of a vast multiverse with most of its universes not able to produce such a coherent one as ours, the fact remains that only in universes that follow logical rules some parts of it can ponder about mysterious initial conditions. Well, it is clear that in a multiverse these mysterious initial conditions are a tiny subset of all the others in the multiverse and therefore not mysterious at all (from a statistical point of view). But the mystery remains by asking why only logically consistent worlds can produce “true” information about the world instead of falseness (non-sense).

Surely, one can answer it’s the math that forces this to be the case. If maths is indeed the most “fundamental” fundamental of existence, then, as I annotated at the beginning of this thread, one has to redefine maths, since classical maths has no power to produce dynamical physical systems (like a universe or some thing out of nothing) out of itself (otherwise we should have seen this happening from time to time in our classrooms or elsewhere).

Interestingly, despite the widespread assumption that maths is an infinite landscape of precise interdependencies, it also seem to have its limits. From a logical point of view, it is only hard to imagine that some parts of maths are able to encode the whole landscape of it (including the encodings of these parts…). But if maths is somewhat infinitely infinite, why not…? Furthermore it is only hard to explain why the property of consistence is such superior over the property of inconsistence. If it would be vice versa, would there be any reliable knowledge of maths about itself (I presuppose here that humans “are” a mathematical pattern, conscious)?

If there is really that limit between consistency and inconsistency, where does this limit come from?

view post as summary

Stefan,

“Ah, now I come closer to your definition of determinism. For me, a strict determinism … is independent of wether or not a machine or a human consciousness should be able (in practice or in-principle) to predict every step”

Ah, but it it not independent. That is the problem. Spooky Action at a Distance - NECESSITATES the acquisition of - Spooky Information from a...

view entire post

Stefan,

“Ah, now I come closer to your definition of determinism. For me, a strict determinism … is independent of wether or not a machine or a human consciousness should be able (in practice or in-principle) to predict every step”

Ah, but it it not independent. That is the problem. Spooky Action at a Distance - NECESSITATES the acquisition of - Spooky Information from a Distance.

“Why is it only interesting if they can predict my doing?”

When Newton introduced his Universal Law of Gravity, enabling the prediction of planetary motions (Laplace’s Vast Intelligence), people asked “Isaac, tell me again, how EXACTLY does this work? How do each of the planets come to acquire the INFORMATION that is NECESSARY to DETERMINE how they should behave, right at this very moment? How do they KNOW where all the other planets are, right now?”

Newton famously replied “Hypothesis non fingo.” - “I feign no hypothesis” - or, more bluntly “I don’t have a clue.”

Field theories, like General Relativity, are supposed to have resolved this problem, by saying that the planet/star does not need to know the positions and masses of other objects, but only needs to interact with the local field. But that does not solve the problem at all in the quantum case. It merely disguises it in a different form; how in the world is some tiny particle supposed to be capable of ever measuring/detecting a tiny field - and THEREBY INSTANTLY ACQUIRE THE VAST QUANTITIES OF NECESSARY INFORMATION? It requires a huge apparatus, and a long length of observations, to perform the recent detection of gravity waves. How is a tiny, single particle supposed to do it at all, much less instantly?

A simple answer to this dilemma is that tiny particles cannot detect any field (and thus exhibit no interaction), except at certain, discrete points, where the detection conditions happen to be "just right". This is why the world is quantized. It has nothing to do with the quantization of space or time or matter. It has to do with the fact that the detection of information, is inherently a discrete interaction process; a single bit of information, a yes or no answer to the question, "Was something that can be interacted with, just encountered?" Whenever the answer is no, there can be no possible interaction. Think of neutrinos passing through the entire earth, with no interaction at all - they just never happened to encounter any "just right" conditions, rather like the binding of a drug-molecule with a very specific receptor, but not interacting with anything else.

It is easy to show that the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle is EXACTLY equivalent to the statement that all measurements (and thus all interactions) must contain >= one bit of information. Hence, if a tiny particle cannot extract even one bit of information, from a tiny field, then it cannot interact with that field - at all. That is what quantum theory is ultimately all about…

Every tiny particle, has the EXACT same problem as Laplace’s “vast intelligence”, but it has vastly less information storage capacity, so the only way it can obtain ANY information NECESSARY to DETERMINE what it is supposed to do at each and every moment, is to collide with whatever is “out there” and attempt to acquire that one and only bit of information, that it is EVER possible to acquire (at the Heisenberg limit) - the answer to the yes/no question “Did I just collide with something?” If it did, then it behaves as if it did. If it did not, then it behaves as if it did not. End of story. That is all there is to reality. It is not about math, it is about information acquisition.

Think of two submarines, designed to be hard to detect, attempting to detect each other. If they succeed, they sound general quarters “All Ahead Full! Dive! Dive Dive!” How did they DETERMINE that that was how they should behave, AT THAT VERY MOMENT, from the acquisition of the single bit of information, the mere detection of the other sub’s existence? They did not. They merely executed a prearranged, standard behavior. Or not - if they failed to detect anything. So all of a sudden, the formerly undetectable “virtual subs” become detectable, by a distant observer, as the result of their change in behavior. And if they return, to “Running Silent, Running Deep”, the distant observer is left to wonder if they were ever, really there at all - hence the sobriquet “virtual”.

It all starts to make perfect sense, when you realize that EVERYTHING, from the most elementary particle, to the free-will of a conscious being, is all the consequence of properties of sequences of single-bits of information. The only difference is the length of the sequence that they are dealing with. Elementary particles deal with sequences of the minimum possible length = 1. Conscious entities deal with much longer sequences. Emergent behaviors are caused by the emergence of entities that can deal with longer sequences of information - by teaming up and combining to form internal structures capable of storing longer sequences of behavioral responses to longer sequences of just-acquired information (observations).

The most elementary particle that is even conceivable, is the one that has the smallest conceivable (most elementary) amount of information - one bit. If there is not at least one bit, then there is nothing to be observed, by a conscious entity, or acted upon, by an elementary one.

It is not "Turtles all the way down." It is information all the way down. But "all the way down" is not an infinite regress. There is an abrupt end to reductionism - at precisely one bit of information.

Rob McEachern

view post as summary

Robert,

what you describe has some characteristics of what we call a „virtual reality“ in some computer.

You wrote

“Ah, but it it not independent. That is the problem. Spooky Action at a Distance - NECESSITATES the acquisition of - Spooky Information from a Distance.”

and

“Every tiny particle, has the EXACT same problem as Laplace’s “vast...

view entire post

Robert,

what you describe has some characteristics of what we call a „virtual reality“ in some computer.

You wrote

“Ah, but it it not independent. That is the problem. Spooky Action at a Distance - NECESSITATES the acquisition of - Spooky Information from a Distance.”

and

“Every tiny particle, has the EXACT same problem as Laplace’s “vast intelligence”, but it has vastly less information storage capacity, so the only way it can obtain ANY information NECESSARY to DETERMINE what it is supposed to do at each and every moment, is to collide with whatever is “out there” and attempt to acquire that one and only bit of information, that it is EVER possible to acquire (at the Heisenberg limit) - the answer to the yes/no question “Did I just collide with something?” If it did, then it behaves as if it did. If it did not, then it behaves as if it did not. End of story. That is all there is to reality. It is not about math, it is about information acquisition.”

In a virtual reality in a computer, spooky action at a distance isn’t spooky, since what the computer outputs is an illusion (misinterpretation) of causal links. A cat on my display that eats a mouse hasn’t that mouse in its stomack after having “eaten” it, nor has the “cat” killed the “mouse”. With other words: Cat and mouse are not located somewhere in the display or even in the computer’s memory.

That’s all fine and I too am a friend of the information-theoretic bit-interpretation of QM. But there are open questions to me: how does it come about that we do *not* confuse a certain bit-sequences that defines a mouse with a mouse as we know (see) it? Same problem with Tegmark’s mathematical universe: how does it come about that we do not confuse a mathematical structure of a chair with a chair – albeit the chair and “its” mathematical structure have been defined (or indeed are?) as one and the same (no difference at all, end of story)?

Next question: are conscious observers generated by the dynamics within the computer, means by the virtual reality itself (this would then be like an animated mouse in some future desktop computer could have also indeed consciousness)? Who or what defined that bit-sequence xyz has to be experienced as the color “red”? And last, but not least, if it is true that

“There is an abrupt end to reductionism - at precisely one bit of information.”

maybe these questions have no real answers?

My answer: the virtual reality idea (inutition?) is compelling, but it is not the end of the story. There has to be something outside it. To see this clearer, remember again your 1 bit of information. If information is not just an absurdity whose origins have no roots in something that (with your own words) “makes perfect sense”, then this one bit of information (that it makes perfect sense) necessitates (signals!!!) that this virtual reality has its roots (and fruits?) beyond itself.

view post as summary

Stefan,

"what you describe has some characteristics of what we call a „virtual reality“ in some computer." But with one huge difference. Virtual machines cannot deal with truly random, real numbers, for all the reasons noted above; such random numbers are not compressible and so cannot be fit in the memory of the physical machine, underlying the virtual reality. So virtual realities use...

view entire post

Stefan,

"what you describe has some characteristics of what we call a „virtual reality“ in some computer." But with one huge difference. Virtual machines cannot deal with truly random, real numbers, for all the reasons noted above; such random numbers are not compressible and so cannot be fit in the memory of the physical machine, underlying the virtual reality. So virtual realities use compressible, pseudo-random numbers instead.

So, in order to determine if we live in a "real" world, or a "simulated" one, we need to know the answer to the question, are the "initial conditions" of our world truly-random or merely pseudo-random?

"how does it come about that we do *not* confuse a certain bit-sequences that defines a mouse with a mouse as we know (see) it?" By looking at all the non-information bits accompanying the mouse, but that have be "compressed" out of the information sequence being used to "represent" the mouse.

To put it simply: An information-sequence is a single number, a unique "index" number into a "look-up table", whose contents defines the behavior to be performed when the index number is observed. There need not be any relationship at all, between two nearly identical index numbers, and there associated behaviors - the system may be "maximally ill-conditioned", the exact opposite of the "smooth functions" so familiar to physicists.

"Who or what defined that bit-sequence xyz has to be experienced as the color “red”?"

So what does evolution load into those look-up tables? Whatever behaviors enable the tables to survive. There is no other reason than this, for why you stop at red, or drive on one side of the road in the United States, but the other side in the United Kingdom; you will not survive for long, if you do otherwise.

So why is there something rather than nothing? Because detecting nothing is a "no op" - the look-up table behavior is "act like you just detected nothing". "Nothing" is the undetectable condition.That is why we cannot detect it.

Rob McEachern

view post as summary

Robert,

thanks again for your extended reply and the will to explain your lines of reasoning. Albeit we differ in some conclusions, I enjoy what you have figured out.

You wrote

“So why is there something rather than nothing? Because detecting nothing is a "no op" - the look-up table behavior is "act like you just detected nothing". "Nothing" is the undetectable...

view entire post

Robert,

thanks again for your extended reply and the will to explain your lines of reasoning. Albeit we differ in some conclusions, I enjoy what you have figured out.

You wrote

“So why is there something rather than nothing? Because detecting nothing is a "no op" - the look-up table behavior is "act like you just detected nothing". "Nothing" is the undetectable condition.That is why we cannot detect it.”

It is clear that “nothing” cannot be detected, because there would be nothing there to be detected and no one (no thing) there to detect something. But this does not give an answer to the more fundamental question (as I wrote it down in my last essay)

Why is there something rather than nothing at all?

Instead of absolutely nothing, there are look-up tables existent and pseudo-random or even truly random numbers. In a virtual reality with pseudo-random numbers, all events are determined.

In a scenario where truly random numbers can be generated, the situation is much more subtle. It would be comparable (coarse grained) with a deterministic “wave function” that immediately after a measurement has been performed has to be updated to continue with the correct *new* initial conditions.

I cannot see how this could enable something that we traditionally call “free will”. So here are my questions: are all possible *truly* random numbers that could exist, listed in a look-up table to determine what to do when such a number emerges? Why is it important to emphasize that those numbers cannot be algorithmically compressed? Is it because all these numbers *must necessarily* (for reasons you should tell me then) be so huge (in length)?

Next question: Let’s take your view on Evolution as granted for the sake of the following lines of reasoning (don’t misunderstand me here, I am not a fundamental creationist who does categorically deny Evolution, far from that, I only take many things into question [like science should regularily do]). Now someone performs a suicide by jumping into a running car and dies. The look-up tables will not survive this. Now the question: If there was an ill-definition (compared to the evolutionary imperative to survive) in the look-up table, the person came to death deterministically from the point on the error in the table has been established. If there was no failure in the look-up table, what “number-sequence” caused the suicide and why did this number-sequence exist at all?

view post as summary

Stefan,

"But this does not give an answer to the more fundamental question..." As I have pointed-out elsewhere, it is impossible in principle, for deductive logic to answer "fundamental" questions about the physical world (as opposed to virtual worlds). Deductive logic can only prove that a conclusion follows from a premise. It cannot prove a premise; if it could, then it would not be a...

view entire post

Stefan,

"But this does not give an answer to the more fundamental question..." As I have pointed-out elsewhere, it is impossible in principle, for deductive logic to answer "fundamental" questions about the physical world (as opposed to virtual worlds). Deductive logic can only prove that a conclusion follows from a premise. It cannot prove a premise; if it could, then it would not be a premise in the first place. It would be another theorem, based on a premise...

As Bacon noted 400 years ago, a premise about the physical world, can only be justified via inductive logic, applied to observations. But such logic can only demonstrate that a premise is probable. It cannot demonstrate that it is certain. Godel's incompleteness theorem is appearing again.

"In a scenario where truly random numbers can be generated, the situation is much more subtle." There is no such situation. Truly random numbers cannot be "generated" by a finite process. They can only be "found". In other words, they must pre-exist the entity attempting to "generate" them; either they exist in the our world, or they do not. If they do not, then our world is a virtual world.

"Why is it important to emphasize that those numbers cannot be algorithmically compressed?" Because that is what creates the dilemma I described earlier; Laplace's vast, virtual intelligence, cannot perfectly describe both itself and a dust speck. If it could perform a lossless compression of either its description of itself, or its description of the dust speck's position, then it might be able to fit ALL the Laplacian required information, within its information storage capacity, thereby enabling Laplace's perfect, error-free predictions. No compression, no (perfect) prediction.

"(compared to the evolutionary imperative to survive)" There is no imperative. There is merely a tendency. The world does not care if we, or anything else survives or not. It simply has not prevented survival of some observable things.

By the way, these types of issues are related to the Anthropic Principle, which, correctly understood, states that "It is absolutely inevitable that every observer must have a past history, that was conducive to it's own existence, consequently, all claims that "fine-tuning" is required to explain an observer's existence, must ultimately have been based upon a false premise."

"If there was no failure in the look-up table" There will always be failures. (1) A failure to correctly decode the index number from the observations (like trying to read bad handwriting). (2) Failure to have exactly the right response in the table-element associated with a correct index. (3) And most importantly of all, the world may have changed, rendering obsolete, most of the hard-learned behaviors, stored within the table. All the things the dinosaurs learned and stored in their tables, enabling them to survive for millions of years, were suddenly, in a matter of days, rendered obsolete and useless, when an asteroid hit the earth. They had no table-entry for that, precisely because they had never observed and remembered and survived such an occurrence previously.

If someone jumps in front of a running car, their table will not survive, as you have noted. So when the surviving tables are copied into a new machine, they will not have that defective table-element. But copying errors will always occur in the real world. They may be very rare, but they will occur. And so a new defect in the table occurs, followed by new suicides eliminating the new defect... an endless process, with no "plan" for survival, just a process that fails to prevent some things surviving preferentially over others.

Rob McEachern

view post as summary

Robert,

i agree with many of the things you wrote. But I yet cannot see how a truly random number should somewhat be an argument for what we call free will.

I understand that the uncompressability of such random numbers excludes a correct prediction of a certain action. But what is the difference between your approach to justify the existence of free will and the widespread...

view entire post

Robert,

i agree with many of the things you wrote. But I yet cannot see how a truly random number should somewhat be an argument for what we call free will.

I understand that the uncompressability of such random numbers excludes a correct prediction of a certain action. But what is the difference between your approach to justify the existence of free will and the widespread “approach” that the randomness of QM somewhat could leave some space for free will?

How can in a deterministic world an agent make use of some truly random numbers? Is the decision (the behaviour) to pick up some “found” number triggered by determinism or by another truly random number? Once picked up, according to your definition, such a number should deliver some information how to behave – namely how to behave independently of what would be the next deterministic step in the chain of deterministic behaviour. To choose freely, and not only randomly this next behaviour, there should be also a look-up table for those truly random numbers where the subject can look up what behaviour the number means. This is necessary to decide for or against this behaviour. Otherwise we do not arrive at some free will but at randomness.

“By the way, these types of issues are related to the Anthropic Principle, which, correctly understood, states that "It is absolutely inevitable that every observer must have a past history, that was conducive to it's own existence, consequently, all claims that "fine-tuning" is required to explain an observer's existence, must ultimately have been based upon a false premise."

Yes, and that “false” premise would be that the world could have some slightly other fundamental constants (or no constants at all, means “nothing”) instead of those constants our world has. But as you have already outlined, one cannot prove a premise (and therefore not disprove it, at least not in the cases we are interested in). So, you handle your example concerning the Antrophic Principle as if your premise must be true, namely that there is no deeper reason (fine-tuning) for life in the universe. With this, the opposite premise, namely that there could be a truly non-random reason (fine-tuning) for life in the universe is therefore necessarily declared false. But you can’t declare such a premise false, because you cannot disprove it - you can’t either prove it! - neither with inductive nor with deductive logic. Both possibilities are therefore logically valid.

"It is absolutely inevitable that every observer must have a past history, that was conducive to it's own existence”

Yes, if my mother and my father died before I was born, this would in no way be conductive to my existence. But this is trivially true (addendum: trivially true only unless there exists a deeper reason for why my mother and my father did not die before I was born, namely a reason that does not exclusively rely only on pure chance, randomness, evolution and bit-sequence-failures).

view post as summary

Stefan,

"But what is the difference between your approach to justify the existence of free will..." The difference is that I am not even trying to justify free will. I am DE-justifying determinism. In other words, since determinism is based on a false premise (that Laplace's vast intelligence is always possible, at least in principle), then there is no reason to continue to suppose that...

view entire post

Stefan,

"But what is the difference between your approach to justify the existence of free will..." The difference is that I am not even trying to justify free will. I am DE-justifying determinism. In other words, since determinism is based on a false premise (that Laplace's vast intelligence is always possible, at least in principle), then there is no reason to continue to suppose that one's "self-evident" perception of free will, is probably just an illusion, as the believers in determinism would have us believe.

"How can in a deterministic world an agent make use of some truly random numbers?" By finding and compressing it, with a loss. In other words, truncate the infinite real-world number that specifies the position of the dust speck, thereby enabling it to fit into Laplace's vast, virtual machine, that only APPROXIMATES the behavior of the real world it seeks to represent.

The ultimate point is this: the dust speck has to exist, in order for its behaviors to exist. It, itself (and not just its past history) plays a NECESSARY role in determining what it, itself is doing, right now. Self-determinism IS a form of determinism; the very form that Laplace tried, but ultimately failed, to exclude.

"So, you handle your example concerning the Antrophic Principle as if your premise must be true, namely that there is no deeper reason (fine-tuning) for life in the universe..."

"Yes, if my mother and my father died before I was born, this would in no way be conductive to my existence. But this is trivially true..."

As you have observed, the premise IS "trivially true." The Anthropic principle does not object to the claim that there may be some "deeper reason" for the world being as it is. Rather, it only objects to the additional claim, of fine tuning; namely, that the "deeper reason" is such that, it would almost never result in an observer coming into existence. Such a claim is rather like your father trying to claim that you probably don't exist, because he might not have existed. If it is highly unlikely that the world would produce a human, then why are there humans in the world, arguing that they themselves probably should not exist? The fine-tuning aspect of the argument is self-contradictory. We do not live in a world that is not conducive to our existence. The fact that many such "other" worlds are conceivable, does not alter the fact that the world we are attempting to understand, is not one of them.

Rob McEachern

view post as summary

Stefan,

"If i got it right, what you termed "free-will" earlier is identical with what you call "self-determinism"." Not quite. Free-will is only a subset of the set of all the things that might be self-determined. Laplace's argument attempts to eliminate the possibility of that subset, by eliminating the possibility of the entire set; the "self" is not present, before it was created/born....

view entire post

Stefan,

"If i got it right, what you termed "free-will" earlier is identical with what you call "self-determinism"." Not quite. Free-will is only a subset of the set of all the things that might be self-determined. Laplace's argument attempts to eliminate the possibility of that subset, by eliminating the possibility of the entire set; the "self" is not present, before it was created/born. Thus, it applies equally to dust specks as well as humans, which is precisely why it is such a persuasive argument. And it would be a valid argument, if its premise was unconditionally valid. But it is not.

"I think Laplace ment a Demon, an intelligence not causally connected to the physical world." I think that is only a subset of the set of all the things that Laplace meant. Recall that Laplace is famously supposed to have said that "God is an unnecessary hypothesis". The same applies to any Demon.

"Have you any theory about how a conscious agent (not a dust speck) decides for which of many mutually exclusive future paths (actions, thoughts etc.) it should determine itself?" That was the topic of my book. Sensory signal processing constructs the "index" at each, present moment, that is being used to immediately access the look-up table behavior that "determines" how to behave/respond appropriately to the present index, while also, slowly, over-time, updating the table, both in terms of the length of the table (number of different indices that have an established response) and the contents of each table entry (the appropriateness of each response).

The massive amount of signal processing power, required to do such a thing (a more sophisticated version of the "deep learning" techniques currently being developed), is the reason for the 100,000,000 gigaflops, that I mentioned earlier.

This is somewhat like an actual procedure for constructing/evolving a sophisticated version of Searle's Chinese Room One notable difference is that Searle's presence, within the room, is not required, in order for the room to function.

As noted in my book, my book was written as a rebuttal to Roger Penrose's 1989 book "The Emperor's New Mind". Not only did I think that Penrose's claim that "quantum weirdness" underlies human consciousness was ridiculous, I also thought that his (the standard) take on "quantum weirdness" in quantum interpretations (like Bell's theorem) was ridiculous. The physicists do not even understand the physics, much less consciousness. So the final chapter in the book explained my take, on the EPR paradox and Bell's theorem. That was the origin of my much later FQXI essays and the vixra papers that I have posted on-line.

"Concerning the Anthropic Principle (there are more versions of it), it all hinges on wether or not one believes to know the correct..." That is why I originally stated that "these types of issues are related to the Anthropic Principle, which, correctly understood..." Most people do not seem to be aware of the fact, that the whole point of the argument is a "reduction to absurdity" of any fine-tuning premise: Someone arguing that "My premise, combined with flawless deductive logic, leads me to conclude that I, very probably, cannot exist."

In regards to the presentation on vixra, it was assembled prior to a year-long, reading and discussion course (using the Great Books Foundation's "What's the Matter? - Readings in Physics", together with my own thoughts about these issues) that I was leading at a local, community college, last year. As the course progressed, I assembled a much longer, more detailed version of the presentation, but it is much too large to fit into the 10 mega-byte vixra limit, so I have never updated the limited, online version.

Rob McEachern

view post as summary

Stefan,

Here is what I mean by the two terms self-determination and free-will.

First consider a hypothetical universe, that is the only thing that exists. Whatever happens in that universe, happens because the universe it-"self" exists. Thus, it is "self-determined". This is "trivially true", because, by the initial postulate, there is nothing "else" that could be causing/determining...

view entire post

Stefan,

Here is what I mean by the two terms self-determination and free-will.

First consider a hypothetical universe, that is the only thing that exists. Whatever happens in that universe, happens because the universe it-"self" exists. Thus, it is "self-determined". This is "trivially true", because, by the initial postulate, there is nothing "else" that could be causing/determining what is happening.

Next, consider subdividing that universe into two parts. Is one part dependent, in any way whatsoever, on the other? If not, then the one part (or perhaps both) that is not dependent on the other, is also self-determined.

Next, consider the case in which neither of the above two parts are ENTIRELY self-determined; what happens to one part, is at least partially due to (influenced by) the other. This is the case noted above, with the two parts consisting of Laplace's vast intelligence and a dust-speck; if a long-range force exists, like gravity, then one part influences what happens to the other, so neither part is ENTIRELY self-determined, even though the universe as a whole (both parts together) is self-determined.

Next, consider if ANY action within either of those two, not-entirely-self-determined parts, could ever be dependent on only one part it-"self". It would have to be an action that can, somehow, negate any long-range force, that would otherwise causally-link the two parts. That may not be possible with a physical action. But it is certainly possible with a symbolic action, because symbols are not subject to physical forces. For example, if there is a tiny "self"-driving car, on the dust-speck, and the tiny car is "programmed" to stop at red-colored lights, this is a "symbolic" action, that utterly ignores (is ENTIRELY uninfluenced by) the existence of any small (not powerful enough to disrupt the symbolic action), long-range force or “physical” influence, due to the distant "vast intelligence". Hence, while “physical” actions occurring within the dust-speck can never be ENTIRELY independent of the vast intelligence, symbolic actions “may” be; symbolic actions “may” be self-determined.

If the above mentioned “programming” (which is itself an example of a symbolic action) ever becomes independent of the “other” part, then the dust-speck/car not only “may” be, but actually “is” self-determined; it is not only behaving symbolically, but is “determining” what constitutes a symbol in the first place, and how to behave towards each symbol, ENTIRELY independent of the “other” part.

Such a dust-speck/car is “free” from the “other” part (the vast intelligence); it CAN perform at least some actions (symbolic ones) that have become ENTIRELY independent of the “other”. But does it have “will”?

If some of the symbols it employs to make some decisions, come to symbolize its own internal states (symbolize it-“self”), rather than symbolizing any external states (non-self), then that is what I mean by “will”; the symbols driving the behaviors, refer to nothing at all in the physical world, but only to the symbolic realm within the thing it-“self”. That is what “will” is. It has a “mind of its own” - though not necessarily a conscious-mind. Thus, when confronted with an option, such as either turning left, or turning right, the “decision variable” being used to “determine” which way to turn, may have a value that has become “disconnected” from the physical realm. This is free-will; decisions are being made via decision-variables that symbolically represent nothing at all, either in or about, the physical world, other than the “self”. And the “other” part, Laplace’s vast intelligence, cannot even DETERMINE that such symbols even exist, much less influence their detailed behaviors.

In a nut-shell, physical laws do not dictate ALL aspects of non-physical (symbolic) behaviors. It can dictate some, such as establishing the maximum number of symbols (information storage capacity) that could possibly exist in a finite universe. But the laws do not dictate what those symbols MEAN as thus, how entities behave/act towards them. The laws DETERMINE what cannot be done, but not what WILL be done. It is the initial conditions that determine what will be done.

Symbols, unlike physical laws, may involve intentions; the laws do not “intend” anything to happen, they merely enable things to happen. But symbols may be “intended” to symbolize an associated behavior. So what happens, when a single “bit-error” EVER occurs in such a symbolic system. Something unintended may happen. Thus, a system that evolved symbolic processing that “seems” to merely represent the physical world (processing sensory data) and thereby enabling continued survival), may suddenly start to behave AS IF it has an entirely different intention - like representing a non-physical, internal “virtual” world. And developing an intention, disconnected from the physical world, is the beginning of something new in the world - something that merely “seemed” to have an intention, may become something that actually does have an (unintended) intention - it actively alters (whether intended or not) its own behaviors, based on it’s own, internal virtual world, rather then the external physical world.

Rob McEachern

view post as summary

Robert,

o.k., thanks, now i got it. Thanks for taking the time to write it down in such an easy-to-understand step-by-step description.

I certainly have to think about the possible implications for all of this.

Isn’t it funny and remarkable at the same time that symbols have such a causal power? At first sight, no one (at least not me) would expect that in the first place....

view entire post

Robert,

o.k., thanks, now i got it. Thanks for taking the time to write it down in such an easy-to-understand step-by-step description.

I certainly have to think about the possible implications for all of this.

Isn’t it funny and remarkable at the same time that symbols have such a causal power? At first sight, no one (at least not me) would expect that in the first place. But one or the other way round, it’s true, since it’s true that we are here.

Albeit one can now ponder about what “programming” means in the absence of any conscious programmer, nontheless it seems true that a running program mustn’t be conscious to output a result that enables some internal system to survive.

One now can ask wether or not that system has to be conscious at all. Surely the reading of some DNA does not necessitate a consciousness, as less as the reading of a computer memory and the subsequent actions do. The latter was facilitated by conscious beings, the former not.

Your example (argument) with the bit-error is interesting. It is very suggestive when one first reads it (at least for me), since it contrasts a definition for a non-conscious symbolic system with the definition for another symbolic system whose bit-errors may force that system to evolve some awareness about the sudden difference (and in the longer run react to it).

Or is it just *me*, the already conscious reader, that is forced to realize this difference between these two systems and now concludes that the symbolic system with the bit-errors should have the “same” (at least rudimentarily) ability… anthropocentrically spoken? Nonetheless, I think it’s worth to further ponder about these questions and not a priori throw them away. You give me valuable things to ponder about.

I agree with your point of view of initial conditions and physical laws. I only suspect that your thought experiment with the hypothetical universe may be to simplified, since there is the possibility that such a universe (our universe?) is not infinite in time, but itself evolved out of something other. Surely, this “something” other (or another “something” other) has to be eternal at the end of the day (unless one does not argue everything can come from absolutely nothing or everything is infinite in time) and could be also termed a “hypothetical universe”. But there is a subtle difference, since this “something other” may have other rules (and another fundamental ontology – compared to that of matter) that we human beings are used to (in our universe).

I think one should not totally exclude the possibility that such a “something other” has an ontology that is much more of the nature of symbols and information than that of “matter”. In such a world, there would be no need for some energy-or-matter exchange to change the state of something. The only thing that would be exchanged would be abstract things (like information, symbols), but for the case that there are also conscious observers and actors there, there probably would be also an exchange of emotions. This scenario would be a kind of “mathematical universe” with the important difference that one has to replace the word “mathematical” by the word “symbolical” and add some observers to this universe. Since every consciousness has some personal symbols that are not exactly generalizable to other conscious agents, this “symbolical universe” would have it’s focus on subjectivity rather than on mathematical “objectivity”.

Well, I will leave my own speculations and ideas at that. Again thank you very much for presenting your really interesting case to me, and if you like, we can communicate further here and / or at the next essay contest (if I have something to say there at all). If you have any further annotations, I would be happy to reply.

view post as summary