Dr. Janna Levin
Barnard College of Columbia University
Project Title
Godelian Incompleteness & A Theory of Everything
Project Summary
A physical Theory of Everything is the greatest ambition consuming theoretical physics. Yet last century we were forced to concede that there will never be a mathematical theory of everything. Kurt Godel, Alan Turing, and Gregory Chaitin proved that our knowledge of numbers themselves is fundamentally incomplete. Most numbers are random, a toss of the coin. There are true relations among the numbers about which we can only prove that we can never prove them.
Many times in the history of physics, theories have been shaped by such profound limits. Einstein proposed a fundamental limit in the speed of light and thereby discovered Relativity. Heisenberg invoked an uncertainty principle in measurements of quantum phenomena and thereby laid a cornerstone for Quantum Mechanics. Alongside these should be listed the profound incompleteness in our knowledge of numbers ? there can never be a mathematical theory of everything. The proposal is to define the limits mathematical incompleteness might set on a physical theory of everything. Just as Relativity emerged from the limit of light's speed and Quantum Theory emerged from the limits of measurement, deep insight into the universe and its origins could emerge by confronting the limit of mathematical incompleteness.
Technical Abstract
Hope for a Theory of Everything rests on a pervasive belief that there must be one simple unifying law of physics. The task is merely to find it, to prove that it exists. This is not entirely dissimilar to a pervasive belief among mathematicians in the previous century. But Godel proved that mathematics was incomplete. Godel invoked self-referential propositions that make unsolvable claims about themselves. Alan Turing, and more recently Gregory Chaitin, went on to prove that most numbers are uncomputable. Most numbers are essentially random, a toss of the coin. There can be no theory of everything for mathematics.
There is reason to suspect incompleteness might shape a physical theory of everything as well. Such a theory must contain self-referential propositions, as in the early universe when the laws of physics make a statement about their own creation. Just as Godel asked if such a proposition was constructible within the context of arithmetic, we can ask if the early universe and the laws of physics contain unsolvable tangles. The proposal is Topical, Foundational, and Unconventional as it questions the very basis of cosmology and the greatest ambition consuming theoretical physics today - the ambition for a theory of everything.
Hide Technical Abstract
Hope for a Theory of Everything rests on a pervasive belief that there must be one simple unifying law of physics. The task is merely to find it, to prove that it exists. This is not entirely dissimilar to a pervasive belief among mathematicians in the previous century. But Godel proved that mathematics was incomplete. Godel invoked self-referential propositions that make unsolvable claims about themselves. Alan Turing, and more recently Gregory Chaitin, went on to prove that most numbers are uncomputable. Most numbers are essentially random, a toss of the coin. There can be no theory of everything for mathematics.
There is reason to suspect incompleteness might shape a physical theory of everything as well. Such a theory must contain self-referential propositions, as in the early universe when the laws of physics make a statement about their own creation. Just as Godel asked if such a proposition was constructible within the context of arithmetic, we can ask if the early universe and the laws of physics contain unsolvable tangles. The proposal is Topical, Foundational, and Unconventional as it questions the very basis of cosmology and the greatest ambition consuming theoretical physics today - the ambition for a theory of everything.
Hide Technical Abstract
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